Democracy, regional autonomy and peace in Aceh by Sholeh, Badrus
Democracy, Regional Autonomy and Peace in Aceh
by
Badrus Sholeh
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy 
Deakin University
November, 2015
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
ACCESS TO THESIS - A 
I am the author of the thesis entitled
Democracy, Regional Autonomy and Peace in Aceh
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
This thesis may be made available for consultation, loan and limited copying in 
accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.
'I certify that I am the student named below and that the information provided in the form is 
correct'
Full Name: Badrus Sholeh
Signed: 
Date: 03/11/2015 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
CANDIDATE DECLARATION 
Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code 00113B 
I certify the following about the thesis entitled Democracy, Regional Autonomy and 
Peace in Aceh
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
a. I am the creator of all or part of the whole work(s) (including content and layout) 
and that where reference is made to the work of others, due acknowledgment is 
given.
b. The work(s) are not in any way a violation or infringement of any copyright, 
trademark, patent, or other rights whatsoever of any person.
c. That if the work(s) have been commissioned, sponsored or supported by any 
organisation, I have fulfilled all of the obligations required by such contract or 
agreement.
I also certify that any material in the thesis which has been accepted for a degree or 
diploma by any university or institution is identified in the text.
'I certify that I am the student named below and that the information provided in the 
form is correct'
Full Name: Badrus Sholeh
Signed:
Date: 03/11/2015 
ii 
 
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the people whose contributions have made the completion of this thesis possible. Firstly, 
I owe heartfelt thanks to Damien Kingsbury, who has been kindly and patiently supportive of this 
research since the earliest period of my study. I also owe thanks to Baogang He, who spent his time to 
discuss some chapters – the most crucial part – which made the comparative studies of Aceh, Timor-
Leste and Southern Philippinesmore interesting. Thanks also to Sue Kenny, who suggested an early 
version of the draft.
Furthermore, I want to convey my sincere thanks to the many people I have met during my research in 
Aceh, Dili and Mindanao: Bang Fahmi and Bang Fuad Mardhatillah of Aceh Institute; Bang Nur Djuli 
and Bang Irwandi Yusuf; Teungku Djamaeka; and all former combatants. Thanks to Rufa of Mindanao 
State University, and to Pak Arif Abdullah Sagran of Dili, who assisted during my research in Mindano 
and Dili, respectively.
Special thanks to my parents, brothers and sisters. Very special and sincere thanks to Tia Mariatul 
Kibtiah, who inspired me and was supportive at all times. Also thanks to Dean Bahtiar Effendy and all 
my colleagues in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic 
University.
Finally, I want to convey my deepest sincere thanks to Ruth Fluhr, who tirelessly edited this document 
and suggested very valuable improvements to the text.
Melbourne/Jakarta, February 2015
iii 
 
Abstract
The thesis examines the dynamics of democratisation and regional autonomy in Aceh, and the way in 
which these have contributed to peacebuilding since the Helsinki peace accord in 2005. The analysis 
undertaken in this thesis attempts to answer three questions. Firstly, to what extent can the implemented 
elections in 2012 and in 2014 in Aceh explain peaceful democracy with free and fair elections involving 
former combatants, local and national parties? The rise of violence before the elections worried analysts, 
who argued that killings, violent attacks and intimidation threatened the initiatives of peacebuilding. 
Security forces responded slowly and late to the rise of violence, due to a strong political interest in the 
attacks giving advantages to the Party Aceh. Even though most of the criminals – the killers and 
attackers – received penalties before the courts, the police failed to search for political motives behind 
the crimes. The violence caused friction among political and grassroots elites, especially between the 
members of the Party Aceh (PA) and the Aceh National Party (PNA). 
The second question is how regional autonomy based on the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), Law 
No. 11/ 2006 as an implementation of the Helsinki peace accord, works effectively to strengthen 
peacebuilding and prosperity in Aceh. Good communication between the local and central governments 
is crucial to ensure that the regional autonomy policy is positive towards economic development and 
peace in Aceh. This thesis argues that the increase in the disbursement of funds derived from local 
government revenues resulting from fossil fuel resources is a great contribution to prosperity and 
development in Aceh. However, mismanagement and corruption in local government have challenged a 
comprehensive effort aimed at peace and economic development. 
Lastly, the thesis aims to investigate how the pivotal lessons learned in Aceh with regard to post-conflict
transition can translate to other Southeast Asian conflict zones – in particular Timor-Leste, the southern 
Phillippines and southern Thailand. The thesis argues that the achievement of democracy and peace in 
Aceh has an important inspirational role to play in strengthening the process of conflict resolution and 
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the transition to democracy in post-war and post-conflict regions, in Southeast Asia particularly and in 
the wider world. 
This thesis is based on fieldwork in Aceh, Timor-Leste and Mindanao in the southern Philippines, from 
2010 to 2014, comprising interviews with local leaders, parliamentary members and human rights 
activists from government and civil society. The theoretical underpinning of the research methodology 
rests on international relations theory; in particular, the theories of realism, liberalism and multilateralism 
are consulted. In addition, democratic peace theory is examined to understand the proper structuring of 
institutions relevant and necessary to conflict transition and the preservation of peace through 
liberalisation and democratisation.
The thesis concludes that, in general, democratic peace has been implemented reasonably well in Aceh
and the province shows positive signs of continuing peace and democracy. However, a crucial and 
urgent factor in realising Aceh’s complete transition from a former conflict zone will be the provision of 
meaningful work for the Acehnese people, many of whom have never known a life other than that of a 
combatant. Such provision will depend on the continuing support of the central government and the 
international community, particularly foreign investors. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction:Aceh History, Conflict and Development
Introduction
This thesis will focus on the study of post-conflict Aceh, especially with regard to four main
issues: firstly, the way in which the practice of democracy strengthens peace efforts in Aceh; 
secondly, the way in which the implementation of the law in regional autonomy, as reflected 
in the Law on Governing Aceh Number 11/2006, supports development and peace; thirdly,
the role of international states and civil society organisations in both the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of Aceh after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, and the reintegration of 
combatants after the peace accord in Helsinki; and lastly, the effects of peace and 
development in Aceh onpeacebuilding initiatives in Southeast Asia. 
It argues that cooperation between the Acehnese people, local government, central 
government and international community has greatly contributed to peacebuilding and 
economic development since the Helsinki peace accord. Furthermore, the inclusiveness of 
democratic institutions, including political parties, parliament and government, is strategic to 
creating a permanent peace in Aceh. However, the existence of poverty and violenceis 
challenging to the preservation of peace, which still requires stronger coordination between 
the regional and central governments. According to statistics for 2014, the percentage of poor 
people living in rural Aceh is about 20 per cent, amost double the national average of 11
percent (Statistics of Indonesia, 2014; seeFigure 1.1). At present, a decade after the Helsinki 
peace accord, Aceh province is still the poorest province in Sumatra. Buchelard (2014) 
criticised this state of affairs: “after US$7.7 billion in foreign reconstruction funds has been 
spent, Aceh is still one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia”. Aceh is challenged by 
corruption and the mismanagement of local government policy. Buchelard (2014) arguedthat 
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“millions of dollars in foreign donations which flowed into Aceh after the Boxing Day 
tsunami a decade ago disappeared into the pockets of the province’s new political elite... 
Some money also went to build projects that are now empty, unused and decaying”.Leonard 
McCarthy, the World BankVice-President, statedthat “fraud and corruption represent a major 
threat to development work particularly when implementing projects in post-disaster and/or 
post-conflict situations” (World Bank 2014).To understand the current political 
anddevelopmental dynamics of Aceh, this chapter will consider the history of politics, 
separatist movements and conflicts in Aceh and assess the importance of theAceh regionvis-
à-vispresent-day Indonesia. 
Prior to the entry of European colonialism to the Southeast Asian region in the 15th 
century,Indonesiahad a long and intricate history.As a diverse archipelago of over 17,000 
islands, centralfeaturesof this history included strong kingdoms andsultanates, some of 
which,by conducting regional diplomacy often linked to their security,reached the zenith of 
power and authority within the region, while some engaged with international super powers.
Moreover,rich natural resourcesand attractive spices enabled them to establish trade 
agreements lasting for long periods.Additionally, the inter-island migration of the people, 
who displayed a rich diversity of cultures, religions and ethnicities, laid the foundation for the 
diversity that is a central feature of Indonesia today.
Religion has always played a central role in the Indonesian archipelago. Buddhism and 
Hinduism werepeacefully replaced by Islam in the 14thcentury through Arab traders 
(Ricklefs 2001; Reid 2006). Muslim kingdoms were well established before the arrival of 
European colonialism in the region several centuries later. Based on the most reliable 
evidence for the spread of Islam in the Malay world, which consists of Islamic inscriptions 
(mostly tombstones) and traveller’s accounts (Ricklefs 2001: 4), the first Muslim kingdom 
was established in a region in Lamreh, Aceh Besar. The gravestone of Sultan Sulaiman bin 
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Abdullah bin al-Basir, who it has beenestimated died in 1211, was foundin the graveyard of 
Lamreh, Aceh Tengah. The Venetian traveller Marco Polorecounted onhis way home from 
China in 1292 that Perlak was a Muslim town near Pasai and Samudra (Ricklefs 2001: 4). By 
the 17th century, the development of Islam was welldocumented and the majority of the 
population of the archipelago had accepted theculture and identity of Islam (Lee 2004: 88). 
The form of Islam that was adopted in the region – Islamic Sufism – was different to that
established in the Arab world andheavily influenced by the local culture.Itwas embraced 
peacefully by the society of the archipelago,a culture influenced by Buddhism and 
Hinduism,where animism was still practised in some areas. An intercultural dialogue between 
local values and Middle Eastern Islam emerged in Aceh. In the 16th century, Aceh was a
centre of Islamic intellectualism in the Malay world, an environment in which Islamic Sufism 
developed very well. This development can be traced in Hikayat Aceh,which often mentions 
the practice of Islamic Sufism and religious mysticism. 
Two great Acehnese scholars of the Malay world – +DP]DK)DQVǌULGDQG6KDPVDO-
'ƯQ ELQ ‘$EG $OOƗK DO-6XPDWUƗQƯ G ) – fostered the development of Islamic 
Sufism.They developed a very popular tradition of Sufism, the wahdah al-wujud (the unity of 
being). )DQVǌULSURGXFHGa book on Sufism, $VUƗUDO-’$ULIƯQ(the secrecy of wise people), and 
al-6XPDWUƗQƯSXEOLVKHGJawhar al-+DTƗLT(the essential nature of realities). Sufists or tarekat 
were influential propagandists of Islam in the early period of Muslim kingdoms in this 
region. In the 19th and 20th centuries, this tradition was communicated via Islamic boarding 
schools, known locally as Pesantren and Dayah (Howell 2001).There now are hundreds of 
Dayah established in Aceh which strongly influence the social and political fabric of Aceh. In 
the 2014 elections, the Dayahcommunity founded the Aceh Peace Party, which only won one 
seat in the DPRA(Aceh Provincial Legislative Council). However, the presence of Dayahin 
almost all parts of Aceh has produced informal leaders who are influential in shaping the 
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Acehnese character. In addition, the intellectualism of the Acehnese is growing now through
thepublication of books on a variety of issues relating to history, science, Islamic law, 
economics and politics.
The assimilation of theIslamic Arab culture into the local culture later transformed moderate 
Sunni Muslims in Indonesia. Due to variouslevels of Islamisation, one region is differentto 
another. The Sultanates in north-east Sumatra, especially in the coastal areas, displayed an
Islamised Acehnese culture. In the 16th century,they were the stronghold of Muslims in this 
area who,during the clash of civilisations that occurred in that period, defended Aceh against 
European colonial forces. Alfian (2006) described the spirit of Jihad (holy war)1 of the 
Acehnese against the European forces. The significance of this spirit cannot be underplayed,
as it later formed the narrative foundations of the Acehneserebelmovements in opposition to 
the central government after Indonesian independence. They claimed the Indonesian central 
government wasoppressing the Acehnese,just as European colonial forces had oppressed 
Indonesia for the past three centuries.
It is important to reflect on the religious and cultural history ofthe past to understand current 
socio-politics;ininterpreting the current political dynamics of Aceh, He and Reid (2004:1) 
state:“the boundaries of the past must determine present choices of national boundaries and 
identities”. The religiosity of the Acehnese in the past has contributed to the development of 
the current democratisation, a general trend thathas beenechoed throughout Indonesia; this 
process is strongly influenced by the character of Indonesian Islam, which is moderate and 
tolerantand, as previously stated, quite different from the form of Islam developed in the Arab 
world. 
                                                          
1Ulama(Islamic leaders) consider fighting against the oppressor and the colonial government as part of Jihad 
(holy war). When the Dutch attempted to return to Indonesia in 1946, Kyai Haji Hasyim Asy’ari delivered a 
decree, Resolusi Jihad (Resolution of Holy War), which greatly benefited the spirit of Indonesian Muslims in the 
defence of newly independent Indonesia.  
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In spite of each regionof Indonesia displaying distinctive characteristics, Indonesian Muslims 
have entered into international political diplomacy in the interests of Muslims worldwide.
After World War II, on 17 August 1945, Indonesia established itsindependence. As a newly
independent state, the Indonesian government was challenged by thediversity of its citizens
and especially by the political expressions of some regions, which wanted special autonomy 
to develop their particular cultures, identities, religious expressionand political structures.
The weak structure and capacity of the new Indonesian military allowed the continuation of 
self-protection for villages and districts in Indonesia. It is clear thatwhen the Dutch attempted 
to return to colonise Indonesia in 1948, local paramilitary forces took control to save their 
own regions from the return of colonialism; in West Java and Aceh, local 
paramilitariessuccessfully protected people from the infiltration of the Dutch forces. 
Aceh is the westernmost province of Indonesia and is distinct and unique compared to the 
rest of the country –“the historical and cultural distinctiveness of the Acehnese made the 
region a peculiar political problem for the Central Government to face, especially in the year 
immediately after independence” (Sjamsuddin 1985: 1). Aceh played a significant part in the 
national revolution, providing financial support and fighters against the Dutch.Furthermore, 
historians consider that Aceh has been the gate of Islam in the region since the 9th century
(Hadi 2010). Its traditional name, Verandah of Mecca, also signifies that the region used to be 
an important venue for Muslim pigrims before their departure to Mecca to make the Haj (or 
pilgrimage – the fifth of the adult Muslim duties). It was also,in its early history, a meeting 
point for international traders from the Middle East, Europe and Asia. After independence, 
President Sukarno worked to gain significant Acehnese support in the early period of his 
government. Acehnese businesspeople bought two presidential planes for Sukarno’s
government and also donated gold for building a national monument in Jakarta, popularly 
called Monas.Aceh is rich in mineral, oil and gas resources which have been continually 
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exploited since the period of the New Order. The Acehnese felt disrespected and exploited by 
the central government. Sjamsuddin stated:
The fact that the Central Government had been acquiescent towards them in its 
most difficult time during the national revolution and that they were forgotten 
after independence had been attained was resented by the Acehnese. They felt 
disdained, since their provincial status was dissolved and their religious values 
were disregarded by incoming government officials. This aroused a strong 
sense of regionalism which eventually stirred the people into a bloody 
rebellion (Sjamsuddin 1985: 3). 
Due to disappointment at theunfair policies adopted in Jakarta in terms ofpolitics and the 
exploitation of natural resources in Aceh, separatist movements were established. The first of 
these was Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, headed by Daud Berueuh. It was carried 
onby Tengku Hasan Mohammad di Tiro, popularly called Tengku Hasan Tiro,who 
establishedthe Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) and Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM);both organisations hadthe aim of the separation of Aceh from the Republic of 
Indonesia.
Tiro considered the central power in Indonesia “colonialist”and“Javanese”. These labels 
contain the anger he expressed with regard tothe exploitation of Acehnese natural resources,
which he claimed did not result indirect advantages and prosperity for theAcehnese people.
Some scholars have argued that Tiro’s shift to leading rebels was mainly due to his failure to 
win a tender for anoil project in north Aceh. However, Acehnese scholars have opposed this 
argument, claiming that Tiro’s leadership ofrebellious movementswaspurely his personal 
commitment to fully supporting the dignity of Aceh (Hamzah 2014). His position displayed a
purely ethno-nationalistinterest in opposition to the dominance of the central government 
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overAcehnese interests. During the inauguration of the ASNLF in Aceh on 4 December 1976, 
Tiro, Chairman of ASNLF and Head of the State of Aceh, declared:
The Javanese, nevertheless, are attempting to perpetuate colonialism,
which all the Western colonial powers had abandoned andthe entire world 
had condemned. During these last thirty years, the people of Acheh, 
Sumatra, have witnessed how our fatherland has been exploited and driven 
into ruinous conditions by the Javanese neo-colonialists: they have stolen 
our properties; they have robbed us ofour livelihood; they have abused the 
education of our children; they have exiled our leaders; they have put our 
people in chains of tyranny, poverty and neglect: the lifeexpectancy of our 
people is 34 years and is decreasing–compare this to the world standard of 
70 years, which is increasing! The whole of Acheh, Sumatra, has been 
producing revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese 
neo-colonialists, which they have used totally for the benefit of Java and 
the Javanese (Damanik 2010: 131).
As an official statement of his declaration of Acehneseindependence, Tiro’s powerful and 
direct claim was readilyaccepted by the Acehnese; theyresponded eagerly to his call to arms 
against the central government of Indonesia, especially the veterans and Daud Bereueh’s
Darul Islamsympathisers.
To overcome the separatist movements, the Indonesian government attempted to implement
various policies with varying degrees of severity. However, diplomatic overtures towards a 
peaceful settlementwerealso initiated,from the time of President Sukarno to President 
Yudhoyono’s governments. Jokowi and Kalla’s government policiessincethe 2014 elections 
continue to preserve peace in Aceh by preventing violence and prioritising stability and peace 
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in the same waythat Yudhoyono’s government managed violence approaching the 2012 and 
2014 elections in Aceh. 
Significantly, it was only after the tsunami and earthquake in December 2004thata peaceful 
diplomatic agreement was able to be succcessfuly managed. GAM and the Republic of 
Indonesia signed a peace agreement mediated by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari
and supported by the European Union. Ahtisaari stated that it was one of the most successful 
peace accords he had been involved in. Many other peace agreements in Africa, the Middle 
East and Asian countries have failed to reach this level of success. Aceh is now a growing 
province in Indonesia,obtaining about seventy percent of its revenue from natural resources,
as signed by both parties in Helsinki. 
Former separatist GAM members and commanders have participated actively in local politics 
by establishing civil society organisations for peace and development, as well as founding 
political parties. Their representatives have successfully become governors, deputy 
governors, mayors, deputy mayors, heads of districts and chairpersons of local government 
strategic departments. Many of them are involved in farmingand trading at the local and 
national levels.Nur Djuli, who used to be a coordinator of GAM in Malaysia, founded 
Sekolah Demokrasi (Democratic School),which trains former combatants as active members 
of political parties and parliament. Djuli hopes the school will contribute toimproving the
social and political transition of former combatants. It is hard for some combatants to 
transform from military to civilian life; Djuli stated that they still function like military 
personnel in terms of discipline, punishmentand command of leadership (Nur Djuli, 
interviews in Banda Aceh, January 2011 ). The violence ofthe conflicts in 2006, 2009, 2012 
and 2014 was a product ofthe challenge for them to transform to civilian life. Nevada (2012), 
an Acehnese scholar, argues that povertyisuppermost among the problemsfaced byformer 
combatants, who find it difficult to work after reintegration. The small funds they were 
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granted after reintegration were not enough for productive work and they still find it difficult 
to fulfill their basic needs. Aceh is one of the five poorest provinces in Indonesia. The current 
poverty rate in the province is around 19 percent, much higher than the average poverty rate 
of 12 percent in the rest of Indonesia. 
Violence in Aceh is part of the adjustmentinvolved in post-conflict transition. Law and order 
are important for the transition. Galtung (1995) argues that the ruleoflaw is a crucial factor in 
managing violence after the conflict.The absence of the ruleoflaw will lead to more violent 
conflicts.Furthermore, the political and socio-economic transition of post-conflict regions 
needsnot only supportfrom the central government, but also the continuinginvolvement of the 
international community.International organisations and governments granted billions of
dollars for the transition of Aceh after the peace agreement. They then withdrew from Aceh 
once their reconstruction and rehabilitation projects had finished. Currently, the central 
goverment of Indonesia continues to fund the transition to peace; itconsiders Aceh’s
peacebuilding and security strategic for Indonesian international diplomacy. 
Aceh has connections withinternational organisationsfor a variety of reasons. Firstly, the 
Aceh peace accord was mediated in Helsinki, facilitated by the European Union. EU 
members were supported by ASEAN, the USA and other countries incontinuing to monitor 
the transition of Aceh and the way in whichthe central government of Indonesia treats
Acehpolitically and developmentally. Every election at the local and national levelsis
monitored officially by such international representatives; this is different to election 
monitoring inother provinces in Indonesia. Some of these countries also continue to fund 
education, peacebuilding and development projects.The Australian government, through 
AusAID, and the US government, through USAID, currently fund education projects in 
Aceh. 
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Secondly, the Acehnese diaspora is spreading all over the world. Antje Missbach (2012) 
arguedthat people from Aceh tightly maintain their unity, solidarity, ethnicity and 
networkingoverseas. They are “diplomats”for Aceh who are influential inthe international 
image and diplomacy of Indonesia. Many Acehnese migrated overseas during the conflicts 
and married with local people in Europe, the USA, Australia and Asian countries. They 
continue to monitor peace, security and development in Aceh. Many of them have invested in 
Aceh and recruited fellow Acehnese to study and work overseas. The spirit of 
internationalisation is embedded in the blood of the Acehnese people. Avoinus(2007) 
arguedthat this is the reason the Acehnese have cosmopolitan spirits:they belong to the world. 
The central government has to understand this in order to manage an effective policy for 
Aceh’s development and peacebuilding.Stability and security arepivotal aspects forAceh. The 
central government has changedits approachand polices for Aceh for the sake of stability and 
peace. Stability to some extent challenges the rule of law. During the violent attacks by 
former combatants leading up to the April 2012 gubernatorial elections, the central 
government failed to manage the violencethrough theruleoflaw. The Aceh police force 
wasnot capable of arrestingthe criminals due to pressureconnected with local politics. The 
central governmentchanged the voting date four times after pressure from Acehnesepolitical 
parties. The central governmentwill manage what Aceh wants as long as stability and security 
are preserved. From a long-term point of view, this is dangerous for Acehnese politics and 
development.
Anderson (2006) described the diversity of Indonesia as containing great potential tension 
due to the broad sense of national identities based on differing ethnicities.Any community 
with balanced proportions divided by religion and ethnicityhas the potential for social unrest.
The central government’s policy may appear unfair and discriminatorytowards local 
communities andthis may create the desire for protest and separatism. 
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Some have argued that the current conflicts and political violence in Indonesia and Southeast 
Asia are part of thecolonial legacy and have beenfosteredby post-
independencegovernments,like the Indonesian New Order or the government of the former 
Philippino president, FerdinandMarcos. During the colonial period, the colonial governments
created political policy by dividing local powers based on ethnic and religious rivalries. In the 
Moluccas, the Dutch government provided privileges to Christians and discriminated against 
Muslims. Many Christians were recruited into the Dutch military forces to pressure Muslim 
rulers who attempted to fight against the Dutch colonial government. Christian troops were 
also sent to other regions of Java and Sumatra as fighters against rebellious groups. The 
current antagonism towards Christians is rooted deeply in the colonial period. 
The character of violent paramilitary organisations,which contributed to the current formation 
of post-conflict and post-war governments,is also rooted in the colonial and post-colonial 
legacy. They utilised violence and intimidation as political strategies to gain maximum 
power. The former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) members involved in current violent attacks 
argue that their behaviour is a result of their experience during the New Order period, when
individuals and groups suspected ofbeing affiliated with GAM sufferedtorture and murderat 
the hands ofthe New Order military.This trauma has contributed to the violent nature of 
GAM in politics. They fight against the individuals and groups who oppose their political 
(and economic) agenda. They have even attacked and killed former GAM district 
commanders and field leaders who were critical of the leadership of former GAM members 
represented in Aceh political parties. The establishment of the Aceh National Party by the 
former GAM spokesperson and former governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf, is not regarded as 
representing GAM. The paramilitary movement’ssupport for current political parties in Aceh 
and Indonesia is acolonial legacy from whenthe paramilitary was the backbone of politicsand 
also the business sector.
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After the colonial period, Southeast Asian regions experiencedmany conflicts and wars. 
Minority ethnic or religious groups in some countries fought for self-determination
andproposed separate states. Some regions where a Muslim sultanate had been in placefor 
centuries before the arrival of the colonising forces proposed special rights based on astrong 
Islamic identity. The southern Philippines and Aceh are among these regions.
Aceh has hadseveralperiods of conflict since the 1950s. This thesis focuses on democratic 
transition and the transformation of combatants in Aceh,in comparison withdemocratic 
transition in post-conflict regions in other parts of Southeast Asia, in particular in Timor-
Leste (East Timor), the southern Philippines and southern Thailand. The comparison is 
intended to establish understanding of how former combatants and insurgents in Southeast 
Asia have kept contactwith each other since the period of war and conflict into the period of 
democratisation and peacebuilding. Analysisof their contact and shared experiences of 
democratisation and peacebuilding isinteresting and instructive. As they are from the same 
regions of Southeast Asia, their perspectives can inform initiatives forstability and security 
across the region. 
Surin Pitsuwan (2013), former foreign minister of Thailand and former secretary-general of 
ASEAN, stated that the longstanding experience of peace and conflict resolution of Southeast 
Asian countries strengthens the initiatives of the peacekeeping bodiesinside ASEAN. 
Pitsuwan argued that ASEAN has learned from itsfailure to assist withsecurity and political 
transition in East Timor after the result of the referendum,which was regarded by the 
Indonesian government as negative and itsuspected the role of international bodies in 
supporting the East Timorese in their bid to separate from Indonesia. The Indonesian 
government believed from its intelligence analysis that most East Timorese preferred to stay 
integrated with Indonesia. According to Pitsuwan (2013), Indonesia was reluctant to have 
Australia chairing theprocess of security and political transition in East Timor.In this period, 
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the Indonesian–Australian political relationship was at a low level. Indonesia doubted that 
Australia wouldsupport regional and international stability and peace initiatives supported by 
experienced peace actors like Jusuf Kalla, Jose Ramos Hortaand Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono.
The experiences of these leaders for peacebuilding and peacemaking were significant forthe
establishment of a strong foundation forpeace in Southeast Asia and for themaintainence 
ofstability and peace in Southeast Asian and international regions. They were able to take an 
active role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Kalla hadan important role in the 
peace agreements between Muslims and Christians resulting from the Eastern Indonesian 
conflicts, which left more than ten thousand people dead in the Moluccas and Poso from 1999 
to 2002. Kalla also took a central role in the Helsinki peace accord between GAM and the 
Republic of Indonesia in August2005. The agreements initiated by Kalla helped to stop the 
severe conflicts in the Moluccas, Poso and Aceh. He continued to take an active role in peace 
initiatives in the Middle East by visiting Palestine and Israel, and also visited Myanmar to
help stop violent clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in Karen.
Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia from 2004 to 2014, also contributed to 
peace agreements and peace negotiations in Southeast Asia and other international regions. 
The experience of Aceh peacebuilding and democratisation not only affected that particular 
region, but enabled individuals experienced in dealing with this peace negotiation toattempt
to initiate peace in other Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern regions. Yudhoyono
highlighted the significant effects that the achievement of peace in “a small town” in 
Indonesia can have on peacebuilding in other regions (Yudhoyono 2014).
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Population, Conflict and Poverty
The population in Aceh province in2013 stood at4,791,924. Most Acehnese (about 46.53%) 
work in the primary sectors ofagriculture, plantations, fishery, forestry and labouring– areas 
of the workforce which can accommodate a lot of workers. Education is a strategic issue 
needingattention. The Acehnese people found ithard to devote themselves to study due to the 
violent conflicts they experienced for more than thirty years, from 1970 to 2005. By 2013, the 
proportion of people graduatingfrom elementary school and junior high school and also 
droppingout of elementary school had risen to unprecedented levels. About 47.83% of the 
Acehnese had graduated from elementary and junior high school,while 19.55% had failed to 
graduate or were still studying at elementary school (Statistics Aceh 2014: 54 and 66). A
further challenge is the high percentage of people living inpoverty. Although it has been 
almost ten years since thepeace accord, the percentage of those experiencing poverty in Aceh 
in2014 wasalmost double the national average –18.5% compared to 11.47%. 
The number of poor people in Aceh fluctuated between 2000 and 2014. Historically, on
average, the number of poor people in Aceh has beenmuch lower than the national level. 
However, the number of poor people in rural Aceh doubled from 595,100 (16.78%) in 2000
to 1,156,200 (32.57%)in 2004, but decreased significantly to881,260 (20.52%) in 2014. The 
conflicts after the New Order depleted theAcehnese economy and the peak of conflict 
between 2002 and 2004 contributed significantly tothe higher poverty rate. The Acehnese
economy recovered after the Helsinki peace accord in 2005, with the active involvement of 
international donors after the deadly earthquake and tsunami and the subsequent reintegration 
programs. 
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Table 1.1: Percentages and Numbers of Poor People in Urban and Rural Areas in Aceh and 
Indonesia from 2000 to 2014
Year 
Urban 
(%) 
Rural 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Provincial 
Total in 
Thousands 
National 
Total in 
Millions 
2000 10.45 16.78 15.20 19.14 595.10 38.74 
2002 20.09 33.06 29.83 18.20 1,199.90 38.39 
2004 17.49 32.57 28.37 16.66 1,156.20 36.15 
2006 19.22 31.98 28.28 17.75 1,149.70 39.30 
2008 16.67 26.30 23.53 15.42 892.87 34.96 
2014 11.76 20.52 18.05 11.47 881.26 28.55 
Source: (Statistics Indonesia 2014)
The percentage of those living in poverty in Aceh was only lower than the national average 
just after the collapse of the New Order. The central government attempted to restructure the 
economy, which impacted onthe poverty level of many people. Sang-Hwa studied the social 
aspects of the economic crisis in Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea,statingthat “a
considerable proportion of the middle classes disappeared” during the financial crisis (Sang-
Hwa 2007: 197). In 2000, the number of Acehnese living under the poverty line was595,100 
or 15.20%, compared to the national level of 19.14% (Figure 1.1; Table 1.1). Given the 
instability of thegovernment of President Abdurrahman Wahid, economic recovery worked 
very slowly. The growth of the economy increased steadily after themore stable government 
of President Megawati Sukarnoputri was instituted. 
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In contrast, the Acehnese were struck by increasinglysevere economic problems due to the 
continuation of violent conflict, even duringthe peace negotiations from 2000 to May 
2003,which did not have support from the military. Thesenegotiationswere deadlocked on 17 
May 2003, when Zaini Abdullah, the head of the GAM delegation, refused to accept the three 
conditions of agreement,namely that: “Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) would remain a 
part of Indonesia; that Aceh would be given special autonomy; and that GAM had to lay 
down its arms” (Priyono 2003: 537).
Soon after,President Megawati signed Presidential Decree No. 28/2003 and military 
emergency status was implemented as of 19 May 2003. The military emergency status 
created more victims among theAcehnese and the economicsector became frozen. During this 
period, the percentage of poverty wasvery high – more than thirty percent – especially in 
rural villages, where clashes between the Indonesian military and GAM commonly occurred.
Figure 1.1.showsthat, at this time, the percentage of poor people in rural areasreached its
peak, risingto 33.06% in 2002 and still 31.98%in 2006. Two years after the 2006 
gubernatorial election, the poverty rate decreased slightly to26.30% in 2008.
Thishigh level of poverty was due to the instability of the security situation and the political 
climate, which affected the economic activity of the people of Aceh, who had lost their 
chance to work, especially in rural villages where people potentially became victims of the 
conflicts. Human Rights Watch reported that “the sharp rise in human rights violations since 
martial law started may in part be attributedto this increase in daily contact between soldiers 
and villagers. The increased village presence apparently aims to limit the material and moral 
support of the local population for GAM” (Human Rights Watch 2003: 15). In addition, it 
was stated that “since the start of martial law, Indonesian security forces have carried out an 
unknown number of extra-judicial executions of unarmed civilians in Aceh” (Human Rights 
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Watch 2003: 18). The declaration of martial law declaration contradicted the message of 
peace of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). Kingsbury said:
The CoHA was seen by many observers as holding some hope of movement towards 
peace for Aceh, but it had been clear all along, as with the previous cease-fire, which 
it engineered at the final meeting in Tokyo on 19 May 2003. The legitimacy of 
Indonesian incorporation of Aceh was not assisted by the declaration of martial law 
from May 2003 until May 2004 (a state of emergency being declared thereafter), and 
most observers agreed that it would have the opposite effect of further alienating the 
Acehnese, particularly young Acehnese, from Indonesia (Kingsbury 2006: 13). 
Figure 1.1. Percentages of Urban and Rural Poor People in Aceh from 2000 to 2014
Source: (Statistics Indonesia 2014)
Democratisation and peacebuilding arestill challenged by a high rate of poverty in post-
conflict Aceh. By 2012, there were21.97% or 737,240 Acehnese livingunder the poverty line. 
Even though the level of poverty is still currently the highest in Sumatra and the fourth 
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highest in Indonesia, the Acehnese people participatedenthusiasticallyin the 2012
gubernatorial elections. Compared to other post-conflict and conflict regions, Aceh 
performed the best when compared to Maluku, Papua and West Papua, which had 291,760 
(28.88%), 932,20 (40.56%) and 216,000 (37.73%) of poor people respectively in 2012 
(Figure 1.2). Like Aceh, Maluku experienced bloody conflicts. Forthe Acehnese and 
Malukans, their experience of violence in the past still impactson current economic 
development. On the other hand, Papua and West Papua still have problemsassociated with 
separatist conflict. Investigation of the relationship between economic development and 
conflict reveals that violent conflicts decrease economic growth. It was stated that “violent 
conflicts affect the economic status of individuals and households through the intensity and 
types of violence they set in motion. Processes of violence impact on the economic status of 
households through the direct and indirect transformations they entail” (Justino 2011: 9). 
Figure 1.2. Numbers and Percentages of Rural Poor People in Post-Conflict and Conflict 
Indonesia in March 2012
Source: (Statistics Indonesia 2012)
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The most vulnerable groups in relation to violent conflicts in Indonesia, as everywhere, are 
women and children. Military operations after the deadlock of the peace agreement between 
the government and GAM in May 2003 left more severely affected victims, especially 
women and children, in rural villages and IDP camps, where facilities were limited 
(Kamaruzzaman 2006). 
Research Method
To examine the post-conflict dynamics in Aceh, the thesis has combined methodologies from 
a range of social science research, particularly international relations, political science and 
development studies. In international relations, Long has argued that:
the study of international relations (IR) is interdisciplinary … Identifying 
the ways in which IR is interdisciplinary highlights the broad and diverse 
character of our subject, helps to identify and specify the oft-neglected 
contrast between international relations and international politics, and 
relocates the academic study of international relations within a wider milieu 
of international studies (IS) (Long 2011: 31).
International relations discusses issues of foreign policy, international conflict, regional 
security, peacekeeping, international organisations, climate change, disaster management, 
and war and peace. This thesis examines international organisations like the EU and ASEAN 
in monitoring peace implementation in Aceh, the initiatives of regional peace efforts in 
Mindanao, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand, and Indonesian foreign policy 
strategy in overcoming war and conflict in the Middle East and Asia.
In addition, as an interdisciplinary research area, international relations also discusses peace 
research. According to Harle, “peace research (PR) was born in the 1950s in North America 
and Western/Northern Europe … PR emerged as criticism of the traditional study of foreign 
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policy where realist scholars advocated the use of military force in guarding the national 
interests of states” (Harle 2011: 108). Drulӽk (2011) agreed, stating that peace research is an 
important subject in international relations:“the study of war and peace used to be seen as a 
disciplinary core providing a clear identity for the study of international relations (IR) in the 
twentieth century, making IR a discipline separate from political science and other areas of 
social inquiry” (Drulӽk 2011: 228). However, war is not only found within the study of 
international relations. Drulӽk (2011) added that war has also been broadly discussed by 
political philosophy and a number of specialised social sciences such as sociology, political 
science, psychology, anthropology, demography and political economy.
Political science methodology provides an approach to examine various issues such as 
political parties, elections, democracy, political behaviour of voters and political violence. In 
understanding the elections held in Aceh and Indonesia after the collapse of the New Order, 
political science methodology guides us in analysing the dynamics of these politics. 
Understanding current political trends requires reflection on the history that led to the 
construction of political entities. For example, both the Party Aceh and the Aceh National 
Party claim to continue the ideals of Hasan di Tiro in establishing a strong identity for the 
Acehnese people in terms of religious, cultural and economic aspects. 
Aceh’spast provides crucial lessons with regard to stepping towards a prosperious and 
peaceful Aceh. In the 2012 election campaigns, parliamentary and gubernatorial candidates, 
especially former separatist combatants, reminded the Acehnese people of the struggle to 
establish their dignity in the past in the face of security pressuresfrom the Indonesian army. 
Now they live in a peaceful environment, which needs a different approach – to struggle for 
economic development and the continuation of peacebuilding. This is how international
relations and political science contribute different aspects to understanding the dynamics of 
Aceh after the conflict. 
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In addition, this thesis examines case studies of Aceh post-conflict and comparative studies of 
Aceh and Southeast Asian post-conflict and conflict regions. Hague and Harrop (2013: 361) 
argued that case studies “combine a qualitative investigation of a specific topic, using all the 
techniques appropriate for that subject, with a link to wider themes in the study of politics”.
Hague and Harrop (2013: 364) add that “case studies are the building blocks from which we 
construct our understanding of the political world”. In addition, a comparative methodology 
“broadens our understanding of the political world, leads to improved classifications, and 
gives potential for explanation and prediction” (Hague and Harrop 2013: 364). Comparative 
studies of Aceh, Timor-Leste, Mindanao and southern Thailand include aspects of 
comparative politics and international relations. 
Galtung argues that conflict and peace studies should not adopt anyone specific approach;
several approaches should be combinedin the social sciences in order to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the subject of conflict (Galtung 2009: 511). In its analysis,
this thesis adoptsa comparative approach which draws on some “relevant cases across time 
and space” in Aceh Province and its districts, as well as elsewhere in Indonesia; it also draws
on some cases in Southeast Asia. A comparative approach is important in this analysis in 
gaining the benefit ofcontextual variation. In addition, achieving understanding of the 
processes and impact of decentralisation and democratisation in Aceh as a means to secure 
and maintain peace needs a comprehensive combination of studies in disciplines such as the 
political sciences, sociology and history, as the following table suggests:
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Table 1.2: Units of Variation, Observation and Measurement
Unit of Variation Unit of Observation Unit of Measurement
Democratisation States Available civil and political rights 
(Through elections and other democratic 
measurements)
Electoral volatility Elections Aggregate change of voters
Ideology Parties Contents of electoral programs
Social movement Organised groups Collective behaviour
Decentralisation Provinces and Districts Constitutional rights for regions
Adapted from (Pennings etal. 2006: 28).
Units of variation, observation and measurement, as shownin Table 1.2,are “linked together 
in actual research in comparative politics” (Pennings etal. 2006: 27). In the process of 
democratisation, the state (including both executive and legislature) is observed by measuring 
the availability of civil and political rights. The elections in Aceh from 2006 to 2011are
observed to discover the voting trends. To understand the ideology of the political parties, the 
electoral programs of the parties are observed and analysed. Organised groups, especially 
civil society organisations (CSOs), which grew significantly in Aceh after the peace 
agreement in 2005, are observed to registertheir collective behaviour. The province of Aceh 
and its districts are closely examined to analyse the process of decentralisation.Comparative 
methodsare employed in all the analyses.
Furthermore, the research methods assimilate some approaches of qualitative research –case 
studies, grounded theory, ethnography and action science – which form“the four methods 
most often followed in political science and management”(McNabb 2004: 348). Typical data-
gathering methods for case studies are: observation, personal interviews and organisational 
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studies. Grounded theory uses the methods of personal interviews, diaries and participant 
analysis (McNabb 2004: 349). Interviews and observations are significant “to learn and 
understand the underlying values of individuals and groups” (Pierce 2008: 45). The 
interviews are focused on the leaders of the political parties, government and CSOs. This 
includes focus group discussions with members of CSOs and the political community. 
Among the targeted respondents are: former GAM members;former leaders (commanders) of 
GAM; members of the Party Aceh;parliamentary members from provincial todistrict levels 
(Kabupaten); and local government officials of Aceh from provincial to district levels, like 
the governor, deputy governor, bupatiand related government heads. In addition, central 
government figures are interviewed,among them leaders of various ministries, TNI (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian armed forces)and Polri.
Furthermore, local, national and international NGOs are important respondents as well. 
Among them are: the Aceh Institute;Kontras;AusAID;USAID; UNDP; and other NGOs 
thathave contributed to supporting development and peace in Aceh. Interviewing the elites is 
a significant method used in this research. According to Johnson and Reynolds, “elite 
interviewing is the process of interviewing respondents in a non-standardised, individualised 
manner” (2005: 271). Among the respondents are the leaders of both local and 
nationalpolitical parties, civil society organisations (NGOs), paramilitary groups and 
representatives of regional (Aceh province and its districts) and central governments. 
For comparison with thepeace initiatives adopted in the southern Philippines and southern 
Thailand, similar approaches are implemented by interviewing the leaders of government as 
well as members of the community. The process underlying the achievement of peaceful 
democracy in Aceh is analysed in light of thesegroups of separatists –the Morro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) of the southern Philippines and groups fromsouthern Thailand. 
Comparisons of political development after conflictare alsomade with Cambodia and Timor-
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Leste. The independence movements of both Cambodia and Timor-Leste were supported by 
the international community; similarly in the case of Aceh, the EU, ASEAN and other 
countries were significant playersin reintegrating GAM into the Republic of Indonesia 
(Schulze 2007). The actions of the elites in relation to Indonesian decentralisation have been 
investigatedby some scholars. Among those investigations is the work ofHidayat and 
Firdausy (2003), who focused on the local stateelites in West Kalimantan and East Nusa 
Tenggara. 
For understanding the dynamics of Acehnese history, this thesis analyses written documents 
covering the processof peacebuilding in Aceh. Primary sources come from documents of the 
Indonesian government and GAM. Interviews with officials of the government and GAM, and 
a variety of Acehnese politicians, are also primary sources for this study. A survey of key 
persons and certain issues for Acehnese and Indonesian government authorities and CSOs in 
Aceh is conducted to strengthen the analysis of the study. 
The study can be divided into five parts:the first part is the history of the peace initiatives after 
the collapse of the New Order, where it is seen how the spirit of democracy at the national 
level influenced the peace process from 1999 until the agreement in Helsinkiin 2005.The 
second part concerns the dynamics of GAMduringthe period of its initial return, how the 
Acehnese and Indonesian authorities and people responded tothem, andhow, very importantly,
the accommodations and interactions between the parties in this period influenced the further 
peace process.The third part is a study of the dynamics of the processes occurring between the 
2006 and 2009 elections, how the Acehnese participated in the elections, and how the strong 
commitment of the Acehnese and Indonesian governmentsto the peace process can be seen 
from the conduct of electoral democracy.The fourth part, in which the policies of the Acehnese 
and Indonesian governments in the arenas of the economy and politicsare examined,analyses
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the role of local government policy in relation to both the peace process and economic 
development.The final part examines the role of the international community in the process of 
securing peace, democracy and economic development in Aceh, and how valuable such 
support might be from the perspective of establishing a model for resolving other conflicted
regions in the world. 
This thesis is based on interviews with more than thirty individuals. Most of the respondents 
are former GAM members who worked for Party Acehand Aceh Transitional Council (KPA)
and local commanders in Banda Aceh, Pidie, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Tengah, 
BenerMeriah, Takengon, Aceh Barat Daya and Meulaboh, from December 2010 to August 
2014. Among the respondents are:Bupati; vice Bupati;members of parliament;heads of the 
KPA, Party Aceh leaders, and former local commanders and members of GAM. Additional 
respondents are local intellectuals and NGO activists. The interviews are supported by an 
analysis of the local media in Aceh; further research, conducted in Jakarta, consists 
ofinterviews with members of parliament from Aceh and some related ministries involved in 
the management of the political and economic development of Aceh. 
Filling the Gaps
This study contributes to fillingthe gaps in the discourse on political development in Aceh 
since the peace agreement. Particularly, it addresses how GAM has been able to transform 
from a violent political movement into a peaceful one. GAM’s involvement in practical 
politics could have two potential impacts:firstly, it could utilise the ‘military’ power and the 
strategic advantages it possesses, such as itsunity and organisation, to form a strong political 
party;secondly, in the event that GAM dominates local politics in Aceh and tends towards
authoritarianism, then itsinvolvement in the political process would be counterproductive to 
the development of democratic politics in Aceh. A clash among various ethnic and political 
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groups would endanger peaceful democracy in Aceh, which would be very significant for the 
ongoing development of reconciliation.
This study also contributes to understanding the transformation of an organisation such as 
GAM from violent to peaceful, democratic politicsthrough its involvementin the direct 
elections in districts, provinces and the country. The transformation of the GAM elites has 
seen them become local political leaderswho are significantly challenged to show how they 
can lead local politics democratically. 
The Aceh peace agreement has been one of the most successful solutions for overcoming 
separatist conflicts in recent decades. Martii Ahtisaari said that the Aceh peace agreement has 
influenced many peace initiatives in conflict regions around the world. For example, attempts 
have been made by the Government of Thailand to reproduce the Aceh peace agreement in its 
dealings with Muslim separatist movements in the southern parts of the country. The 
delegation members of the Indonesian–Acehnese peace agreement have been invited by the 
Thai government to share their experience in overcoming conflict. This thesis discusses an 
analysis of the peace process in Aceh and compares this with attempts at reconciliation in 
other conflicted regions like Thailand. The success of the Aceh mediation process facilitated 
by the EU has “supported the idea of exploring different ways of peacefully resolving intra-
and interstate conflicts in ASEAN”, where southern Thailand and the southern Philippines 
are still trying to overcome separatist conflicts (Wandi 2010: 8). Lingga argued that there are 
lessons to be learned from the Aceh peace process that can be used for peace negotiations 
with MILF in the southern Philippines; such lessons can be useful in “conceptualizing 
creative approaches [in the context of the Philippines], which can be made possible by 
learning from past experiences” (Lingga 2007: 13). 
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The transformation of Aceh after the conflict has been very successful compared to the trends 
in politics that came after conflicts in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Africa.Aceh’s democratic 
transition exhibits peaceful participation as political leaders from former GAM combatants 
and other local and national parties. Concerns about the rise of threats of violence in relation 
to the December 2011 elections were that this would endanger the long process of 
peacebuilding in Aceh.An example of this was in Cambodia, where the peace agreement was 
followed by “recurring patterns of authoritarianism and rebellion” (Paris 2004: 88).
The political dynamics operating inAceh have provideda good model for other Indonesian 
regions as well. For example, the practice, following the 2006 elections,of 
nominatingindependent candidates for gubernatorial and district elections has been adopted in 
all Indonesian provinces, districts and cities. The spirit of local democracy and freedom of 
political expression are accommodated in the legal frameworkfor regional autonomy.Pieter 
Feith, the chief of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which brings together the EU and ASEAN 
to monitor the peace process, stated that “the new law on the Governing of Aceh could be a 
model for autonomy legislation for other parts of Indonesia. Local political parties, 
independent candidates, and a share in the management of Aceh’s vast natural resources are 
all part of the package”(Feith 2007: 5).
The underlying justification for this study rests on the belief that the process of political 
transition in Aceh needs to be continuously evaluated to ensure the continuity of peace. 
Reconciliation among political party leaders and all Acehnese leaders, as well as the 
relationship between the Aceh region and the central government, must ensure long-term 
peace. Democratisation and peacebuilding in Aceh are a test case for Indonesia and for the 
Acehnese people. Preservation of the dynamics of local democracy is vital to the future of a 
prosperous and peaceful Aceh, and political institutions need to be strengthened in order to 
support the peacebuilding process. 
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The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis examinesa range of strategic topics related to democratisation, decentralisation and 
peacebuilding in Aceh. The first chapter has coveredthe historical aspectsthatform the basis 
on which to understand current socio-politics in Aceh. As He and Reid state:“the boundaries 
of the past must determine present choices of national boundaries and identities” (He & Reid
20014: 1). Acehnese democratic participation after the Helsinki peace agreement has 
beenstrongly influenced by the religiosity operating in this region; in this context, Hefter 
(2000) considered that the current democratic participation of Indonesian Muslims 
isinfluenced by adaptation between aninternational religion and their local world. 
The second chapteris the theoretical framework, which rests on a discussion of international 
relations and development theory. In international relations theory, the realist concept of non-
interference and the liberalist notion of democratic peace are examined. In development 
theory, theories of peacebuilding and collective development are discussed in the context of 
the politicaldynamics operating in Aceh. 
The third chapter covers the dynamics of the 2012gubernatorial elections. The way in which 
the democratic processworkedin the 2012 elections – the second gubernatorial elections after 
the Helsinki peace agreement – is examined.The fourth chapter analyses the legislative and 
presidential elections conducted in 2014, which marked a strategic moment in keeping intact 
the peacebuilding process in Aceh. The frictions among former combatants seemed clearer in 
these elections, compared to the 2009 elections when combatants were united.
The fifth chapter covers the role of the international community in peacebuildingin Aceh,
especially the way in which the EU and ASEAN have beeninvolved in rehabilitation, 
reintegration and democratisation.International factors are significant for Acehnese who 
fought during the New Order period under control from overseas due to tight security in 
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Aceh. In this chapter, realist theoretical notions arecontested via an examination ofthe non-
interference approach of ASEAN in post-conflict and post-war transition.Realist
theorycontinuesto informa comparison between Aceh and Timor-Leste which is discussed in 
the sixth chapter. 
The last chapter, the conclusion, argues that the processes of democratisation, 
decentralisation and peacebuilding requiresome critical factors to ensure the future 
continuation of peace in Aceh:firstly, the democratic participation of the Acehnese in 
political and civic engagement is the most significant aspect in achieving a good standard of 
post-conflict democracy;secondly, in the decentralised system legally adopted in Aceh, some 
elements of the LoGA, in particular oil and gas revenue sharing, international investment and 
other rulesoflaw relating to the approach to security, are urgentlyand strategically important
and, in this context, it is vitally important that good, productive relations between Aceh and 
Jakarta are maintained;thirdly, international support in the areas of post-conflict democracy 
and development is still needed. 
Conclusion
War, conflict and violence in Aceh’s history have traumatised the Acehnese peopleand this is 
reflected in the current dynamics of politics, democratisation and economic development. In 
the 2012 and 2014 elections, discussed in further chapters, it issuggested that people prefer 
peace and security to democracy. Intimidation and violent attacks during the post-conflict 
transition traumatised the Acehnese and they continued to vote for the Party Aceh, a 
combatant party, to ensure the continuation of peace. However, to develop permanent peace,
freedom of expression should be guaranteed under the constitution for the future of 
democracy, development and prosperity in Aceh. 
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In addition, the history of Aceh has contributed to the construction of the identity of the 
Acehnese, which in turn has influenced current politics. There are at least two signs of how 
Aceh’s political identity reflects its history. Firstly, the strength of the arguments that allowed 
the establishment of a local party in Aceh resulted in the full expression of local identity in 
opposition to the centralisation of politics in Indonesia. Acehnese currently prefer to vote for 
their local party in order to communicate more closely with constituents and political parties. 
Secondly, symbolism dominates current politics in Aceh. Symbolism is expressed in the 
establishment of Islamic Shari’ahlaw (qanun syari’ah) as it relates to the Acehnese language 
and flag. However, the politics of symbolism present a new challenge to the restructuring of
relations between Aceh and Jakarta.The political dynamics are discussed in the further 
chapters on regional autonomy and the 2012 and 2014 elections.
The following chapter contains areview of the literature relating to the various strands of the 
topic under investigation.Thus it discusses documents, books, book chapters and journal 
articles in a bid to understand Aceh post-conflict, especially within the context of democracy, 
peacebuilding, regional autonomy and international engagement in conflict resolution and 
post-conflict development. 
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Multidimensional Perspectives on Aceh Post-Conflict 
Introduction
Analysts have concerned themselves greatly with the study of Aceh during and after the 
conflicts, adopting points of views originating from various disciplines such as history, 
anthropology, political science and international relations; for example, while Reid (2010) 
looks at Aceh from a historical perspective, Aspinall (2009) analyses Aceh from within the 
discipline of political science. Galtung (1995, 1996) argued that conflicts need a 
comprehensive analysisachieved by combining a number of methods and approaches. 
Galtung’s Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization 
(1996) provides a comprehensive analysis of non-violent resolution of conflict. Galtung has 
said that a multidimentional and holistic approach is required to anayse conflict (Galtung,
1996);he suggests that “the peace researcher must look for causes, conditions, and contexts in 
various spaces – Nature, Human, Social, World, Time, Culture. This transdisciplinary 
spectrum makes peace studies both challenging, difficult intellectually, and problematic in 
praxis” (Galtung, 1996, p. 1).In addition, Miall (2004) argues that understanding conflict
transformation requires multi-dimensional tasks, such as in Galtung’s multidimensional 
approach. Thus, this thesis combines a number of different approaches found in the research 
literature of international relations, political science and development studies. Discussion of 
the role of the EU and ASEAN in mediation and peace accord implementation employs 
international relations analysis, and the chapters on the 2012 and 2014 elections in Aceh are 
based on an analytical approach adopted in the area of political science. 
The literature relevant to this thesis yields five topics of investigation:(1) the history of 
conflict in Aceh,encompassing more than four decades of struggleagainst the central 
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government of Indonesia –that is, the early period of Indonesian independence up to the 
contemporary development of Aceh after the Helsinki accord – provides a strategic 
foundation on which to understand the political dynamics of Aceh; (2)the regional autonomy 
policy as an instrument used to overcome separatist conflicts is an interesting development of 
conflict resolution in Aceh, where special autonomy laws have been granted, particularly
after the collapse of the New Order–these laws inspired the drafting of the current Law on 
Governing Aceh Number 11/2006 which regulates the current political, economic and 
cultural environmentin Aceh;(3) the contributions of international states, multilateral 
organisations and civil society organisations tothe reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh 
after the tsunami and earthquake in 2004 and during the process of the reintegration of GAM 
combatants are central to the discussion–post-conflict Aceh continues to be acentre of interest 
for the great powers, especially the EU and ASEAN countries,whoseactive involvement in 
the Aceh Monitoring Mission aims to closely monitor the process of reintegration of 
combatants and the implementation of the Helsinki peace agreement;(4) democratisation and 
local politics in Aceh are interesting issues provoking ongoing discussion amongscholars
andthe analysis here focuses on the political dynamic in Aceh after the Helsinki accord,which
allowed the establishment of local parties in order to provide, for former combatants, freedom 
of local political participation not directly related to the politics controlled by national 
parties–the domination of the local partiesin both the 2009 and 2014 elections, in particular 
the Party Aceh, is interesting to analyse;(5) scholarly comparative studies have been made of 
Aceh and other conflict and post-conflict regions, such as Timor-Leste, the southern 
Philippines, southern Thailand and Sri Lanka, among others (Tan 2007; Miller 2012)–
however, this thesis focuses solely on a comparison of Aceh and Timor-Leste during their
political transitions, and Aceh and the southern Philippines during their processes of peace 
mediation and peace accord implementation (which to some extent adopted the Helsinki 
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MoU and LoGA). Thus, this literature review addresses questions of how democracy and 
peacebuilding in Aceh have been seenin the literature and specifies the way in which this 
thesis contributes to the literature documenting the study of democracy, regional autonomy 
and peacebuilding in Aceh. 
History and Development in Aceh
The dynamics of the current political situation in Aceh need to be understood through
reflecting on the history of identity and politics of Aceh five centuries ago, before the 
colonial period. The Acehnese people had always been successful inmaking strong 
partnerships with international powers. This pride in the history of Aceh was referred to by 
the founders of Darul Islam and GAM to legitimise their rebellions against the Indonesian 
government (Kell 1995).
The identity of the Acehnese has been well constructed since ‘the age of commerce’,which 
flowered in the 16th and 17th centuries. Aceh in the 17th century was “strong enough to 
develop some state nationalism based on military mobilization, dynastic pride and Islam”
(Reid 2010: 115). The Acehnese languages and ethnic identities of today are descended from 
that legacy of the age of commerce. Aceh was much stronger than other regions such as 
Makassar (conquered by the Dutch in 1669) and Banten (transformed into a client state by the 
Dutch in 1684), as well as Burma and Siam (old Thailand). The strength of the Aceh 
Sultanate at the beginning of the 17th century remained a focal point for pride and identity 
until 1874 (Reid 2010: 116). 
In his diary, Hasan Tiro, the founder of GAM, urged the Acehnese to fight against Indonesian 
military forces in order to defend the heritage of their Acehnese ancestors, who had
successfully fought against the Dutch. Tiro’s diary inspiredyoung combatants and other 
Acehnese to support the rebel movement, which he called Syaheed, the “holy war” (Tiro
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1984: 1). Tiro reminded his followers to be proud of their Acehnese identity, underlining the 
fact that they had never been colonised by any forces. They were encouraged by him to 
continue the legacy of their Acehnese ancestors for the pride of an independent Aceh (Tiro
1984).The state of Aceh proclaimed by Tiro is termed by Thaib (2002: 268)“a successor state 
to the old state of Acheh, occupying the same national territory, regulating itself under the 
same law, under the same constitution, and under the same one thousand-year-old flag”. The 
literature onthe separatist movements of Darul Islam and GAM, as well as their background 
of war against the central government, dominates further analysis. 
Studies of the rebel movements of Darul Islam and GAM have been discussed by several 
scholars including, most prominently:van Dijk (1981); Sjamsuddin (1985);Kell (1995);Thaib 
(2002);Miller (2009); and Aspinall (2009). These analysestake as their central themes the 
reasons for the rebellions and how the Acehnese managed their revolution against the central 
government. Van Dijk, Sjamsuddin, Kell and Thaib examined the movements during the 
authoritarian regime of the New Order. Their analyses were completed by Miller and 
Aspinall, who had the opportunity to observe and interview the leaders of the movements 
until their reintegration, soon after the 2005 Helsinkipeace agreement.This thesis fills the gap 
that exists in relation tohow former GAM members who are now involved in the structure of 
KPA (Aceh Transition Committee) and Party Aceh (PA)transformed from their military roles 
to achieve political participation. The interaction of former members of the rebellion and non-
GAM members in the political camp post-reintegration is analysed in later chapters of this 
thesis. 
Based on his fieldwork in Indonesia in 1973 and 1975, originally carried out for his 
dissertation at Monash University, Sjamsuddin’s book analyses the background of the 
Acehnese rebellion. He concluded that there were two main reasons for the rebellion –
“religious and regional dissatisfactions”, which were of “equal significance in constituting the 
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main motivations of the Acehnese leaders in their opposition against the Central 
Government”(Sjamsuddin 1985: 319).In addition, Kell (1995) has written on the Acehnese 
rebellion in the years 1989 to 1992,arguing that the overcentralisation of Acehnese
economics and politics by the New Order regime contributed to the rise of rebel groups. Kell 
said that “the natural riches of Aceh have been exploited for the benefit of the central 
government...while the province itself has gained relatively little”(Kell 1995: 53). 
Reid in An Indonesian Frontier the Acehnese & Other Histories of Sumatra (2005) discussed
how the Acehnese connected with the international community and resisted Dutch 
colonialism.In the updated edition, Reid reflected briefly on the prospect of conflict and 
peace in Aceh after the collapse of the New Order (Reid 2005: 350). As one of the scholars 
who for decadeshas dedicated his research to Sumatra and Aceh, Reid is at the forefront of 
scholarly investigation of the region and welcomes the rehabilitation of Aceh after the 
tsunami. He has visited Aceh many times and initiated an annual conference in Banda Aceh
which is very important for the development of peace and democracy. The introduction in 
one of his most important books reflecting on the future of Aceh after reintegration –
Verandah of Violence: the Background of the Aceh Problem (Reid 2006) –states that the 
Aceh problem needs to be understood from a multi-dimensional perspective: cultural, 
economic and political. This book originated from a conference held in Singapore in May
2004 concerning the process of peace and negotiations in Aceh. As a compilation of scholarly 
views on Acehnese history, conflict and security, this book discusses the problems of Aceh 
very comprehensively. 
After discussing conflicts and development in Aceh from ahistorical perpective, it is timely to 
look at regional autonomy, a policy which, in the context of peace studies, is strategic to 
overcoming conflicts and wars. Regional autonomy was introduced into the national political 
agenda in Aceh in 1999, after the rise of social violence. 
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Regional Autonomy 
Regional autonomy is a key instrument of peace efforts in Aceh, even though GAM refused 
to accept the term ‘regional autonomy’ in the Helsinki peace negotiations and proposed the 
term ‘self-governance’ (Kingsbury 2006; Awaludin 2009). Abdullah stated that GAM was 
overly concerned with the various policies enacted in Aceh by the central government in 
Jakarta, including special autonomy status granted in 2001, due to the continuation of 
military repression (Abdullah 2013).Djumala (2013) argued that the politics of 
decentralisation is the necessary first step towards conflict resolution in Aceh. 
Decentralisation, based on Law No. 22/1999, whichregulates the creation of regional 
autonomy, and Law No. 25/1999, regulating the fiscal balance of the autonomy,has 
authorised local government to develop all fields except defence and security, foreign policy, 
the legal system, monetary policy and religious affairs (Rasyid 2003). Rasyid stated that Law 
No. 22/1999 gives the “central government responsibility for national planning, the allocation 
of financial subsidies to the regions, the strengthening of national economic institutions and 
public administration, the promotion ofhuman resource development, the control of natural 
resource exploitation” (Rasyid 2003:69). 
The difference between regional autonomy and the government policy of the New Order is 
that “regional governance and modernization are no longer a matter of presidential command, 
as was the case before 1999, but of cooperation between government regions and the people, 
and self regulating “ (Holtzappel 2009:2).Rasyid argued that regional autonomy has benefited 
local development greatly;as an example, he describedthe policy of the oil-rich district of 
Kutai Kartanegara in East Kalimantan. Kutai Kartanegara allocated Rp 2 billion to upgrade 
all villages and waived fees for all students from both private and state schools. It also built 
its own power plant to support industrialisation programs (Rasyid 2003). Rasyid saidthat 
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“none of these programs would have been possible under the earlier centralised system”
(Rasyid 2003: 69). 
The decentralisation laws aroused debates as to whether the laws could lead to a declinein the
quality of governance and threaten national unity (Aspinall & Fealy2003: 4). Sulistiyanto and 
Erb (2005: 1) maintainedthat “the regional autonomy laws of 1999 (Undang-Undang 
Otonomi Daerah),that were implemented in January 2001, brought a great deal of hope to 
those people in Indonesia who had been crying out for reformation of the government”.After 
three years of implementation, the regulation was revised by Laws 32 of 2004 (regional 
government) and 33 of 2004 (fiscal balance between central and regional government). These
delegated stronger authority tokabupaten (districts) and cities.The debates on decentralisation 
have continued until today after the economicimbalance betweenthe regions drew the 
national attention of politicians and intellectuals. Many cities and municipalities still have 
limited resources to develop their regions. They lack administrative structures and there is 
confusion over the delegation of authority from central to regional governments (Abidin
2009: 73).Furthermore, the fast growth of new kabupatenand cities after the decentralisation 
laws were implemented could lead to difficulty in the management of national unity across 
the country (Damanik 2010). 
The euphoria in democratic spirit after the collapse of the New Order influenced the 
Acehnese to end the conflicts,which had killed an estimated thirteen thousand people. Aceh 
Province, which was labelled a ‘Special Region’ (Daerah Istimewa) during the New Order, 
gained higher status, being upgraded to‘Special Autonomy’. On 22 September 1999, the 
Indonesian parliament officially passed Law No. 44/1999 on the “Special Status of the 
Province of Aceh Special Region”, which granted the Acehnese “additional powers in the 
fields of Islamic law, education and adat (customary law)”(Miller 2009: 41).
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The politics of decentralisation implemented in Aceh were not intended to overcome poverty 
and promote economic development in the same manner as Tiro’s struggle towards the 
economic prosperity of Aceh (Djumala 2014: 75).After receiving some critiques and 
evaluations from the people of Aceh, the central government produced Law No. 
18/2001,which allowed Aceh an economic share of 70 percent of the oil and gas exploited. 
President Megawati politicised the laws granting access to further negotiations with GAM by 
creating a permanent requirement that the “Indonesian government would continue the peace 
negotiation with GAM, if they will acccept the status of regional autonomy”(Djumala
2014:76).No significant political development occurred in Aceh after the implementation of 
these laws. 
The Indonesian Research Institute (LIPI) evaluated the regional autonomy laws 22/1999 and 
18/2001 by stating that the rise of conflicts around separatism and ethno-religions should 
become a critical consideration in managing these new laws. Syamsuddin etal. (2004), in 
Desentralisasi dan Otonomi Daerah Naskah Akademik dan RUU Usulan LIPI 
(Decentralisation and Regional Autonomy: Academic Draft and the Laws Proposal of LIPI), 
stated that regional autonomy should involve a fair policy in terms of the regional economy. 
This work was extended in further analysis of regional autonomy (Haris etal. 2006), resulting 
in a proposal entitled Membangun Format Baru Otonomi Daerah (Developing a New Format 
for Regional Autonomy).
Aceh Province had greater autonomy after the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement and the 
passing of Law No. 11/2006, which authorised the Aceh government to manage regional 
politics and economic development. This thesis, in its examination of the dynamics of the 
decentralisation of Aceh after the collapse of the New Order, arguesthat the decentralisation 
process has had a strong impact on the prospect of reconciliation and peace in Aceh. 
39 
 
A further strategic issue is how the working of democracy in post-conflict Aceh positively 
affects peacebuilding. It is also important to understand the actors in the area of local politics 
who are involved in the democratic process through elections, the engagement of political 
parties and governance. The continuing challenge for this process is the upsurge in violence 
approaching elections, which threatens the initiatives of peace and economic development. 
Democracy and Peace
Democracy is one of the crucial means of achieving lasting peace through allowing 
individuals and parties which had fought during conflicts and wars to participate in 
restructuring of post-conflict and post-war governments through democratic mechanismssuch 
as elections.Mansfield and Snyder (2007), however, argued that democracy in a post-conflict 
society may transform that society towards autocracy if democratic institutions are not well 
prepared. They statedthat “an incompletely democratizing state may revert to autocracy”
(Mansfield & Snyder 2007: 267). Aceh and Indonesia have experienced a democratisation 
process which, this thesis argues, has significantly supportedpeacebuilding and development 
under national and regional constitutions.For example, anticipatinga rise in violent attacks 
during the 2012 election in Aceh, the central government postponed the schedule of the 
election, which was expected to involve all political parties and independent candidates in 
Aceh. The new regulations prevented an increase in violence and guaranteed a peaceful 
election involving all political actors. 
Diamond (2010) has formulated two arguments which help in the analysis of the depth and 
durability of democracy in Indonesia:
First, democracy is about popular sovereignty, and one cannot gain an adequate 
purchase on the quality of democracy withoutknowing how a country’s people 
evaluate the extent and performance of its democracy. And second, democratic 
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stability depends heavily on robust public support for democracy. To measure
progress towards the consolidation of democracy, we must know the extent to which 
its citizens regard it as legitimate – as a better form of government than any other they 
can imagine (p. 37). 
Diamond’s analysis of the crucial factorsunderlying the evaluation of Indonesians’
knowledge and understanding of their participation in electoral democracy is instructive 
forthis thesis,which examines the arguments of local leaders in relation to the value of 
democracy for peaceful coexistence in Indonesia. In the Acehnese context, most respondents 
were optimistic about ongoing democratisation after almost thirty years of conflict. For 
example, Irwandi Yusuf (2012), the first governor of Aceh after the Helsinki peace 
accord,believedthat Aceh has turned out to be a democratic region with a great participation 
rate of the people, not only during the vote, but also in the campaign period. They also 
support local government projects, for instance, in building infrastructure and agriculture 
(Yusuf 2012). 
Like Yusuf, Mardatillah (2012), an academic and human rights activist based in Banda Aceh, 
arguedthat the Acehnese demonstrate their respect for theefforts made towards peace by their 
active participation in local politics, including the involvement of NGOs in monitoring the 
public service and the behaviour of political parties and independent candidates during the 
elections in 2012 and 2014. Yusuf and Mardatillah have confirmed that democratisation is a 
strategic factor for peacebuilding in Aceh. Yusuf (2012)arguedthat GAM exercised a 
democratic culture during the conflict period when it had to govern the Acehnese, especially 
in rural villages, based on the local constitution. Therefore, Yusuf’s views are in line with 
those of Kingsbury (2010), former political adviser of GAM negotiating members in 
Helsinki, who reported the democratisationtaking place inside GAM soon after the peace 
accord. 
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Kingsbury (2010) argued that the internal democratisation of GAM has transformed its 
members, after reintegration,into powerful political actors. He stated that “this 
democratization eventually allowed agreement for the implementation of democratic 
processes in Aceh, including local elections and the creation of local political parties”
(Kingsbury 2010: 66). In addition, the Acehnese have the freedom to participate in 
establishing local parties and to be involved with national parties, and independent candidates 
are allowed to compete in gubernatorial and head-of-district elections. Haq’s article, ‘Starting 
from Local’(Haq 2009: iii), states that “an open political space in Aceh gives an opportunity 
for all people to get access to power. At the same time, political leaders will gain tight control 
of the people, who feel closer to political authority”. Like Haq, Kingsbury (2010) stated that a 
closer control of the peopleof Aceh, including local elites, would prevent them 
fromcorruption ofpower. In addition, he argued that “it would be pointless if GAM took 
power in as corrupt and authoritarian a manner as its predecessors”; he said that “short of 
independence, substantive democratisarion holds the best hope for Aceh’s future” (Kingsbury
2010:66). However, the corruption that Kingsbury was concerned about did occur in Aceh 
after the process of reintegration. 
This process of the reintegration of former rebel GAM members has been discussed by 
numerous analysts (Hadiwinata 2007,2010;Bhakti 2008;Stange & Patock 2010).Nurhasim 
(2008) said that the reintegration process was like a charity that provided abundant cash for 
combatants and that the trend towards corruption continued more actively after combatants 
dominated local government. An influx of funds attracted corruption in the local government, 
NGOs, and reconstruction and rehabilitation bodies. The political transformation of GAM 
from a rebel to a political movement has been seen as an important aspect of reintegration
which allowed former combatants to participate in democratisation and peacebuilding.
However, their participation in the KPA and PA was characterised by a lack of experience. 
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The victory of PA in the 2009 election was not followed by enough capacity-building from 
their parliamentary members, from provincial to district level, which showed them to 
beineffective in managing local politics (Stange & Patock 2010). 
Furthermore, the book edited by Bhakti (2008) describing the peace process, the integration 
of GAM into Indonesia and the election of the new governor in the 2006 election is very 
useful. This is a collection of scholarly writings on Aceh containing reflections on subjects 
ranging from the Helsinki peace process tothe bureaucracy of the Aceh government after 
2006. This book is not wholly comprehensive in that it omits to describe the contemporary 
history of peace in Aceh.However, Bhakti argued that the reintegration process of GAM into 
the political arena is a transition towardsbetter democracy and peace in Aceh, as is the 
continuation of capacity-building, especially in the leadership ranks and among political 
representatives at provincial and district levels. 
A more detailed analysis is provided by Hadiwinata (2007, 2010), who analysed the 
dynamics operating inAceh from the onset of conflict to the period of elections. He argued
that the election in2006 was a significant factor in peace implementation, as some of the 
leaders of the groups participated in constitutional political competition. The 2009 elections 
can be seen as an example of the stronger participation of GAM elites in local politics, which 
provided them with broader political authority in developing Aceh from district to provincial 
levels (Hadiwinata etal. 2010). Their political participation was challenged by the December 
2011 gubernatorial elections, which still ignited flaring tensions among Acehnese leaders —
especially former GAM elites.A number of former GAM combatants were killed in the 
period approaching the 2011 elections (Sholeh 2011). 
The currentinvestigation examines the dynamics of the transition of GAM members from 
military operativesinto political representatives. This democratic participation is seen to have 
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contributed to the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding in Aceh. The cooperation of 
KPA and PA, as representatives of GAM,is envisaged as a peaceful partnership among 
political and ethnic groups in Acehwhich can support the future of Acehnese democracy, 
prosperity and peace.
Democracy, peace and development in Aceh cannot work well without support from national 
and international agencies, both states and civil society organisations. This includes the 
continuation of the development of peace and infrastructure. Djuli (2013) argued that the 
absence of international agencies impacted on the progress of both the reintegration of 
combatants and economic development. This was due to the limited concern shown by 
national interests involved in managing Acehnese politics and security with regard to the 
challenges faced by former combatants at the grassroots level; the latter were disappointed 
with local government policy which focusedon small circles of elitesin the Party Aceh and its 
coalition. 
International States, CSOs and Regional Peace
International states and CSOs have contributed to the stages of rehabilitation and 
peacebuiding of Aceh after the earthquake and tsunami and, in the longer term, the 
reintegration of combatants, democratisation and peacebuilding involving governments and 
local NGOs. The crucial transformation in Aceh, contributed to significantly by the 
international community, resulted from the two periods of peace mediation conducted firstly
in 2000–2003 by the Henry Dunand Centre (HDC) and then in August 2005 by the Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI). This is an example of the argument put byrealists such as 
Greig and Diehl (2012) that international states and multilateral organisations have become 
effective parties which have ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ to ensure the process of peace negotiation 
continues successfully. DeRouen Jr (2015), editor of the recently published work, An 
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Introduction to Civil Wars,said that “external partners can provide resources, assurance, 
expertise, and experience supporting peace agreement implementation” (DeRouen Jr 2015: 
164). 
The HDC and CMI are third parties which have mediated and facilitated peace negotiation
and implementation in Aceh with external partners from the international community 
representing state and civil society organisations. Paffenholz’s article, ‘What Civil Society 
Can Contribute to Peacebuilding’, in a collection of scholarly essays entitled Civil Society 
and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, argues that “the main supporting factors for 
successful protection [of mediation and peace] are sufficient space for civil society to act and 
the combination of protection, monitoring, and advocacy that can attract media attention and 
gain the support of international networks” (Paffenholz 2010a: 383–384). With regard to 
Paffenholz’s argument on the role of international organisations in mediation, the EU and 
ASEAN can be seen as significant strategic partners in peacebuilding in the Acehnese
context.
The EU and ASEAN were involved in the Aceh Monitoring Mission after the Helsinki peace 
accord in August 2005.Multilateral organisations such as the United Nations have been 
shown to be effective bodies in peace operations supported by international states. Askandar 
(2005), in his article entitled‘A Regional Perspective of UN Peace Operations in Southeast 
Asia’,argued that “regional mechanisms, such as those within ASEAN, have proved 
ineffective especially for intra-state conflicts, and new formulas, which could involve the 
UN, must be found” (Askandar 2005: 28). This is due to the principle of non-interference
adopted by the members of ASEAN to overcome disputes and conflicts. However, the 
involvement of ASEAN, which is a regional mechanism that legitimises the prevention of 
conflict and war, has contributed to overcomingconflicts within the states of ASEAN. 
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Furthermore, Askandar argued that “in both Aceh and Mindanao the respective governments 
would be apprehensive about receiving international peacekeepers. However, they would 
welcome peace operations under the guise of development programmes as this would 
welcome peace operations” (Askandar 2005: 37).In line with Askandar’s argument that 
international peacekeepers were strategic factors in conflict resolutions in Aceh and 
Mindanao, the current thesis analyses, in a later chapter, the current stage of peacebuilding in 
Mindanao and the transformation of MILF combatants. It argues that democratisation and 
peacebuilding in Aceh provide important lessons for Mindanao’s peace initiatives. NGO 
activists and the local government of Mindanao have visited Aceh to learn from the 
experiences of local NGOs and political parties in Aceh. Furthermore, some GAM elites and 
NGO activists from Aceh have also visited the southern Philippines to strengthen the 
capacity-building of government and civil society in Mindanao. 
To understand the post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh in a wider context, 
Post-Disaster Reconstruction: Lessons from Aceh (Clarke, Fanany & Kenny 2010) is a 
crucial book to consider; it is a compilation of articles including ‘Political Reconstruction in 
Aceh’ (Kingsbury 2010), ‘The Voices of International NGO Staff’ (Clarke & Murray 2010), 
‘Reconstruction through Participatory Practice?’ (Kenny 2010) and ‘The Role and 
Experiences of Badan Rehabilitasi dan Reconstruksi [BRR]’ (Mardhatillah 2010). Kingsbury 
(2010) argued that examining the reconstruction of Aceh after the tsunami should include 
criticallyinvestigating the democratisation of GAM whereby former combatants were allowed 
to be involved in local politics; this process critically changed local politics in Aceh. The 
confidence of GAM leaders to transform politics in Aceh was reflected in the Helsinki peace 
negotiations.Kingsbury (2006) stated that Indonesian negotiators offered political leadership 
to GAM elites as a reward granted by the central government, allowing GAM representatives 
to be integrated into the Republic of Indonesia; this leadership took the form of governor, 
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bupati (head of dictricts) or mayor. GAM negotiators opposed the offer and proposed 
freedom for the Acehnese to create local parties – a special policy at odds with the national 
political structure. 
Furthermore, comparative analysis of democratisation and peacebuilding in Aceh, Timor-
Leste and Mindanao is urgently needed to discover how post-conflict and post-war regions 
can share common experiences and learn from each other in order to gain lasting peace, 
democracy and prosperity.
Aceh, Timor-Leste and the Southern Philippines: Comparative Studies
Literature on Southeast Asian conflicts is generally lacking in comparative analysis, 
especially as to how the actors in conflicts and peacebuilding in the regions have shared their 
experiences in the process of democratisation and initiatives for peace. One welcome 
analysis, A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (Tan 2007), provides a 
comprehensive investigation of conflicts and peacebuilding in the southern Philippines, Aceh, 
southern Thailand, Papua, Laos, Timor-Leste and Burma. It includes the communist 
insurgency in the Philippines and religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso. Rodell (2007: 225), 
in his ‘Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines’, argues that the Islamic insurgency 
there is “a domestic phenomenon with deep historical roots, (which) results from the 
unsuccesful integration of the Muslim population into the Christian-dominated nation-state 
and society”. The complexity of the conflict in the southern Philippines challenges the 
decades-longpeace initiatives. 
The process of peace in Aceh has been shorter. Askandar argued that, in the Acehnese 
peacebuilding context, “for the best results, the peace-building process should be initiated 
from within. This means the peace structure created should involve all parties who are in the 
conflict and are feeling the impacts of the conflict” (Askandar 2007: 259). Peacebuilding 
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from within, as Askandar argued, involves the wider participation of combatants and civil 
societyin peace initiatives. In addition, Askandar stated that “the most urgent task now is to 
make sure that the ceasefire is not violated and the provisions of the MoU are fully 
implemented according to the letter and spirit of the agreement. The role of civil society in 
this peacebuilding process will be crucial, [and will] rely on the goodwill and acceptance of 
the main parties to the peace agreement”(Askandar 2007: 263). 
The post-conflict periods in Timor-Leste and the southern Philippines provide pivotal 
comparisonswith that in Aceh on issues of democratisation, economic development, 
peacebuilding and the role of women in peace efforts. Dibley (2014) argued that, in the 
political transition in Timor-Leste and Aceh, CSOs have played a crucial role in 
peacebuilding, democratisation and socio-economic development. NGOs and CSOs have 
completed the policy of government and strengthened the democratic transition towards 
permanent peace and prosperity for thepeople of Timor-Leste and Aceh. 
Conclusion
The literature on Aceh post-conflict has discussed diverse issues in history, politics, 
international relations and economic development. With regard to the situation in Aceh, a
multidimensional perspective on conflict studies needs to learn from both history and 
contemporary politics; in particular, it requires understanding of the current issues of the 
multilateral coalition involved inthe recovery of Aceh after the tsunami and conflict. The 
largevolume of literature concerning Aceh reflects its importance,both duringconflict and 
postconflict,as a lessonin overcoming conflict for other regions. Aceh’s experience of
democratisation and peacebuilding has inspired government and civil society in the southern 
Philippines to ensure the transition of Bangsamoro province after the peace accord in 2012. 
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The subsequent discussion ofthe theoretical considerations relating to this thesis comprises
diverse theories from the fields of realism, liberalism and multilateralism,international 
relations,and peace and development studies. However, this thesis focuses on multilateralism 
and the democratic approach to peace in order to understand the way in which democratic 
transition and international cooperation have been able to aid the development of Aceh after 
the conflict. 
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Considerations
Introduction
Interpretations of the issues of decentralisation, democracy and peace have resorted to a 
number of theories across a range of disciplines – in particular, international relations, 
political scienceand peace studies. In the field of international relations, the debates between 
realism and liberalism, as well as the options provided by theories of institutionalism, guide 
the path of analysis of this thesis – the transition of Aceh from conflict to peaceful 
democracy. This theoretical base facilitatesthe interpretation of the role of international 
cooperation and the international community in supporting peace negotiations, peace accord 
implementation, and post-tsunami and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction; it also 
underpins analysis of the way in which the Indonesian governmentsought and gained
advantage in dealing with conflicts and disputes in regional and international forums working 
on Aceh peacebuilding and democratisation. 
Even though realism theory maintains that international organisations and INGOs “perform
important roles, but are always ultimately subordinate to states, or, at least, to the most 
powerful among them” (Chiaruzzi 2014: 43; italics added), it is certain that international 
states and INGOs have played a pivotal role in post-conflict Aceh. Immediately after the 
tsunami, between 160 and 400 international and national NGOs were operating in Aceh at 
any one time and “brought with them financial resources, materials and technical capacity”
(Clarke & Murray 2010: 155). Some of them worked on peacebuilding and democratisation 
in Aceh rather than post-tsunami rehabilitation. However, CSOs and non-state actors have 
been marginalised in the conflict resolution. 
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States override the preferred approach of conflict management “to end wars through 
diplomatic initiatives” (Paffenholz 2010: 51). A prime example can be found in the 1995 US-
mediated peace pact for Bosnia, when the USA threatened to bomb Bosnian-Serb artillery if 
no peace agreement was reached. This conflict management strategy used, in the words of 
Paffenholz (2010: 51) “financial ‘carrots’ and/or military ‘sticks’.
On the other hand, some conflicts are more effectively ended by the mediation of non-state 
actors. Ahtisaari, former president of Finland, acted as head of the Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI), anNGO based in Finland, when he mediated between the Government of 
Indonesia and GAM in 2005 (Awaludin 2009; Bose 2012). Ahtisaari, however, maximised 
his conflict management strategy by organising significant support from states and non-state 
organisations towards the management of peace in Aceh. Bose argued that “Ahtisaari’s
success in mediating a settlement to the Aceh dispute was aided by the dexterity with which 
he deployed his elder statesman-like persona to maximum effect, in a way that won 
acceptance and respect from both the Indonesian government and GAM” (Bose 2012: 247). 
In addition, international states and organisations approached and pressured GAM in Sweden, 
Malaysia and other parts of the world, which encouraged them to return to the table to 
seriously set up a peace negotiation and make a peace accord to the greater advantage of the 
Acehnese people (Kingsbury 2010, 2014). Awaludin (2009) confirmed the latter’s view that 
the Indonesian government was pressured by international states after the earthquake and 
tsunami.In this context, the realist and liberal approaches are very relevant to understanding 
the dynamics of mediation, conflict resolution and post-conflict transition in Aceh. 
Furthermore, in the context of Aceh, the alternative strategies of reconciliation, peacebuilding 
and democratisation through the implementation of local wisdom and best practice are also 
formulated, in this thesis, as possible and preferable pathways to peace. The intended result is 
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that the assimilation of values, theoriesand concepts from the West with the local wisdom, 
culture and politics of Aceh will produce modelling and lessons for other separatist conflicts 
all over the world.An NGO base in Aceh, the Aceh Institute, has attempted to research how 
Adat (custom),a concept long established at the heart of Acehnese culture, can be an effective 
tool for reconciliation and development. Nurdin (2013) argued that Adat, involving 
traditional leaders in villages such as geuchik gampong and imum mukim, has been an 
effective instrument already employed for decades in conflict resolution and the overcoming 
of disputes among the Acehnese. People have trusted these figureheads due to their capacity 
in local leadership and religion. In LoGA Chapter 1, article 19, it is stated that “Mukim is a 
legal community unit consisting of the union of several gampong having certain territorial 
borders and private assets, led by imum mukim or by any other names, directly positioned 
under a district”.
However, in higherlevel disputes, especially among combatants or between the Aceh local 
government and central government, they had a limited capacity and access. Badruzzaman 
Ismail, head of Majelis Adat Aceh (Aceh Adat Council), said that “the council only 
encourages combatants to join reintegration by preventing violence” (Basyar 2008:102). In 
other parts of Indonesia, disputes of land, local politics and domestic violence have been 
effectively overcome by non-state actors. They have been managed by various local cultural 
foundations such as the Lembaga Adat Nagari (Village Custom Foundation) in West Sumatra
and the Islamic traditional school and Kyai (religious leaders)in East Java (Sholeh etal. 2007). 
Local politics in Aceh and other Indonesian regions still depends on the power of cultural 
leaders who are able to maintain the continuity of peace and development. 
Yet they also have limitations, being able to be easily ‘politicised’ by the state apparatusthat 
aims to control state interest in domestic politics. The implementation of Islamic Shari’ahin 
Aceh was an effective strategy used by the Indonesian central government to prevent 
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conservative Acehnese Muslim leaders from supporting the politics of GAM. Yusuf, then 
governor of Aceh, was concerned that “Shari’a came to Aceh, but it only created more anger 
about religion being used for unpopular political purposes” (Yusuf 2008).This exemplifies 
the tension that exists between the realist and liberal approaches to the issue, and poses the 
question as to how these theories can best be implemented to understand the context of 
democracy and peace in a post-conflict region like Aceh. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the realist stance was challenged to provide a way forward 
for the post–Cold War world. Former Soviet Union states needed to modernise their 
economies and democratise their politics. Their system was “all the more sensitive to liberal 
ideas where cooperation with the West was concerned … Economic and political liberalism, 
liberal internationalism, and the lifestyles of the democracies brought about the fall of the 
Soviet empire”(Colonomos 2008: 43). Realism is regarded as less sensitive to modernisation 
and the transformation of states from authoritarianism to democracy. 
Realist theories argue that states need to have a stronger role in securing peace and stability in 
the global world. Liberal theories, on the other hand, emphasise the need for a balance 
between states and civil society. Therefore, this thesis focuses on liberal theories to interpret 
the issues of decentralisation, democracy and peace. Democratic peace is compared to neo-
liberal institutionalism in order to see their relevance to the dynamics of local democracy, 
participatory decentralisation and peacebuilding in developing countries. 
This chapter examines international relations (IR) theory, focusing on realist and liberal 
theories. In realist theory, the focus is on how states play important roles in managing 
mediation, post-conflict transition, security and stability. The principle of non-interference of 
ASEAN, for example, in the case of Timor-Leste’s political transition, is part of how realist 
approaches view stability in the region. In addition, liberal theorists view peacebuilding 
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mechanisms through the lens of multilateral cooperation and international NGOs. Liberal 
peace theory is examined in this context. As an alternative approach to conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding, international regime and development theories interpret the current dynamics 
of democratisation and peacebuilding in Aceh. This thesis argues that Aceh,following the 
Helsinki accord, needs an ongoing, long-term effort towards peace through the strong 
commitment of multilateral partnerships and the strong capacity of local leaders, especially 
those on the Aceh Adat Council. 
Realism 
The approach offered by the realist school, which focuses on how the state is the central actor 
in dealing with conflict and peace,is important in understanding conflict and conflict 
resolution. Realism emerged victorious over idealism after the outbreak of the Second World 
War in 1939; this momentous event confirmed for the realists the limits of the idealist 
approach for the study of international politics (Dunne & Schmidt 2014). According to them,
“realism taught foreign policy officials to focus on interests rather than on ideology, to seek 
peace through strength , and to recognize that great powers can coexist even if they have 
antithetical values and beliefs” (Dunne & Schmidt 2014: 100). In addition, realism “aspires to 
be suprahistorical, explaining in all epochs the fundamental features of international politics: 
first and foremost, conflict and war” (Chiaruzzi 2014: 36). Realists claimed that “conflict is 
inevitable, even necessary in international politics. When disputes cannot be resolved 
peacefully or diplomatically, force, and ultimately war, is a decisive means of settling 
matters” (Chiaruzzi 2014: 36).Realists tend to focus on four central topics: (1) groupism;(2)
egoism;(3) anarchy; and (4) power politics (Wohlforth 2014).With regard togroupism, realists 
argue that:
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group solidarity is essential to domestic politics and conflict and cooperation between 
polities is the essence of international politics. To survive at anything above a 
subsistence level, people need the cohesion provided by group solidarity, yet that very 
same in-group cohesion generates the potential for conflict with other groups 
(Wohlforth 2014: 133). 
Groups will act politically with other groups and individuals,but are moved mainly by self-
interest. The expression of egoism may be “exacerbated, moderated, or even temporarily 
overcome by national and international political structures, institutions, and values”
(Wohlforth 2014: 133). This is closely related to Thucydides’ theory on human nature that all 
humans are power-hungry, self-interested and egoistic. In this context, states “seek protection 
for themselves and exclude all others from this protection, unless in some circumstances they 
are to gain from this inclusion” (Marsalis 2012: ii). In addition, it has been argued that 
“realists don’t tend to give a solution to a problem, rather, an explanation for it. That war 
happens because states are power hungry and because states fear for their own survival and 
so by abolishing other competition, they guarantee their own existence” (Marsalis 2012: iii–
iv). This is one, in terms of the current investigation, of the weaknesses of realism. The US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a perfect example. At first, the USAaimed to disarm Saddam 
Hussein of his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). After the finding that Iraq had no 
WMDs, Saddam Hussein was termed a dictator and the spread of democracy was the goal of 
the invasion (Marsalis 2012: iv). 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Explanatory Perspectives on the Iraq Invasion(Lieberfeld 2005: 2)
Theory Causal/explanatory focus
Realism Unipolarity, maintain hegemony and avoid post-9/11 decline by 
demonstrating US willingness to use force
Avoid nuclear proliferation, eliminate Iraqi WMD threat against Israel
Secure US oil supplies, reduce energy vulnerabilities
UN inspections are unreliable;sanctions policy causes resentment
Liberalism Democracies fear that dictatorships will attack them first 
Security derives from speading democracy and human rights
According to Lieberfeld (2005), in realist terms, the invasion in Iraq was a rational means for 
the USA to achieve its pivotal goal of “demonstrating its power to allies and competitors 
alike ... As well, it was intended to prevent Iraq’s actual or potential use of WMD and oil 
resources to threaten the U.S. or its allies, and to prevent Iraq’s potential collaboration with 
anti-U.S. terrorist groups” (Lieberfeld 2005: 4). 
Mearsheimer and Walt (Chiaruzzi 2014), two prominent US realists, criticised the US plan to 
launch a war against Iraq in March 2003 by publishing a powerful critique entitled ‘Keeping 
Saddam Hussein in a Box’ (New York Times2 February 2003). They rejected claims made by 
the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq could not be overcome through a 
containment policy. They argued that “war is not necessary. Containment has worked in the 
past and can work in the future, even when dealing with Saddam Hussein” (Mearsheimer & 
Walt 2003). These scholars considered the cost of unnecessary war against Saddam Hussein;
they said that“preventive war entails other costs as well. In addition to the lives lost, toppling 
Saddam Hussein would cost at least$50 billion to $100 billion, at a time when our economy 
is sluggish and huge budget deficits are predicted for years” (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003). 
They concluded their critique by stating that “although the Bush administration maintains that 
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war is necessary, there is a better option ... We should perpetuate this state of affairs by 
maintaining vigilant containment, a policy the rest of the world regards as preferable and 
effective” (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003).
Mearsheimer continued to present arealist critique of the US in relation to its Iraq war 
policy.It has been claimed that:
This critique of the Iraq War was consistent with Hans Morgenthau’s critique of the 
Vietnam War. The neo-conservative case for war, built around Wilsonian idealism 
‘with teeth,’ failed to appreciate the historical tendency of states to balance against 
power (rather than bandwagon), and failed to recognise nationalism as a more 
powerful ideological force than democracy (Chiaruzzi 2014: 46).
If realism emphasises the crucial position of state interest in international politics and regards 
the international realm as anarchic, liberalism’s main principles are freedom, progress, 
reason, (human) rights, tolerance and the norms of constitutionalism and 
democracy(Richardson 2014). The present study aligns itself with the latter set of liberalist 
values and ideals. Realism understands international states’ approach towards security and 
stability and ending conflicts and wars, including how international organisations involve 
themselves in ending wars. 
Liberalism
Richardson (2014) stated that liberalism is commonly seen as “the characteristic political 
philosphy of the modern West” (Richardson 2014: 69). The historical–political context of 
liberalism dates back to England in the 17th century and the political struggle waged there 
against monarchical absolutism. The English philosopher John Locke published Two Treaties 
of Government, which is regarded as the first great liberal text (Richardson 2014).
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Dunne (2014: 117) argued that “the First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a 
recognition that peace is not a natural condition but is one that must be constructed”.The 
English School established this approach as ‘liberalism’, as an alternative to the demonstrated 
inadequacy of the realist approach to understanding international affairs after the Cold War.
Liberalism has influenced international and domestic government structures that recognise 
individual and civil society by stressing international and regional cooperation to maintain 
peace and stability. It includes the way in which post-war and post-conflict reconstruction 
and transformation are able to be managed. 
The three most prominent liberal empirical theories are focused on democracy, international 
institutions and interdependence. Liberal thinkers claim that “democracies do not go to war 
against one another ... Democracies are committed to the principle of resolving political 
differences non-violently ... The public, who would bear the cost, is unwilling to support war 
against another democracy” (Richardson 2014: 54).Liberalist theory evaluates the dominance 
of realism in earlier scholarly analysis of international relations. It argues that, because 
realism rests on the basis that anarchy and war are abiding features of international affairs, it 
therefore sees the necessity of a balance of power to stabilise the world. However, the 
critique maintains that realism has failed to understand the approach of diplomacy as a means 
of prevention of war and conflict.Liberalism provides alternative mechanisms for the 
purposes of overcoming war and conflict by establishing dialogue and diplomacy as 
important means of conflict resolution. In addition, liberalism examines international 
relations by recognising actors who have a commitment to resolving conflicts. After the Cold 
War, more diplomats have tended to prioritise peace mediation and conflict resolution, and 
have actively worked to prevent war and conflict.
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However, Dunne has stated the limits of liberalism. He said that “the challenges that lie ahead 
for liberalism are immense. Whether the challenge is the environment, or poverty reduction, 
or nuclear non-proliferation, or humanitarian atrocities, liberal institutions and policies have 
not mitigated or eradicated these issues” (Dunne 2014: 124).
Liberal Peace
Democratic peace theory emphasises the existence of peaceful cooperation among democratic 
states, a contention which is challenged by the fact thata strong democratic country like the 
USA can undertake political intervention in a democratic state for certain reasons. 
Democratisation is argued by some scholars to be‘dangerous’, as opposed to the argument in 
favour of democratic peace – that is, that most democratic states have successfully 
maintained peaceful global partnerships (Goldsmith & He 2008).In addition, Rasler and 
Thomson have argued that that there is a strong relationship between democratic states and a 
low level of conflict and incidence of war (Rasler & Thomson 2005: 3). 
However, there is no single theory that fits all interpretations in the quest to understand the 
dynamics of politics and society. Some states might have different schools of thought 
underlying their foreign policy. This depends on the context and the interest of the state. 
Institutionalism, a theory originally developed in economics, has now been adopted by 
multidisciplinary studies in sociology, politics and security.
The concept of the balance of power, for example, is interpreted differently by different 
schools of thought. It was originally stated by Morgenthau, the father of realist theory, 
according to whom abalance of power is “indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic 
societies … yet it is capable of operating … under the conditions of relative stability and 
peaceful conflict”(Morgenthau in Hughes & Meng 2011: 121). As a complex concept, power 
“embrac(es) both material factors, such as the number of troops and weapons available to the 
59 
 
state, as well as intangible factors, such as troop morale, national character, and the quality of 
a government and its diplomacy”(Little 2007: 139). However, this thesis focuses not on the 
balance of power, but on the notion of power-sharing, as formulated by Galtung (1995), to 
support the process of reconciliation and preserving peace. Power-sharing is “vital for 
containing and managing intercommunal tensions in multiethnic societies emerging from 
civil conflict, thereby helping to sustain fragile democracies”(Norris 2008: 3). 
Power-sharing has been implemented well in the Middle East, where Shi’I and Sunni leaders 
take leading political positions in government. The leadership represents its own community. 
In Palestine, Hamas and Fatah share policial leadership in central government. In 
Indonesia,since the establishment of the New Order, Muslim and Christian leaders in Maluku 
and Poso have shared local power to continue the efforts of peacebuilding after bloody 
conflicts between Muslims and Christians. Even though violence and clashes between 
Muslim and Christian communitieshave sometimes occurred at the grassroots level, the unity 
of interfaith leadership has prevented further conflicts; moreover, the elite-centric political 
leadership in Indonesia also influences the foundation of peace. If leaders take advantage,for 
their political interests, of weak communities or individuals at the grassroots, the resulting 
political violence is a dangerous operation that threatens peace. 
The killings and attacks of the Ayah Banta group were apparently orchestrated by the PA 
elite in order to attract serious interest from the central government; its aim was to achieve 
the suspension of elections and to weaken the political support base of Irwandi Yusuf,
asamong the victims were local GAM commanders who had supported him. In contrast, in
Timor-Leste, leader Xanana Gusmao offered to his rival, Mari Alkatiri, the chance to lead the 
development of Okuse. This is a way of sharing political power to maximise development 
and to stabilise post-conflict politics. In Bangsamoro, the MNLF threatened to fight against 
any peaceful agreement with the Government of the Philippines, as it was not included in the 
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peace accord implementation. In the southern Philippines, political leadership is diverse and 
therefore needs a more comprehensive approach by the central government to end the conflict 
through the participation of all communities.
The theory of neo-liberal institutionalism is challenged to interpret and understand the 
dynamics of decentralisation, democratisation and peacebuilding in post-conflict regions. The 
idea of institutionalism has been debated among scholars since the 1970s. In addition, the 
UNhasadopted the theoretical approach of ‘new institutionalism’ in order to overcome 
conflict and preservepeace in the global world. US President Barack Obama, for example, 
stated in his speech in Accra, Ghana, on 11 July 2009 that “Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it 
needs strong institutions”(The White House 2009). Institution building is the focus of the 
Obama administration as “the fulcrum of its international law and development policy, and 
that it will continue to measure the health of Third World institutions with reference to the 
Millennium Challenge goals’ (Kelley 2010: 549). 
The theory of new institutionalism has more advantages for overcoming the problems of 
post-conflict regions. It has more advantages for supporting rehabilitation and
development.Finnemore argues that institutionalism “provides a system-level theoretical 
framework with which to analyse international politics, and generates testable hypotheses 
about international behaviour that compete with those of realism and liberalism”(Finnemore 
1996: 326). Furthermore, institutionalisation is argued as a better way than liberalisation to 
reach productive post-conflict peacebuilding. The establishment of domestic institutions can
manage “the transition from war while avoiding the destabilising effects of democratisation 
and marketisation” (Tschirgi 2004: 15). 
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On the other hand, some scholars who oppose the institutionalist approach have argued that 
institutionalism is not a practical approach in dealing with post-conflict society. Roberts, for 
example, states that: 
Liberal institutionalism may seem like a good idea in theory, but it may 
not be very useful for or applicable to many people’s everyday lives in 
places just emerging from war, or to elites whose internalized and 
legitimated privileges risk being rescinded or curtailed dramatically 
(Roberts 2011: 36).
The new institutionalist approach isnot only significant for critically evaluating the process of 
decentralisation, democratisation and peace building in post-conflict regions like Aceh, 
Indonesia, but it also offers a strategic bridge for mediating between the international 
community and the conflict regions, in situations where the international community has 
invested to support institutional building. International donors and NGOs can work more 
easily in post-conflict regions that have a similar ‘tune’ in their approach todevelopment and 
peacebuilding.
In the Indonesian context, institution building is a significant factor in supporting post-
conflict regions, as well as in looking after all regions where there is potential for conflict to 
occur. Cooperation among states and civil society is a core element in effectively managing 
regional peace and stability. The institutionalist approach should be implemented not only by 
regional governments, but also by CSOs. This has been an effective mechanism in Aceh 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in the period since the tsunami and the subsequent 
reintegration (Clarke, Fanany & Kenny2010). In addition, civic engagement and leader 
integration should also be institutionalised in order to gain long-term peace (Tadjoeddin 
2004). Effective political institutions managed by local Aceh parties, notably the Party of 
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Aceh, have also attracted people to support them. This is called ‘votes for peace’ where 
people support the PA in the hope of sustained peace initiated by PA leaders (Palmer 2010: 
295).
Multilateralism and the International Regime 
Haggard and Simmons (1987) asserted that international regimes have developed as a main 
focus of theoretical discussion and empirical enquiry within international relations. The 
concern with regimes sprang from discontent with the notions of world order, organisation 
and authority. Regime specialists suppose that the arrangements of state operations are 
inclined to follow norms, but that such norm-governed performance is wholly co-dependent 
on the national interests. Therefore, the workings of regimes can be seen as a way of 
reconciling the realist and idealist traditions,which have generally opposed each other in 
international relations theoretical debate. 
International regime theory emphasises the importance of cooperation and partnership in 
building peace. It includes prioritising multilateralism in supporting post-war and post-
conflict regions. Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman of the Crisis Management Initiative,while 
attending an EU forum in Brussels in November 2005 a month after the Helsinki peace 
accord, stated:
Let us consider some of the major threats in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century: failing states, global disease outbreaks, chronic poverty, natural 
disasters, climate change, terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. How would the world deal with these threats if 
there were no multilateral systems – no regional organizations, no World 
Bank, no United Nations? (Ahtisaari 2005). 
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Multilateralism is a new mechanism by which to achieve global cooperation among 
states in order to overcome conflict and preserve stability and peace.In post-conflict 
Timor-Leste, Aceh and Bangsamoro, cooperation among states has successfully 
played a significant role in reconstruction and rehabilitation in each case, and has 
helped the political transition towards permanent peace. Having multilateral 
diplomacy aimed at peacebuilding means the initiatives of peace and post-conflict 
development are based on international cooperation.
This is the role of the EU and ASEAN in constructing peace in Aceh. The Asian 
Monitoring Mission is part of the multilateral cooperation among the member states
of the EU and ASEAN that has been mediating the transition of security and political 
structuressincethe peace accord in Helsinki.
Paradigm of Peace 
Galtung’s theory on the paradigm of peace is especially relevant to understanding the 
dynamics of the peace process: the balanceofpower and therule of law are the first tools to 
observe and analyse in relation to peace and democracy in Aceh. The existence of regulations 
– from elections to investments – and the power-sharing among Acehnese leaders have 
reinforced Galtung’s argument. The consensus among Acehnese leaders and the Indonesian 
government as regards peace and its implementation bears out the theory of Dahrendorf (in 
Schaefer 2003: 220), a British sociologist who argued that the common interests among 
parties will preserve the peace. Dahrendorf stated that “social classes are groups of people 
who share common interests resulting from their authority relationships”. Acehnese leaders 
are challenged by having to unite in their own interest for the priority of peace and prosperity 
for Aceh after more than thirty years of conflict.Galtung also discussed peacebuilding, peace 
culture, peace structure and mediation, arguing:
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There are many practices to draw upon, and to be developed, in peacebuilding. An 
elementary practice is the civil disobedience of establishing contact with the 
appointed enemy, engaging in positive, helping, cooperative relations instead. The 
mental task would be cognitive/emotional disobedience, refusing to structure the inner 
world in that polarized way, also identifying the negative in Self and the positive in 
Other. Avoiding the trap of Self-hatred combined with Other-lover; that is only 
polarized in reverse, not reversed (Galtung 2007: 29).
The goals of democracy and peace in Aceh haveoccupiedthe period of ‘post-conflict 
peacebuilding’, which was defined by the UN Secretary-General as “collective action to 
identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict”(Forman & Patrick 2000: 4). This definition is especially significant in 
terms of the dynamics of peace and reconciliation in Aceh, from local, national and 
international perspectives. 
The theoretical concepts of nationalism and cosmopolitanism are also presented in this thesis
to evaluate how the experiences of the Acehnese people froma wide range of rural and urban 
locations, where they took refuge during the period of conflict, might have influenced the 
sense of cosmopolitanism in the province.The argument of Avoinus (2007), which uses the 
theory of Immanuel Kant on cosmopolitanism, is here analysed. Avoinus also considered the 
idea of ‘national romanticism’ of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johan Gottfried von Herder. 
According to Avoinus,“if nationalists were keen on developing a deep understanding of the 
nation’s own history and culture, cosmopolitans desired to learn extensively about other 
cultures. The idea of travelling and establishing international contacts was part of the 
cosmopolitan lifestyle of the Enlightenment’ (Avoinus 2007: 155). 
65 
 
However, the culture of cosmopolitanism typifies many ethnic groups in Indonesia. Besides 
the Acehnese, the Buginese and the Javanese also have cosmopolitan cultures. But the 
difference lies in the individual experiences of these cultures in exploring a sense of 
nationalism, which are closely related to the history of the region. Greater freedom to express 
individual ethnic group identity while participating in a collective process is also a significant 
instrument of peace. Sen (2006) argued that it is critical to accommodate minority groups 
within a dominant ethnic, cultural and religious ethos. 
Galtung’s argument on peacebuilding is useful in understanding current frictions inside the 
former combatants of Aceh,some of whom attempted to disengage from the Aceh 
Transitional Committee, the CSO founded to assist the transition of former militia members 
to civilians. Horgan (2009) called this group ‘disengaged’ from its community for political 
and economic purposes. Disengagement is the process whereby individuals or groups leave 
off from past violent activities and engage in normal, peaceful behaviours; as such, it captures
the relative success with which former combatants transformed themselves from paramilitary 
forces by adopting totally or partially civilian identities and living with others under the 
constitution of their shared country. Disengagement can be designed as a program or it may 
work naturally. 
According to Bjorgo and Horgan (2009), disengagement is one of the new alternatives among 
counter-terrorism strategies. This notion is based on concerns that traditional counter-
terrorism, which imprisons terrorists, fails to overcome the core element of terroristactivities. 
Bjorgo and Horgan argued that “countries which have had, in common, growing populations 
of prisoners held for terrorist offences, have realized that they cannot solve their terrorist 
problems with force and detention alone”(Bjorgo&Horgan 2009: 1–2). In addition, Horgan 
defined the meaning of disengagement and how it is relevant to coping with terrorist or 
separatist groups by saying that “disengaging might suggest critical cognitive and social 
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changes, in terms of leaving behind the shared social norms, values, attitudes, relationships 
and social networks so carefully forged while the individual (or a group) was still a member 
of a terrorist (or a separatist) group”(2009: 20).
Canter agrees with Horgan’s argument with regard to the difficulty of disengagement for 
people whose whole livesand subcultures have embraced terrorism and separatism (Canter 
2009: 15). Djuli (2014) was concerned about the difficulty for combatants of leavingbehind 
their past, especially those who had experienced many years in the jungle. They received, 
during the conflict period, enormous logistical support from villagers. Those are the ones 
who have found it hard to adapt to the current transformation. They have failed to disengage 
themselves from conflict and war.In north Aceh, some groups of former combatannts have 
kidnapped foreign workers for their own gain or threatened to attack workers in local industry 
due to the difficulties theyhave experienced in finding jobs. Ayah Banta, who headed a 
special forceof such ‘retired’combatants,used explosives to kill more than ten people in the 
days approaching the 2012 elections in Aceh. 
These killings and attacks are part of a failed process. Djuli (2014) asserts that combatants 
who have lower levels of education and belong toa lower socio-economic demographic are 
the most vulnerable groups with regard to returning to their conflict experience in order to 
gain access to the economy. Disengagement can be influenced by compatriots of the former 
combatants,in sympathy withgroup members who are trying to get justice. In the context of 
Aceh, access for combatants to special treatment in the form of financial assistancewould
help them to leave their past and step forward into a future of prosperity and peace. This
includes those who are currently working in political parties, parliament or local government 
and still using a military approach in managing their work; they too are part of the failed 
process of disengagement. 
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Disengagement can only be said to have succeeded when Aceh achieves economic stability 
and a unified outlook. Cut Intan, who joined GAM in her teenageyears, could be considered 
one of the people typifying Horgan’s picture of a terrorist; she was involved in separatist 
activities throughout her life until the end of the conflict. She learned from her father, a close 
aide of the GAM commanderTeungku Abdullah Shafe’I, how to be committed, as a GAM 
female combatant, to the dignity and freedom of Aceh. She also prayed for her baby to be 
born in exile so that he could continue the struggle of his father, who was killed by 
Indonesian military forces.2Intan has now attempted to leave her past behind and dedicate her 
life to the future of her son and to enjoy the peace and stability of the current environment in 
Aceh. But she has been disappointed in her former combatant commanders who, she argues, 
have betrayed the original spirit of GAM in relation to the prosperity and unity of Aceh. 
Unlike Horgan, Galtung approached violent acts of former combatants with nonviolence,
arguing:
There is a practice: Nonviolence, breaking that vicious cycle, by some called ‘the 
security dilemma’, refusing to use violence, engaging in constructive action across 
conflict borders instead. Nonviolence actually has two meanings. One is broader, 
more or less co-extensive with what here is called ‘peace by peaceful means’,
including most steps and most therapies in the model. And one is more narrow, seeing 
nonviolence as a better way of doing legitimate jobs violence is supposed to do, such 
as defence against direct violence attacks, and offense against structural violence 
(Galtung 2007: 29).
Peacebuilding and the nonviolence approach as well as further processes of mediation and 
reconciliation require comprehensive methods in order to transform people, communities and 
                                                          
2Cut Intan, interview in Pidie, February 2012. 
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the environment into a situation of permanent peace. Galtung further recommended the 
importance of peace education, which was initiated by former GAM leaders and intellectuals 
like Nur Djuli by providing training in democracy and peace to former combatants. Some of 
the training graduates are now local government leaders and parliament members. Galtung 
(2007: 27) said: “this is deep culture work, calling on cultural anthropology, philosophy, 
history of ideas, etc. The major instrument is peace education. But people associate that with 
schooling and think they have graduated from schools”.For Galtung, peace journalism is 
urgent:“observing and reporting events within a solution-oriented peace discourse, not only 
within the victory-oriented security discourse” (2007: 27). 
Furthermore, we need to examine how special autonomy is a strategic means to overcome
secessionist movements. It is interesting to learn how the status of special autonomy, initiated 
after the collapse of the New Order, failed to end the conflict, especially from 1999 to 2004, 
and finally, after a few months of serious negotiation in Helsinki, ‘self-governance’ status 
agreed to in the accord allowed former combatants to integrate with the Indonesian state. 
Self-governance is interpreted in theLoGA, Law Number 11/2006 and this enabled the 
participation of former combatants in local politics. They established a local party, Party 
Aceh, and in the 2012 gubernatorial and head of district elections they won in 11 of the 17 
districts and one governor and vice-governor. 
The special autonomy status granted in the LoGA allowed local politics and development to 
be dominated by former combatants, giving them the opportunity to establish the ideals of 
their long struggle for prosperity, peace and justice for the Acehenese people. Before the 
Helsinki accord, scholars argued that establishment of autonomous regions was not the 
solution to secessionist movements. McGibbon (2004) stated that special automomy laws 
established from 1999 failed to end the separatist movement:“special autonomy has failed to 
provide a sustainable framework through which to address separatist conflict in Indonesia”
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(McGibbon 2004: 4). Even though federal status was proposed by some activists and 
requested by Hasan di Tiro in the 1950s and 1960s as the best formula for a diverse and 
plural nation, Indonesia allowed for special autonomy status and passed regional autonomy 
laws which sent a powerful message to local leaders to developgood local government.
Thisensured the dynamics of local politics and democratic transition worked smoothly at
provincial and district levels in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 4
Regional Autonomy, Development and Peace in Aceh
“Wallah(I swear to God), Billah(I swear to God), Aceh region will be granted special 
rights to self-regulate based on Islamic syariah”
(President Sukarno’s statement in 1948, quoted by Tempo, 24 August 2003). 
Introduction
Regional autonomy has been strategic for diverse and plural states where people live in a 
broad area with varieties of ethnicities, religions and cultures. Autonomous regionsallow
people from the local area to manage their own territory based on their local culture. The 
richness of the culture and the distinctiveness of the economy give freedom and opportunity 
for local leaders and communities to develop pride in their cultures and economies. A major 
reason that regions attempt to separate from the state is due to centralised political policy that 
is discriminatory and abuses power by exploiting the natural resources of the local region 
without any return of revenue for the development and prosperity of the local community.
Expressions and movements towards separatism in order to develop independently and 
autonomously may take decades and a number of regime changes. The East Timorese people 
successfully transformed their country into an independent state after more than two decades 
of struggle against the central government of Indonesia. Ali Alatas, former minister of 
foreign affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, said that “today our responsibility and our 
commitment is to help make possible the fulfilment of the newly expressed will of the 
majority of East Timorese to seek a new destiny outside the Republic of Indonesia” (Alatas 
2001: 606). Guelke stated that Timor-Leste transformed from regional autonomyto 
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independence:“despite opposition in the military, the new Indonesian government decided 
that it needed a quick solution to the problem of East Timor to prevent the issue from 
contributing to a wider process of disintegration” (Guelke 2012:142). Timor-Leste and 
Indonesia are now forming a good relationship; Timor-Leste depends on commodities from 
Indonesia and citizens of Timor-Leste living in the border areas maintain strong networks and 
a feeling of unity with the people in East Nusa Tenggara. Many of them originate from the 
same families and clan groups.
Timor-Leste and Aceh have had similar experiences of military pressure against separatist 
movements that has left some problems in relation to human rights violations. This inspired 
negotiators in Helsinki to manage the issue of human rights violations in order to create a just 
and permanent peace in Aceh. Acehnese activists and human rights organisations visited Dili 
in Timor-Leste to learn about the process of the National Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation (Guterres 2013; Sholeh 2014b). They were able to share common 
experiences of conflict and attempted to establish a strong foundation to seek justice from the 
Indonesian military forces involved in the killing and disappearance of East Timorese and 
Acehnese during the respective periods of conflict (Guterres 2013). Guterres is an East 
Timorese lawyer, founderof the HAK (Hak Asasi Kemanusiaan or Human Rights) 
Foundation andmoderator of the National Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation, which negotiated with the Government of Indonesia in efforts to deal with 
human rights abuses. Given the strong political pressure attending such negotiations, the title 
of the commission changed to the Commission of Truth and Friendship. This theme of 
collaboration between Timor-Leste and Aceh is discussed in detail in a later chapter in a 
comparison between Aceh and Timor-Leste,with a focus on how they have shared and 
learned from each other on issues of conflict and initiatives for peace. 
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The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Article 2 on human rights states:
2.1. The Indonesian Government will adhere to the United Nations International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
2.2. A Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh. 
2.3.A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the 
Indonesian Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, with the task of formulating 
and determining reconciliation measures (Awaludin 2009: 320). 
However, human rights violations that occurred during the conflict have never been discussed 
seriously by the government due to the refusal of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to 
create a foundation for the Indonesian Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, a refusal 
which significantly affected the establishment and process of the Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation in Aceh (Sholeh 2014b).
Equality, freedom and justice remain the key factors for many regions in terms of their 
affiliation with, or separation from, the state. Aceh has a long history of separatism and of 
initiatives to overcome the separatist movement through the implementation of special 
autonomy. The dynamics of history, conflict and initiatives for peace created a strong and 
confident autonomous region. Pride in Acehnese history has strengthened the foundations of 
current economic development; however,human rights violations have been made by the 
Indonesianmilitaryforces and unfair development policies on the part of the central 
government are a strong impetus for Aceh to be an autonomous region that conducts its own 
affairs. Daud Bereueh struggled against the central government for the creation of a special 
autonomous region with independent governance in regulating the religion and culture of 
Aceh. Abdullah confirmed that: “the politician-Ulama just wishes Aceh to be a part of an 
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alternative NKRI by becoming either an Islamic state or a federal state, but not separated 
from the state. Nine years later, Daud Bereueh and his followers surrendered and were 
welcomed with honour” (Abdullah 2003). Bereueh continued to fight against the central 
government after realisingthat it had not fulfilledits promise of regional autonomy on the 
terms he had demanded – that is, Aceh as a special regional autonomous region based on 
Islamic syari’ah. Bereueh’s demands were continued by Tiro, who supplanted the central 
concept, switching from religious to ethnic nationalism.
Tiro continued Bureueh’s separatist movement by proposing an independent Aceh where 
people could develop and take advantage of their natural resources. To overcome these 
movements, the Indonesian government established special regulations for an autonomous 
Aceh. In the end, the idea of separatism was changed through the Helsinki peace negotiations
and GAM agreed to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia by accepting self-governance
status, which is interpreted in LoGA Number 11/2006 as ‘special autonomy.’McGibbon 
(2004: 1) said that “Indonesia offered the special autonomy laws as a major concession to 
Aceh and Papua as part of its overall accommodating approach to resolving separatist conflict 
that had few parallels in Indonesian history”.
This chapter examines regional autonomy in Aceh from the perspectives of its economic and 
political character and its history. It is argued that the regional autonomy initiated in Aceh has 
displayed an inconsistent history, even from the early period of the Indonesian revolution. 
Betrayals of the people of Aceh by the central government over many years have created a 
deep feeling of cautionabout the central government. The expression of betrayal remained for 
some time after the 2005 Helsinki peace accord, which granted ‘self-government’ status to 
Aceh through the welcoming and reintegration of GAM to the Republic of Indonesia. Even 
though the regulation was inconsistent, regional autonomy policy has effectively overcome 
the secessionist movement in Aceh; this is in line with Brancati’s argument that most 
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secessionist movements have been overcomeby decentralisation, except in the case of Central 
Europe,where decentralisation created ethnic conflicts (Brancati 2006). 
The subsequent discussion is divided into four parts: firstly, the relationship between the 
regulations surrounding autonomy and central government policy in Aceh, from the period of 
Daud Bereueh of Darul Islam to that of Hasan Tiro of GAM; secondly, central government 
policy on regional autonomy in the period after the fall of the New Order until the Helsinki 
negotiations; thirdly, the implications of the Helsinki peace agreement for the nature of 
regional autonomy in Aceh, including the way in which the MoU was transformed into 
LoGA Number 11/2006; and lastly, the implementation of the special autonomy regulations 
of LoGA and reflections on the current dynamics of local politics and economic development 
in Aceh. 
Separatism and Regional Autonomy
Central government policy towards the autonomous region of Aceh has been established 
since the Sukarno period. It has also provided a way for the central government to 
accommodate the rise of insurgencies in Aceh against the central government. To 
accommodate the demand for a separate self-governing state, Sukarno visited Aceh and 
expressed a promise to be benevolent to Aceh, which had contributed a lot in the early period 
of Indonesian independence. It was an interesting statement by Sukarno, who responded 
emotionally to a surprising demand from Daud Bereueh to sign a letter of agreement that 
Aceh should be given the status of a special autonomous region where Islamic syari’ahand 
the culture of Aceh could be freely implemented, thereby distinguishing Aceh from the rest 
of Indonesia.On 15 June 1948 in front of Daud Bereueh, Sukarno promised: “Wallah(I swear 
to God), Billah(I swear to God), the region of Aceh will be granted special rights to self-
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regulation based on Islamic syari’ah” (Tempo, 24 August 2003). Sukarno knew how strong 
the sense of ethnic identity and religiosity was among the Acehnese. 
His statement was responded to positively by Daud Bereueh, who refused to join the State of 
Sumatra Timur headed by Teungku Mansyur. In Bereueh’s statement of refusal, published in 
the Kutatadja newspaper Semangat Merdeka on 23 March 1949, he said: “given that there 
isno sense of local nationalism (kedaerahan), we will not establish Aceh Raya and so on. We 
are here having a spirit of republiken(republic)” (Tempo, 24 August 2003).However, the 
commitment of Bereueh to the Republic of Indonesia was betrayed by Sukarno, who stated 
two years later in Amuntai, South Kalimantan, on 27 January 1953, that: “what we want is a 
national state that covers all of Indonesia … if we establish an Islamic-based state, a lot of 
non-Muslims will separate (from the state)” (Tempo, 24 August 2003). Bereueh’s proposal 
for a special autonomous region of Aceh based on the regional identity of Acehnese culture 
and Islamic syari’ah was not responded to by the central government. Bereueh claimed that 
Sukarno broke his promise and betrayed the Acehnese. On 21 September 1953, Bereueh 
launched the rebel movement Darul Islam, hereafter DI (Tempo, 24 August 2003).
This movement became the first challenge to the central government in terms of how to 
manage such a strong expression,from a local area, of republican unity. This was a difficult 
moment, testing whether Indonesia was going to be a federal or a unitary state. Separatist 
movements also arose in Maluku, South Sulawesi and West Java. From New York, Tiro sent 
a letter to the Indonesian Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, in September 1954. He asked 
Sastroamidjojo’s government to stop the “genocide” against the rebel movement in Aceh. In 
response to Tiro’s letter, the Indonesian government demanded that Tiro return to Indonesia 
as soon as possible, then the government put a stop on Tiro’s passport from 22 September 
1958.
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In the meantime, in opposition to the central government, Bereueh operated DI in the rural 
and forest areas of Aceh for three years. In April 1957, Bereueh made a peace agreement,
called the Lamteh Pledge (Ikrar Lamteh), with the Indonesian government. On 16 May 
1959,the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Hardi, established the Special Region (Daerah 
Istimewa) of the Province of Aceh by law No. 1/Missi/1959, which allowed the government 
of Aceh to autonomously regulate the subjects of education, religion and culture (Prang 
2010). The regulation officially worked according to Law No. 18/1965 (Djumala 2013). This
was the first special autonomous status granted to Aceh to accommodate the separatist rebel
movement of Bereueh. However, this special status did not change Aceh very much. Bereueh 
continued to fight against the central government for true recognition of the special status of 
Aceh. 
The central government has regulated a special autonomy law or special political policy 
towards the Province of Aceh since the Old Order. The purpose of this special status 
regulation or policy was to allow more attention to be given to Aceh, recognising, in 
particular, that the Acehnese contributed significantly to the struggle of Indonesia against the 
Dutch during the revolutionary period, and in relation to the oil and gas exploration begun in 
the early 1970s. However, this special status of Aceh was more symbolic than anything else; 
at the time of the early Acehnese resistance against the central government, it was stated by 
Bereueh that the central government did not pay serious attention to the prosperity of Aceh, 
and that political and economic policies implemented towards Aceh were inconsistent.
Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia, headed by Bereueh, responded promptly to these 
inconsistencies. Suharto attempted to change the policy by providing a stronger role for the 
heads of villages to secure their territory. Aceh’s oil and gas exploration and exploitation, 
with its very limited advantages for Aceh, created new rebels under the banner of the Aceh 
Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which later changed to the Free Aceh 
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Movement, initiated by Hasan Tiro. Development did not proceed effectively in Aceh, 
disrupted as it was by the conflicts, and Special Autonomy Law No. 44/1999 and Law No. 
18/2001were granted to Aceh in order to stop the spread of separatism after the New Order. 
As soon as Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945, Indonesian political 
leaders were challenged as to how to distribute political power between districts, provinces 
and the central government. The debates raisedthe question of whether the country was to be 
founded as a federal or a unitary state. Political leaders agreed to establish the unitary state of 
Indonesia. They introduced Law No. 1/1945, which was replaced by Law No. 22/1948 to 
make it more effective and applicable. The latterlaw failed to be implemented due to the 
Dutch government’s military pressure on Indonesian territory. Indonesia and the Dutch 
government signed a peace agreement in The Hague to establish a federal state of Indonesia 
under Law 1950, which delivered wider political powers of autonomy to Indonesian 
provinces and districts. However, thisdid not work due to the weakness of the new Indonesian 
government. Reid (2007) argued that Indonesians generally opposed federalism and favoured 
the notion of unitary states due to the challenges issuing from this very diverse and pluralistic
society. Rebellions, ethnic conflicts and violence that killed thousands of people resulted 
from that choice. Aceh’s violent history describes the price of the diverse unitary state of 
Indonesia. Reid (2009: 95) argued that:
Aceh was a model of resistance to all ideas emanating from the Dutch in this 
contested period, including federalism, though in practice, the Acehnese had no need 
of federal safeguards, since they were fully in control of Aceh. Daud Beureu’eh’s
1953 rebellion was not to support an overtly independent Aceh, but an Indonesian 
Islamic State (NII), for which he believed Aceh had fought in the revolution. 
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Bereueh was appointed by all factions of NII/Darul Islam of Java, Aceh Sumatra and South 
Sulawesi as an Imam of DI in 1973 at the first meeting after the Old Order among all DIs in 
Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. Bereueh confirmed that the purpose of DI was to guide the 
morality of the Indonesian government. He warned those present:“do not be in a hurry to 
evaluate the government negatively. We have to look at the government’s positive efforts. 
What we have to do is give guidance to the government” (Solahudin 2011: 92).
Bereueh took his leadership of DI in a more radical direction when he gave his approval to 
violent attacks against the Indonesian government after a rise in the number of prostitutes 
surrounding the Arun Oil Company in Lhokseumawe, Aceh, was discovered in 1975. From 
1973 to 1975, DI of Java had prepared I’dad asykary or military training (including bomb-
making) and put in place recruitment to launch a violent attack against the central 
government. These forces supported the concerns of Bereueh on how to uphold Islamic 
syari’ah in order to prevent the rise of immorality in the new and growing town of 
Lhokseumawe. 
To strengthen these operations, DI initiated fundraising from overseas, especially from the 
Middle East. DI searched for financial support from the government of Libya to launch this 
action. In September 1975, Bereueh asked his most trusted men, Hasan Tiro and Sanusi 
Juned, to arrange lobbyingof the Libyan government in Kuala Lumpur. They proposed 12.5 
billion US dollars for violent operations, which was refused by the Libyan government due to 
a lack of evidence of the need for such a fund (Solahudin 2011: 97). The moral 
considerations underlying the motives of Bereueh in the Aceh rebellion movement were later 
changed by Tiro to reflect concerns relating to the political and economic situation;
additionally, the question of Aceh’s ethnic nationalist identity arose after the collapse of the 
New Order through the rise of ethnic conflicts in some regions of Indonesia (Bertrand 2004). 
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This change of focus transformed the movement into a more effective and militant operation 
against the Indonesian government.
Bereueh and Tiro’s rebel movements against the central government of Indonesia were partly 
the direct result of the ambiguity in policy on regional autonomy from the Sukarno 
period.When Tiro arrived in Aceh around 1976, he said that “the first order of things is to 
make the Achehnese opinion leaders understand in what political process our people and our 
country are involved; we are in the process of being swallowed by Javanese colonialists”
(Tiro 1984: 10). Before launching the rebel movement against the central government, Tiro 
formulated an alternative structure of federal government in order to give enough space for 
the myriad varieties of ethnic groups in Indonesia. His bookDemokrasi untuk Indonesia 
(Democracy to Indonesia) in 1958 explained his position on handling the ethnic diversity of 
Indonesia by establishing a federal state. Tiro’s proposal was in line with the ideas of 
Bereueh as to the autonomous region of Aceh with its special character of culture and 
adherence to the religion of Islam. 
About fifty years after Indonesia withdrew his passport in 1958, Tiro returned to Aceh on 11 
October 2008 for some two weeks. Then, from 17 October 2009, he stayed permanently in 
Aceh. He applied for Indonesian citizenship in 2009, but his application was approved only 
one day before he died on 3 June 2010 in Zainal Abidin Hospital in Banda Aceh. Tiro was 
buried next to the grave of his grandfather, Teungku Cik di Tiro, an Indonesian hero who 
fought against the colonial Dutch forces. From 1958 to 2010, Tiro was an American citizen. 
His wife Dora and his son Karim now live in Ohio (Tempo, 2 June 2010; Belford 2010; 
Kingsbury 2010).  
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After the New Order
After Suharto stepped down, the demand for decentralised power increased from all 
Indonesian regions. People expressedtheir demands in a variety of ways:firstly, some regions 
threatened to separate from Indonesia, particularly afterthe result of the referendum in Timor-
Lestecaused a rise in demandfor a referendum inotherregions, including Aceh, Papua, Riau, 
Maluku, South Sulawesi and Kalimantan (Lesperssi Team 2008; Bertrand 2004), all of which 
are not only rich in natural resources, but importantly have a strong sense of 
ethnicity.Secondly, in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West and Central Kalimantan, these
demands were expressedthrough violent riots and conflicts;thirdly, the voices of federalism 
began to be heard. In order to accommodate these strident expressions of identity and 
political will, the central government responded by creating laws that granted the
decentralisation of power and wealth to regional districts.
Provincial political elites demanded special autonomy laws which accommodated the identity 
of local culture and higher revenue from natural resources managed in their provinces and 
districts. McGibbon (2004: 5) argued that the autonomy laws were the consequence of a 
timely political change: “fearing the disintegration of the state, the government hastily 
granted key concessions to provincial elites. The granting of these concessions did not follow 
from a systematic process of bargaining and negotiations with board-based elements in the 
provinces”.As a result of this fear, the policy was politicised and provincial and district elites 
took advantage of this. Corruption was almost uncontrolled in Aceh, especially before the
2005 Helsinki peace accord. 
Miller’s argument is different from McGibbon’s. She doubted that regional autonomy can 
overcome separatist movements, saying that:
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Jakarta’s inability to resolve Aceh’s conflict through its special autonomy package 
can be largely explained by three interrelated factors. First, within the Megawati 
administration, there was a high degree of ambivalence about decentralisation in 
general, and strong suspicion about the NAD law in particular. Second, this dominant 
attitude contributed toward the government’s greater reliance on militaristic measures 
than on political policies, which eroded and delegitimised the conciliatory spirit of the 
NAD law even as aspects of it were implemented in Aceh. Third, pre-existing 
systemic factors in Aceh such asthe dysfunctional, war-ravaged state infrastructure 
and the inherent culture of corruption within the bureaucracy undermined the national 
government’s authority, political legitimacy and special autonomy policy objectives 
in the province (Miller 2004: 334).
Miller’s argument suggests that the special autonomy law released by President Megawati 
just continued the domination of the central government through a military approach and a
corrupt local government which was managedby the central government in Aceh. The 
attempts at peace made by individuals and CSOs failed due to the corrupt local government 
and military pressureon human rights activists and combatant leaders. President Wahid’s
peace initiatives are included in this challenge, as the military elite played a crucial role in 
maintaining conflicts in Aceh as well as Papua (McGibbon 2004). 
Brancati argued that decentralisation successfully reduced the conflict and prevented
separatism. Her claims were based on research of thirty democracies from 1985 to 2000. 
Brancati stated that “decentralization is thought to reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism in 
democracies by bringing the government closer to the people, increasing opportunities to 
participate in government, and giving groups control over their political, social and economic 
affairs” (Brancati 2006: 651–652). The study is relevant in terms of Indonesia; Haris held the 
viewthat local secessionist groups in Indonesia resulted from development policy which was
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exploitative and marginalised the local community (Haris 2007: 67).The arguments of 
Brancati and Haris do not support the fact that decentralisation, as an instrument of conflict 
resolution,has failed to overcome some separatist conflicts. The key factor in the success or 
failure of measures to accommodate demands for greater autonomy lies in the fulfilment of
the demands of the local community – the local community needs to be respected.
The rise of local nationalism gave rise to violence and increased conflict in some parts of 
Indonesia soon after Suharto resigned. This was the reason for the establishment of the 
regional autonomy laws – Law Number 22/1999 on local government and Law Number 
25/1999 on the financial balance between central and local governments. Ethno-religious 
conflicts began in Maluku in January 1999 and at the same time religious conflicts also 
occurred in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The Maluku and Poso conflicts left more than five 
thousand people – both Christians and Muslims – dead and millions displaced. The conflicts
ended after the Bali bombing in October 2002, with pressure from the international 
community for the Indonesian government to overcome the conflict. 
There was a close relation between jihad in Maluku and Poso and the Bali bombing. 
Jihadists3 operating in both regions launched broader attacks against the Indonesian 
government (police and military) and any symbol of Western culture (Sholeh 2003, 2007). 
The returnees from the conflicts had become established as radical jihadists based in Java and 
                                                          
3 The words‘jihad’and‘jihadist’ refer to militia groups and members involved in the Maluku and Poso conflicts. 
There were at least two main jihadist groups. Firstly Laskar Jihad,also called Salafy-Jihadist,deployed more than 
2000 members from Java to Maluku and Poso(Hasan 2006). From 2001 to 2002, it was estimated 3000–4000
Laskar Jihad militia members joined the operation. Secondly, radicaljihadism refers to radical groups affiliated 
with Darul Islam and Jema’ah Islamiyah. They had operated in Maluku since January 1999 in the earlier stage 
of the conflict (Imron 2007). Their numbers were smaller than Laskar Jihad but they worked in a more deadly 
and effective manner. Many leaders of the group had gained experience in the Afghan war in the 1980s. This 
group endangered the harmony of Maluku and Poso due to its teaching on jihadism. They recruited local 
fighters who becameviolent and radical. The recruitswho joined attack operations in Loki, West Ceram in 2005
killed a few of the Mobile Police Brigade.The commander of the jihad operation argued that the police were 
unintended targets. They had planned to attack the Christian village of Loki, which was protected by the police 
(Jaja 2013). Some Acehnese fighters also joined the conflict. Among them was Abu Jihad,alias Tengku Fauzi 
Hazdi Geudong, who was killed in Maluku. Abu Jihad published bookscritical of Hasan Tiro. Jones claimed that 
Abu Jihad was the Al-Qaidah leader in Southeast Asia (Jakarta Post, 3 April 2003). 
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influenced radicalism all over Indonesia, including an attempt to establish military training in 
Aceh in 2010 (Andriyanto & Hasan 2010). Ethnic conflict between Madurese and Dayak 
occurred in West Kalimantan in January 1997, when about 500 people were killed and 20,000 
Madurese displaced (Bertrand 2004: 48). 
The central government managed to control regional politics by establishing a new regional 
autonomy policy. Decentralisation laws released to accommodate the demands from 
provincial and districts formore freedom and opportunity to develop based on their strengths.
Butt (2010: 178) stated that: “under decentralisation laws, authority was granted to two levels 
of regional government – provinces (propinsi) on the one hand, and districts (kabupaten) and
cities (kota) on the other – to make their own policies and local laws”. Regional autonomy 
laws were established first in 1999 and changed in 2004. Furthermore, Butt (2010: 
179)explained that:
Regional Autonomy [Law No. 22 of 1999] (Indonesia) gave both districts (kabupaten) 
and cities (kota), rather than provinces (propinsi), broad and wide-ranging lawmaking 
autonomy (otonomi yang luas), except over several matters reserved exclusively for 
the central gobernment (art. 7). Other part of Indonesia were granted ‘Special 
Autonomy’ (otonomi khusus) status under separate legislation. 
The 1999 regional autonomy statute was replaced by Law No. 32/2004 on Regional 
Governance. This ensured the central government regained power after the high levels of 
power and authority granted to districts and cities based on the 1999 regional autonomy laws. 
In Law No. 32/2004, the central government delivered power to provincial levels which 
represented the central government role in order to coordinate development in districts and 
cities. Governors were enabled to report directly to the president on the progress of regional 
economic development. The impact of the regional autonomy with economic and political 
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privileges for local elites was a rise in new districts and provinces being proposed to the 
central government. Indonesia had about 292 local governments (provinces, districts and 
cities) outside Jakarta in 1998. Three years after the 1999 regional autonomy law released, 
there were approximately 440 cities and districts in 2003. By 2009 there were 33 provinces 
and 484 districts and cities in Indonesia, almost double the numbers before the collapse of the 
New Order (Butt 2010).The increase in demand to establish new provinces, districts and 
cities were part of an effortto grow local politics.
The Acehnese responded differently to the people of Maluku, Poso and Kalimantan. They 
institutionalised their power by demanding justice and a referendum. Bertrand described it
thus:
While in most of Indonesia, clamors for democracy accompanied the mantra of 
reformasi (reform), the Acehnese immediately focused on justice. Demonstrators 
demanded a withdrawal of soldiers from the region and investigations into human 
rights abuses committed by the armed forces over the past decade. Shortly after, a 
civilian movement began to demand a referendum on the future status of Aceh, with 
increasing evidence that a large proportion of the population supported independence 
(Bertrand 2004:174).
After the establishment of the New Order, Aceh had two special autonomy laws. Firstly, Law 
No. 44/1999, on the special status of Aceh was approved by the legislative members of the 
New Order before they were replaced by legislators appointed after the June 1999 elections. 
The law acknowledged the special status of the Acehnese in terms of religious life, customs, 
education and the role of Muslim priestsin the determination of regional policy. However, it 
was not very significant. The Acehnese hoped for a clear development policy that directly 
improved their prosperity and security. In fact, the number of poor people in rural Aceh 
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increased in that year, in comparison with the figures for 2003 and 2004, by more than 30 
percent. The ‘special status’ of Aceh had to overcome the rise in poverty in Aceh.
Two years later, the government released a new autonomy law, Law No. 18/2001 on Special 
Autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). In the second law, the funds granted to 
Aceh were much greater than the amount stipulated by the first law. Not only did it provide 
stronger authority to the Ulama, but it also paid more attention to economic development. 
Crouch (2003: 28) statedthat “unlike the national laws, special autonomy in Aceh devolves 
authority to the provincial rather than the district level. The law provides for the return to the 
province of 80 per cent of petroleum and natural gas revenue under the national autonomy 
law”.Revenue was the most crucial factor demanded by the Acehnese for their development 
and prosperity. This is what Tiro wanted – to use the gains resulting from their natural 
resources for economic development for the people of Aceh. In addition, the law gave special 
authority for Aceh to self-regulate based on Islamic syari’ah. Crouch stated that “the law also 
provides for the establishment of a Syari’ah Court under which syari’ah would be 
implemented. It specifically states that syari’ah will not be applied to non-Muslims” (2003: 
28). 
These laws were not able to be implemented due to the security situation. Violent conflicts 
were common for the people, but the hardest impacts were on the people in the rural villages,
who had to stay at home for fear of harm. They couldnot go out to their farming. Until the 
peace agreement was signed, the security control over Acehnese territory impacted very 
strongly on local security.Whatever laws are designed to ensure the pride, dignity and 
development of Aceh, if a lack of security and stability threatens the lives of civilians and the 
people of Aceh, then the laws are ineffective. The government failed to resume peace 
negotiations from 2000 to 2002. GAM refused the proposal of the Indonesian government 
delegation to create special autonomy status for Aceh. According to Nurdin Abdul Rahman, 
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one of the GAM negotiators: “HDC did not fulfil justice. It only stopped a fire or created a 
temporary break in the conflict. It did not work effectively because it did not state clearly the 
economic and social rights of the Acehnese, and how to treat Acehnese justly” (Rahman 
2013).
The achievement of a lasting peace in the region needed a more powerful incentive to force 
both parties towards serious and effective negotiations. This came, unexpectedly, in the form 
of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Aceh on 26 December 2004. More than two 
hundred thousand people were killed. This catastrophic natural disaster forced GAM and 
Indonesia to achieve an effective result from their peace negotiations. The Indonesian 
government approached GAM in Aceh and Sweden. Finally, it was agreed that the Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI), headed by former Finnish president Ahtisaari, would moderate 
the peace process.
Reintegration
The Helsinki peace accord changed Aceh dramatically from a place of conflict to one of 
peace. What Bereueh and Tiro had worked towards – a special autonomy status that strongly 
featured the dignity and prosperity of Aceh – was a central discussion point at the negotiating
table. Former combatants who had fought against the government were now allowed to return 
to Aceh. Under the agreement, they received amnesty and the right to establish local political 
parties. To implement the MoU established in Helsinki, the points of the MoU were to be 
transferred into regional law. The preparation of the law was supported by academics and 
CSOs in Aceh. It was probably the most pluralistic draft bill ever produced from all members 
of the Acehnese community, local government and civil society. The draft was sent to Jakarta 
and discussed by the national legislature. The law that resulted was titled the Law on the 
Governing of Aceh (LoGA) Number 11/2006. 
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Human rights NGOs criticised any members of the national legislature who did not 
accommodate the aspirations of Aceh. According to Fuad Mardhatillah, human rights activist 
and now head of the Aceh Institute, “there are four versions of the drafts from Syiah Kuala 
University, State Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Malikussaleh and the Free Aceh 
Movement. The national legislature disregarded the drafts” (Mardhadillah 2013). The 
participatory process of legislation of the LoGA, involving all stakeholders in Aceh, indicates 
a sense of belonging in relation to the law. It will impact on further legislation, which will 
involve public consultancy, a mechanism by which members of the public are allowed to 
present their opinions and thoughts on legislation and other government policy initiated by 
the Aceh legislature (Meliala etal. 2007). 
The key word of the accord is “self-governance”, which is interpreted in the LoGA as 
“special autonomy”, even though the phrase‘special autonomy’ was taboo during the 
Helsinkidiscussions. GAM considered that accepting ‘special autonomy’ status would bring
similar outcomes to those of the previous laws on the special autonomy of Acehformulated in 
1999 and 2001. However, Rahman argued that “‘self-governance’ is synonymous with 
‘special autonomy,’ which we adopted from the statutes of Hong Kong, China following by a 
principle of justice for Acehnese society on politics, economy, law, education and culture”
(Rahman 2012). 
Furthermore, some Acehnese responded negatively to the transformation of the MoU into the 
LoGA, one criticism being that there was a reduction of some of the contents. Rahman 
conceded that there was some downsizing of the original draft but recommended a
conciliatory approach: “there are six points of the MoU not accommodated in the LoGA. 
However, let the LoGA be implemented. It is part of the process of mutual trust development 
between central and local government. After the trust, the possibility of the amendment of the 
law will be easy” (Rahman 2012). 
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However, it has now been almost ten years since the LoGA was implemented and the 
promise of amendment stated by the national legislature has never been fulfilled. The 
Acehnese demanded that the LoGA should genuinely reflectthe Helsinki MoU as agreed by 
both parties during the 2005 negotiation. GAM transformed itself to reintegrate with the state 
of Indonesia; as a reward, Indonesia had to fulfil its promise to thoroughly implement the 
agreement for the prosperity, dignity and peace of Aceh (Abdullah 2015).The demands of the 
Helsinki MoU havebecome crucial issues that were stated by candidates of the political 
parties, especially by the Party Aceh and Aceh National parties, in the elections of 2012 and 
2014. CSOs are also concerned overthis issue, which should be well understood by the 
central government and the national legislature. To highlight the critical issues stated in the 
LoGA,the following discussion underlines the need for further recommendations for
implementation and amendment.
Among the critical points needing to be kept centre stage for the implementation of regional 
autonomy are: 
1. the matter relating to the raising of funds with external loans– In the section of the 
LoGA relating to economic matters (Article 186.1), this requires “the agreement of 
the Minister of Finance and the considerations of the Ministry of Home Affairs to 
raise funds with external loans”. This is very different to the provisions of the MoU 
(Article 1.3.1.), which state “Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans. 
Aceh has the right to set interest rates beyond that set by the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Indonesia” (CMI 2012: 17). This proviso includes revenues from all 
current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in Aceh, where 
the Acehnese areentitled to retain seventy (70) per cent as stated in the MoU (Article 
1.3.4). However, the LoGA regulations (Article 165.3) require Aceh to follow 
national norms, standards and procedures.
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2. the matterrelating to retention of revenue share– The LoGA (Article …) states 
that“Aceh does not retain its revenue share of 70%, but all revenues are transferred to 
the central government, which reallocates funds to Aceh. The Second MoU signatory 
is concerned about a possible lack of transparency” (CMI 2012: 18).
Further strategic reintegration processes included the distribution of economic facilitation 
packages to former GAM combatants and amnesty for prisoners. Victims of Aceh’s thirty-
year conflict were also eligible for financial support. The Aceh Monitoring Mission reported 
that “throughout Aceh, local governments have distributed economic facilitation packages to 
3,000 former GAM combatants… Each package consisted of one million Rupiah 
(approximately US$100) for each GAM former combatant. These packages are granted in 
order to assist former combatants’ safe return to their society” (AMM 2005). 
Financial support was very urgent for former combatant returnees, who needed to 
immediately begin the re-establishment of their lives and their contribution to the wellbeing 
of their family. However, it was less than sufficient that each combatant received US $100; 
moreover, the actual number of combatants on the ground was about 100 percent more than 
the number reported at the negotiations. The number of 3000 was only a strategy of the GAM 
negotiator in anticipation of an attack by the Indonesian military, like what happened in 2002
after the peace negotiations in Tokyo under the supervision of the HDC. This was one of the 
hardest challenges for combatants – to return with a limited budget (Djuli 2013; Rahman 
2012). 
In order to fulfil the demand, the Aceh ReintegrationPeace Board (BRDA/BRA) managed to 
provide limited funds to those combatants who did not receive enough funds on their return. 
Nur Djuli, former head of the BRDA and one of the official representatives of GAM during 
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the Helsinki peace agreement, confirmed that the program of the BDRA/BRA was focused on 
supporting the combatants and other victims (Djuli 2013). 
Patronage and Corruption
Regional autonomy was also challenged by the high incidence of corruption and patronage. 
During the conflict, Aceh had a reputation as one of the most corrupt provinces in Indonesia.
Extortion from conflicting parties was one of the most popular means of corruption (Multi-
Stakeholder 2009).After the conflict, that reputation continued. In 2010, Banda Aceh was 
listed as one of the ten worst cities in the Corruption Perception Index, having decreased 
sharply from number 3 in 2008 to number 33 in 2010 (Simanjuntak, Digdowiseiso & Saputro 
2010: 18). 
The Multi-Stakeholder of the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs, 
National Development Planning Agency and the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Board reported 
that:
Several early attempts to distribute post-conflict reintegration assistance were widely 
criticised as disproportionately benefiting KPA or PETA allies. However, serious 
attempts to investigate allegations of such corruption or misdirection of funds have 
been conspicuously lacking. This situation has improved considerably as BRA has 
improved its capacity to verify claims and monitor implementation. However, the 
continued focus on providing direct reintegration benefits or compensation continues 
to create opportunities for patronage and pay-offs, while also creating expectations 
and feelings of entitlement that such programs can never completely appease (Multi-
Stakeholder 2009: 154). 
The Multi-Stakeholder’s report on allegations of corruption or misdirection of funds 
originally targeted the mismanagement of reintegration, which was intended to share funds 
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between combatants and militia members. This system created a weakness in the policy due 
to the understanding that “integration is identical to the programs of providing funds from 
central government to some groups … [it is called] an integration charity – or economic base 
integration” (Basyar 2008: 101). Basyar (2008) arguedthat most funds delivered to the groups 
were for short-term consumption and it was rare that funds were given to develop the 
economy or establish local industries to provide more jobs for Acehnese. The high 
dependence of the Acehnese on funds from the central government continues with the current 
government. 
Economic Development
Ten years after the Helsinki peace accord, Aceh is still lagging behind many of the other 
provinces in terms of economic and social development. By 2012, Aceh had the sixth highest 
poverty rate among Indonesia’s 33 provinces and ranked number 17 in terms of its Human 
Development Index (HDI) (CMI 2012). In fact, Aceh had been granted the benefits of special 
autonomy funds to fill the economic development gaps inits cities and districts. Under the 
national budget, Aceh is entitled to 2% of the general grant allocation budget (Dana Alokasi 
Umum DAU) for 5 years and 1% for an additional period of 15 years, based on its special 
share of oil and gas revenues. It was estimated that from 2008 to 2027 more than 10 billion 
US$ would be contributed to the provincial budget (CMI 2012). This fund would generate 
economic growth and development across Aceh with the active participation of the Acehnese 
community. However, what concerns foreign investors who plan to come to invest in Aceh is 
the threat to security. 
In some post-conflict regions, economic growth is hard to establish. Security and stability are 
among the crucial factors considered before business leaders will invest. It takes serious, 
willing and strong leadership of the post-conflict government to invite investors and 
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guarantee their assets in the region. Governor Zaini Abdullah confirmed that national and 
foreign investors are still reluctant to come to Aceh due to security factors (Antara, August 
2014). Singaporean Ambassador Anil Kumar Nayar, who visited Aceh in August 2014, said 
that Singaporean investors wait for stability and security before they invest. For them, 
investment insurance from the government and political stability are urgent (Joni 2014). 
The economic growth of Aceh decreased sharply after the collapse of the New Order, then it 
increased slowly after the Helsinki peace agreement. The GDP of Aceh in 2004, 2005 and 
2006 was –9.6, –10.1 and 1.6 respectively (World Bank 2009). In the last three years from 
2012 to 2014, this has decreasedsignificantly. The economic growth of Aceh without oil has 
been reported as 6.09% (2012), 5.45% (2013) and 4.82% (2014), while the economic growth 
of Aceh with oil is 5.21% (2012), 4.18% (2013) and 2.71% (2014) (Statistics Aceh 2014).
Professor Raja Masbar, former Dean of Economics of Syiah Kuala University, Aceh, argued 
that the economy of Aceh is sick. Two crucial factors influence the stagnation in economic 
growth in Aceh: firstly, the Acehnese economy is mainly dependent on its primary sectors, 
namely agriculture and mining; secondly, there is a lack of service and production industry 
sectors in Aceh (Serambi Indonesia, 1 May 2013). 
Facilitated by the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate and the Center of Reform on Economics 
(CORE),Governor Zaini Abdullah presented at a business forum entitled “Go West, Invest in 
Aceh” on 15 April 2014 in Jakarta. Abdullah invited potential investors to invest in Aceh,
which has abundant natural resources, especially in the sectors of agriculture, mining, rubber 
and palm oil, including processing and packaging facilities for coffee and cocoa, and a 
potential rubber and palm oil processing site. Foreign direct investment is growing in Aceh. 
According to data from the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), foreign 
directinvestment in Aceh reached US$94.2 million in 2013 and $172.3 million in 2012, 
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versus $22.5 million in 2011 and $4.6 million in 2010. To boost the investment, Abdullah 
said:“We are prepared to facilitate potential investors, streamline investment licensing 
process and provide fiscal and non-fiscal incentives” (Jakarta Post, 16 April 2014). 
Managing Divided Society
Regional autonomy in Aceh also faces the threat of disintegration. A feeling of discrimination 
against non-combatant groups has created frictions. Moreover, various ethnic groups with 
spoken language differences raise a challenge as to how local government can maintain the 
unity and integrity of Aceh. Guelke (2012) argued that languages are among the reasons that
people of some regions propose to separate or have special autonomy status or self-
governance. The people of Gayo Luwes speak the Gayo language and preserve their own 
distinct ethnic traditions,which are different from mainstream Acehnese culture. Guelke 
stated that “as in the case of some of the conflicts involving religion, language may be seen 
simply as a marker of ethnic difference and the situation characterized as an ethnic conflict”
(Guelke 2012: 18). A critique of the Wali Nanggroe requirement to be able to speak the 
Acehnese language came from the Gayo people, who do not speak Acehnese. Their request to 
separate from Aceh province has been made repeatedly since 2000. 
However, their proposal tends to be political rather than a genuine attempt to separate due to 
pressure from the grassroots. Many academics, students and elite in Gayo Luwes also speak 
Acehnese. The language is a medium of communication among people in Aceh. In official 
meetings among ethnic groups in Aceh, people speak at least two languages – Indonesian 
(Bahasa Indonesi) and Acehnese. Both these languages presenta strategic means for unity in 
the diversity of ethnicity in Aceh. In addition, the area of Aceh Tengah and Gayo Luwes is a 
major economic resource in Aceh, especially from commodities such as agriculture and 
coffee. 
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To handle the diversity of ethnicities in Aceh, the local government has to treat all parties and 
groups equitably.It is commonly feltamong people in Aceh that the current government gives 
preferential treatment to development policy especially for former combatants. Reintegration 
programs were developed as soon as the MoU from Helsinki was implemented from 
September 2005, monitored by foreign states and international agencies. Billions of dollars 
were invested to ensure the smooth transition of the reintegration. This sort of treatment 
created dependence in some of the former combatants, who wish to continue to enjoy these
advantages. To them, the funding is a reward for their struggle of more than thirty years 
against the Indonesian government. 
As a response to this, the former militia group Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) has retained its
movement, predominantly in Central Aceh. PETA was a militia established by pro-
nationalists facilitated by the military forces during the conflict to fight against GAM. The 
friction between the militia and combatants continues. Sofyan, the head of PETA, argued that 
the group was founded to defend people’s territory against threats from GAM, which 
frequently attacked the community in Central Aceh (Sofyan 2012).According to Djuli, given 
the problem of the ethics of political leadership, which tends to favour a small circle or group 
and does not protect the Acehnese peopleoverall, the reintegration of former militia and
combatants creates problems. The ongoing friction between combatants and the militia will 
challenge further initiatives towards permanent peace, which will need the total participation 
of all parties and people in Aceh (Djuli 2014a). 
This includes the aspiration for two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALAS) and Aceh 
Barat Selatan (ABAS), proposed by the people in Central Aceh. It is true that some new 
provinces established after the New Order came from the political aspirations of leaders and 
people who regard themselves as distinct in terms of ethnicity and economic development. 
They were different from most Acehnese in terms of history, political identity and culture,
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and were discriminated against by the regional government in Aceh in terms of economic 
development (Serambi Indonesia, 6 November 2014).The new province of Gorontalo, for 
example, was established due to its special ethnic and religious character, which is different 
from that of North Sulawesi.Gorontalo is predominantly Muslim and North Sulawesi is 
predominantly Christian. Menado, as the capital city of North Sulawesi, is too far away to be 
reached by the people of Gorontalo, which is closer to the border of Central Sulawesi. 
The idea for the new provinces of ALAS and ABAS came from the ethnic distinctiveness in 
terms of language, culture and economic development. Infrastructure in Central Aceh is 
lagging behind infrastructure in North and East Aceh.The idea is that ALAS and ABAS 
provinces will comprise two areas: ABAS is the area of Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat 
Daya, Aceh Barat, Aceh Selatan and Simeulue,while ALAS is the area of Aceh Tengah, 
Gayo Lues, Bener Meriah, Aceh Tenggara, Kota Subulussalam and Aceh Singkil. To 
overcome this idea of separatism, the regional government of Aceh has provided a special 
autonomous region fund from 2012 to 2014 of about 5 billion rupiah for developing roads 
and bridges across Central Aceh (Serambi Indonesia, 6 November 2014). However, special 
autonomous fundswhich have been forthcoming since the fall of the New Order already 
provided for them quite well despite the rise of expressions of separatism.
The experience of Aceh and other provinces, districts and cities in Indonesia in managing 
local government has grown, and along with it the problems of budgeting to increase
economic development and encourage local people to be more productive and prosperous. 
However, there is still a lot of corruption and mismanagement by local government. Direct 
elections have given the opportunity to popular leaders in the local area to lead government. 
Unfortunately, some of them do not have enough experience in managing politics and 
bureaucracy. 
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The mismanagement of government budgets allocated to local economic development was
responded by Law No. 23/2014, which regulated new relations between local and central 
governments.Robert Endi Jaweng (2014), director of Regional Autonomy Watch 
(KPPOD),claimed that:
For 13 years relations between the central and regional governments have been 
tumultuous. The central government appeared weak, having only three instruments for 
controlling the regions: fiscal instruments, determining civil servant formations and 
general authority such as cancellation of local regulations. Only in fiscal matters do 
local administrations seem obedient and disciplined enough to meet prerequisites and 
submit all reports required by the central government.Responding to the abnormal 
situation to date, Law No. 23/2014 introduces a number of measures aimed at 
correcting and rearranging decentralization so that governance of the public sector 
becomes more effective in the future.
In addition, Law No. 23/2014 strengthens the role of the governor in the provinces as a 
representative of the central government. This law is a response of criticism that Law No. 
22/1999 and Law No. 32/2004 gave weak authority to governors to evaluate, manage and 
coordinate districts and cities. The communication between central and local government was
a key part of this regulation. Transparency and open communication, as well as a clear 
national policy direction, according to Jaweng (2014), is “the key to future policy 
synchronization. Political divisions at the national and local levels have clearly affected the 
regions. Leadership communication and policy direction are the key to unlocking the political 
blockage”. The weak communication between Aceh and Jakarta has also become a problem.
Aceh political elites demanded the total implementation of the UUPA, but the central 
government did not approve their demands. Among the pending matters in relation to
regional autonomy are the management of natural resources, especially oil and gas, foreign 
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investment and the status of Sabang island as an international seaport to facilitate 
international businesspeople.
Governor Abdullah said that the central government should finish drafting the regulations on 
the joint management of natural resources and natural gas, and the presidential decree on the 
handing over of the National Land Agency regional office to the Aceh provincial 
administration. Djohermansyah Djohan, the Home Ministry’s regional autonomy director-
general, responded that all drafts of the government regulations and presidential decrees had 
been compiled in 2010, but they had to be shelved due to the rising political tension 
surrounding the gubernatorial elections (Jakarta Post, 9 August 2014). Abdullah warned that 
“central government needed to immediately draft the regulations or disappointment among 
the Aceh people could lead to further conflict between the central government and the people 
of Aceh” (Jakarta Post, 9 August 2014).
It seems that miscommunication between central government and Aceh government is part of 
the legacy of three decades of conflict. The Aceh government believes that the regulations 
they proposed cover the rights of Aceh to gain maximum advantages to resources,as stated in 
the Helsinki peace accord. On the other hand, the central government looks at the limited 
capacity of the Aceh government to implement these regulations. For example, the local 
government established a public company in order to cooperate with foreign investors to 
operate strategic projects in Aceh. Daud shared his experience in leading this local 
government company;he said that the Aceh government-owned company (Perusahaan 
Daerah Pembangunan Aceh, PDPA) attempted to incorporate a joint venture company as part 
of a local government partnership with an international company under the 2005 Helsinki 
MoU. Daud said that the local government did not provide financial support for the early 
establishment of the company, which is a basic requirement in runninga company for staff 
payment, administration, etc. Daud believed that there are a lot of potential investment 
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projects in energy resources, agriculture and the food industry (Daud 2014). John Towner, 
Triangle Executive Chairman based in Perth, Australia, said that “Triangle will be the first 
foreign company to form a Joint Venture with the Acehnese Government to manage an oil 
and gas field and we look forward to working closely with PDPA. Triangle has been 
successfully operating the Pase Field since 2009” (Triangle Energy 2013). 
A further challenge for regional autonomy in Aceh is the regulation of Islamic shariahlaw 
such as qanun jinayat (criminal law). Soerono (2014) said that “the application of the law 
therefore presents risks for business and investment. The law may not have provisions 
directly to business operations such as the confiscation of assets, but it does have a significant 
indirect effect on businesspeople”.
Conclusion
Brancati (2006) argued that regional autonomy has been a pivotal policy in reducing most 
separatist conflicts. The policy is also an effective instrument for solvingethnic conflicts 
(Bertrand 2004). Brancati’s and Bertrand’s argumentsare in line withhow the Indonesian 
Government has dealtwith regional conflicts from the early period of independence to the 
post-Suharto period. Aceh has anexceptional history of conflict and regional autonomy. Even 
so,the Acehnese are not satisfied with thecurrent implementation of the policy of regional 
autonomy, which,some argue, has been reduced fromthe conditions set out by the Helsinki 
peace accord (Abdullah 2015; Djuli 2013).
Regional autonomy is a strategic means to overcome conflicts in Aceh. It has been 
implemented differently since early independence. During the Old Order and the New Order, 
regional autonomy was very limited and the government handled the Acehnese using a 
military approach. After the fall of Suharto, the Acehnese demanded a referendum inspired 
by the referendum in Timor-Leste. The government responded with the establishment of laws 
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created in 1999 and 2001. Given the pressure of military operations against the people of 
Aceh, these laws are clearly not working effectively. The change was very clear after both 
GAM and the Republic of Indonesia signed the MoU for permanent peace in Aceh.
The reintegration of combatants has faced some challenges. Firstly, the number of 
combatants was not reported based on actual numbers. This had implications for the funds 
received. It has taken longer to integrate them due to the limited budget devoted to this 
operation. The BRDA/BRA helped bridge the gap, but this was only temporary. Secondly, 
the learning capacity of former combatants needs a broader and more specialised education 
system. Some leaders established schools and training designed especially for former 
combatants. 
In addition, the transformation of the MoU into the UUPA created a lot of gaps. Some crucial 
points of the MoU were not accommodated within the UUPA.As stated by Rahman (2012), 
mutual understanding and trust between central and local governments need to develop in 
order to monitor the process of implementation of the LoGA; this is seen as necessary in 
order to do justice to the spirit of the regional autonomy law with, at its centre, the principle 
of justice for Acehnese society in terms of politics, the economy, law, education and culture. 
Regional autonomy is also challenged by the demand from Central Aceh for the 
establishment of two new provinces, ALAS and ABAS, which has been responded to rather
late by the local government in providing a new government policy to support infrastructure 
development across Central Aceh. Another strategy is the recent importance given to 
communication and the building of mutual trust and understanding between the local 
government, which is dominated by former combatant leaders, and the people of Central 
Aceh. An inclusive approach and policy from both local government and members of the 
Aceh legislature will open the minds and hearts of the people, not only in Central Aceh, but 
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also in other parts of Aceh that have been discriminated against in government policy 
decisions since the period of the New Order. 
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Chapter 5
The Contribution of the EU and ASEAN to 
the Transition ofPeace in Aceh4
“Despite the many challenges, even the most intractable conflicts can be resolved if 
the parties involved and the international community join forces and work together”
(Martti Ahtisaari 2008).
“You cannot play ball and be the referee at the same time”
(Ambassador Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, cited by Kivimäki 2014: 132).
Introduction
Indonesia has reached a new phase of nationalism. The expression of local communities in a 
variety of Indonesian regions is accommodated by the implementation of LawNo. 22/1999 
and LawNo. 32/2004 on regional autonomy. The policy of regional autonomy was first 
launched in 1999 after the collapse of the New Order, and gained both critics and supporters 
after a period of implementation. The laws that encouraged regional autonomy were 
implemented by PresidentB.J. Habibiebecause of regional and national factors like ethnic 
conflict, religious conflict and political friction. The laws were also designed to overcome the 
expressions of separatism thathad increased in Aceh and Papua. After the New Order, the 
central government attempted to overcome separatist conflicts in Aceh and Papua by 
establishing special autonomy laws such asLaw No. 18/2001 on special autonomy in Aceh. 
However, the separatist movement in Aceh continued until the signing of the Helsinki peace 
                                                          
4A part of this chapter was presented at the European Convention organised by the Department of 
International Relations of the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) Yogyakarta, 16–18 March 2009. 
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accord in August 2005, which led to the new special autonomy LawNo. 11/2006 (Law on 
Governing Aceh).
After political friction arose between Habibie and the military elites,a team chaired by Ryaas 
Rasyid tried to control national politics by managing a balance of power between the central 
and regional governments. Decentralisation is designed to prevent further conflicts and 
separatist expressions. Mietzner stated that “faced with the threat of territorial disintegration, 
the Indonesian elite turned to decentralization. First designed in 1999 and implemented since 
2001, decentralization transformed Indonesia from one of the most centralist nations in the
world into a polity with near-federal structures” (Mietzner 2014: 45–46). The decentralisation 
process was strengthened by the Helsinki peace agreement between GAM and the 
Government of Indonesia.
As part of the agreement, the combatants of GAM were allowed and encouraged to 
participate in political and economic development in Aceh. This began during the 
gubernatorial elections in 2006, which were attended by most Acehnese. This celebration of 
freedom of expression allowedthe leaders of Aceh, including former GAM members and an 
independent candidate who was the governor and a former GAM spokesperson, to gain a 
majority of the votes. As stated by Galtung (1995: 4), a peace process is preserved by “the 
balance of power”. The GAM-ledleadershipwas welcomed by the Acehnese after more than 
30 years under the pressure of the Indonesian military and authoritarian New Order regime.
The 2006 gubernatorial elections in Aceh were a historical moment for the commitment of 
GAM and the Indonesian Government to implement peacebuilding and economic 
development in the region. Democracy and the political participation of the Acehnese in 
choosing their leadership changed the status of Aceh from a conflicted region to a peaceful 
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one. Its special autonomy accommodated the local political identity of groups in Aceh, which 
are different from parties at the national level. 
Therefore, a study of the role of the EU and the European community in relation to peace and 
stability in Aceh is crucial. The initiativefor peace negotiations began in 2004 just before the 
tsunami, which then became a catalyst for theratification ofthe agreement supported by peace 
activists in Europe, especially under the NGO organised by Martti Ahtisaari in 2008. During
the period of implementation of the peace agreement, within the context of regional 
autonomy and peacebuilding, the 2006 gubernatorial elections and the 2009 general 
electionsare very significant to understanding of the dynamics of Aceh after the peace 
agreement when GAM was integrated into the Republic of Indonesia. The 2006 election
period was a historical moment for enabling the role of the Acehnese in developing theirown 
local politics and economy. It served as a foundation for the elections of 2009, when the 
Acehnese were able to develop local parties beside national party (LawNo. 
11/2006).Acehnese leaders could then compete with each other to work for the support of the 
Acehnese to vote for them in the 2009 elections. The awareness of the Acehnese leadersand 
the peopleof the importance of peace and stability for Aceh has strengthened the process of 
democracy. 
The integration of GAM into the Republic of Indonesia under the Helsinki peace agreement 
was arguably one of the greatest historical moments for the cessation of conflict in the world. 
The peace process involved states and international organisations, especially the EU and 
ASEAN, which initiated communication between the leaders and combatants of GAM and 
the Government of Indonesia (GoI), as well as monitoring the implementation of the peace
accord.
104 
 
Therefore, the dynamics of politics, peace and security in the province of Nangroe Aceh 
Darussalam (NAD) is a top priority of the international community as part of its
responsibility to preserve reconciliation and peace, which it has endorsed since the early 
peace initiatives. Husain (2007) and Kingsbury (2006) wrote about their personal experiences 
in supporting peace from very early days. Both agreed that the EU was pivotal in mediating 
between the parties and they both endorsed the peace agreement. 
This chapterexplores the theories of international relations and development studies. Aceh 
peace mediation and the international monitoring of the reintegration of combatants attracted
both realists and liberals in post-tsunami and post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding, 
mediation, reintegration, stability and development. In addition, the chapter examines 
Galtung’s theories on ‘the balance of power’ and ‘the rule of law’ as two paradigms of peace 
through which to analyse the peace agreement and its implementation in Aceh. It analyses
how the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) worked, as well as the prospectsfor peace and 
democracy in Aceh since the 2006 elections.
This chapteralso attempts to answer some basic questions as to how the Aceh peace 
initiatives are related to Europeanpolicies for global stabilityand the integrity of such policies,
and whether the model of peace in Aceh could suit other conflicted regions of the world. 
Power-sharing, as part of any peace principle, has been established in the local government 
and politics of democratic Aceh; this concept needs to be analysed to predict the future of 
peace in the region. This chapter is based on qualitative research through the study of
documents on Aceh and other written sources. 
Non-interference and Peacebuilding 
Acharya (2001) is critical of the doctrine of non-interference of ASEAN. He arguesthat “the 
salience of the doctrine of non-interference in Southeast Asia has long predated ASEAN … 
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the sources and exceptional salience of this principle have to be understood, however, in the 
context of the grouping’s search for internal stability and regime security” (Acharya 2001: 
57). The principle of non-interference aims to prevent clashes between states in Southeast 
Asia. The war between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963–66), before the foundation of ASEAN 
in 1967, was the last regional conflict. Non-interference has been considered an effective 
norm or as “a cardinal principle of regional order (underpinning) a sub-regional reconciliation 
mechanism, or even the creation of a regional identity” (Jones 2012: 39). Like Acharya, 
Jones also criticised the ambiguity of the non-interference principle, which has not been 
followed by ASEAN members with regard to some cases of conflict such as those between 
Vietnam and Cambodia, and Indonesia and East Timor in the 1970s, and in ASEAN’s
approach to Myanmar. 
In addition, Kivimäki, who is concerned with the EU’s and ASEAN’s roles in peace 
mediation and the reintegration of GAM in Aceh, argued that “the strict interpretation of non-
interference has made it difficult for other states or other external actors to offer good 
services mediation or arbitration in conflicts where the government of an East Asian country 
is a conflicting party” (Kivimäki 2014: 132).The peace accords in Aceh and the southern 
Philippines are important lessons learned by Southeast Asian countries ready to build a strong 
Southeast Asian peacekeeping force. Indonesia in 2004 proposed the formation of such a
force. However, ASEAN leaders responded differently to the idea of thispeacekeeping force. 
Some worried about the intervention of such a force. 
The initiatives of the EU and ASEAN that are facilitating mediation and post-conflict 
transition are crucial elements of peace creation. According to Beer (1990):
Two major branches of peace theory, defined in this normative way, 
concentrate in turn on war reduction and peace creation. The first branch –
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war reduction – accepts the international system as given and tries to 
alleviate its most extreme dangers by reducing and limiting war (p. 15).
The lessons of peace in Aceh, as well as in other places in Southeast Asia, are crucialresources 
for the development of international relations theory. They provide a genuine contribution 
tonon-Western international relations; as Acharya and Buzan (2010) claimed, IR theory has 
grown in non-Western countries based on their historical conflict prevention, peace 
negotiations and international diplomacy for creating a stable region. 
EU and ASEAN for Peace
The EU is one of several international entities supporting peace, stability and democracy in 
Aceh. The initiative for peace has been facilitated by many organisations and countries. One 
of the most significant moments was in 2004 when Jusuf Kalla – the Coordinating Minister 
for People’s Welfare and later Vice-President of Indonesia – started serious peace 
negotiations after an unsuccessful agreement in the previous period. The Henry Dunant 
Center (HDC) initially attempted to mediate between RI and GAM in 2000. It arranged an 
agreement for temporary peace through the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
(CoHA) in December 2000. 
The peace discussion was discontinued after the Indonesian Government ordered GAM 
leaders and members to surrender and imprisoned some of them in May 2003. Among the 
peace negotiators arrested by Indonesian authorities when they were on their way to Banda 
Aceh airport for the peace talks in Tokyo in May 2003 were Nashiruddin bin Ahmed, Amni 
bin Ahmad Marzuki, Muhammad Usman Lampoh Awe, Kamaruzzaman and Sofyan Ibrahim. 
They were released after the Helsinki peace accord was signed, but Sofyan Ibrahim died in 
prison during the tsunami (Kingsbury 2006: 25; Husein 2007: 20). The order to arrest them 
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disappointed the GAM leaders and they decided to stop the discussions; they considered that 
the government had betrayed the agreement (Aspinall & Crouch 2003; Nurhasim 2008: 113).
On the role of the EU and ASEAN, Ahtisaari stated during a speech at a conference in 
Jakarta:
The EU and the five participating ASEAN countries have put their full political 
weight behind the implementation of the peace agreement. Once a peace agreement 
has been reached, it is crucial to be able to deploy quickly. The Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM) filled a potentially harmful vacuum through its one-month Initial 
Monitoring Presence phase. The mission has since gained the confidence of both the 
parties and civil society through its neutrality and transparency (Ahtisaari 2006).
Speaking on the process of preserving peace and stability in Aceh, Ahtisaari continued to 
endorse the support of European and other international communities for the sustainability of 
peaceful democracy and economic development in Aceh. To ensure the continuation of the 
EU’s support for peace and stability in the world, he argued that “if the EU wishes to be a 
major player in world affairs, it needs to work in cooperation with all institutions, 
governments and non-governmental actors concerned. I believe this principle should be one 
of the beacons guiding EU external action” (Ahtisaari 2006[1]). 
The role of the international community in rebuilding Aceh after the 2004 tsunami has been 
an earlycontributor to peace as well. There are two important organisations from Europe 
involved in the peace process and its implementation –– the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI) and the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). 
The CMI is a CSO based in Helsinki, Finland,which promotes sustainable security. It was 
founded in 2000 by former president Martti Ahtisaari, who is the chairman of the 
organisation.Besides managing peace and reconciliation in Aceh, the CMI has resolved 
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conflicts in Namibia (Africa), Kosovo and other places.Ahtisaari’scharacter and experience 
have been very influential in mediating conflicting parties. Kingsbury described Ahtisaari as 
“bluff even by conventional Finnish standards of directness, (who) on occasions betrayed the 
slightly paternalistic qualities of his original occupation as a school teacher”(Kingsbury 2006: 
16). Ahtisaari’spersonality has helped him to solve problems and mediate in many places. He 
combines informal diplomacy through the CMI with formal diplomacy between states, as he 
is a former president of Finland. In the peace process between GAM and GoI, the Finnish 
Government supported the funding through the CMI (Kingsbury 2006: 17).In the 
implementation of the agreement, the role of the EU in a broader sense was endorsed by the 
FinnishGovernment, as Finland is an EU member. 
Ahtisaari described the role of the CMI in the peace agreement and implementation as 
follows:
The CMI has of course been closely following the implementation of the 
accord to be able to assist in dispute settlement, if needed. I am happy to say 
that the parties, with the help of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, have been able 
to settle differences at the lower tiers of the dispute settlement mechanism, 
which is how it was always intended (Ahtisaari 2006 [1]).
Compared to the HDC, the CMI was in a better position and enjoyed a higher level of trust 
after the peace agreement. It successfully mediated the peace negotiation and engaged with 
other partners from states and international CSOs to support political transition and economic 
development in Aceh. 
The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is an EU monitoring mission in Aceh established by 
the EU under the Council for Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP on 9 September 2005 and
launched on 15 September 2005. ASEAN members, especially Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, 
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Singapore and the Philippines, as well as Norway and Switzerland, joined with the EU to 
reconstruct Aceh.
The process of peace resulted froma new breakthrough in the separatist conflict, as stated in a 
seminar at the University of Syiah Kuala on 21 September 2006 entitled ‘The Aceh Model of 
Resolving Conflict as an Alternative Conflict Resolution Model for Other Territories’. The 
approach to ending conflict in Aceh and the integration of GAM into the Republic of 
Indonesiaprovide an alternative method for other conflict regions (Husein 2007: 2). This
model of peace has inspired other peace mediators to end conflicts in many regions; among 
these are conflicts in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. The Thai and Philippine 
governments have consulted with Indonesian authorities on how minority Muslims in their
regions can integrate peacefully. 
A representative of the Thai army who was involved in a peace-monitoring mission team in
Aceh stated that the Thai government is learning in detail how the peace process in Aceh can 
be adapted to solve the conflict in southern Thailand (Sholeh 2007). The National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) and the army elites of Thailand consider the integration of 
Aceh into Indonesia is the right model for how Malay Muslims in five provinces in the south 
of Thailand (Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, Satun and Sonkla) could be integrated to create
national unity.
What is the role of ASEAN? In a report published by the ASEAN Secretariat, it was stated 
that the establishment of peace in Aceh was closely related to the recovery and rehabilitation 
of tsunami victims. Support for GAM integration was one aspect of humanitarian aid after the 
tsunami. ASEAN then became involved with the EU in the AMM in the process of 
disarmament and rehabilitation of former GAM combatants both inside and outside of prison.
This included combatants returning to their home territoriesand their direct involvement in 
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local politics. This was one of the important elements for ASEAN in preserving regional 
stability. 
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, stated:
The EU encouraged the efforts for peace in Aceh from day one by providing political 
and financial support for the negotiations in Helsinki that led to the signing of the 
peace agreement. However, without the political vision of the Indonesian Government 
and of GAM, who respected the undertakings given in Helsinki from the beginning, 
and the support of the people of Aceh, the AMM would not have been possible. The 
EU will continue to stand by the people of Aceh in the ongoing peace and 
reconciliation process (Solana 2006).
The governments of the United States, Australia and New Zealand also joined Europe and the 
countries of ASEAN in supporting peace in Aceh. Donor agencies such as USAID, AusAID 
and NZAID assisted CSOs and the Aceh government as part of their commitments to
reconciliation and peaceful democracy in Aceh. The participation of GAM combatants in 
local democracy is a very interesting phenomenon which raises the question as to 
howdemocracycan be a strategic instrument in achieving peace and reconciliation.
Reintegration of GAM
The reintegration covered many groups of Acehnese;central in this processwere those related 
to GAM combatants. In a study by the World Bank on the integration of GAM, it was 
revealed that the members were divided into three groups (World Bank 2006: 4).Firstly, there 
were political prisoners who needed to receive amnesty as part of the agreement between 
GAM and GoI.Secondly, there were the active combatants of GAM called theTentara 
Nasional Aceh (TNA) from inside and outside Aceh.Thirdly, there were the non-active 
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combatants, GAM police and civilians, who had trained GAM combatants. This group took 
the role of GAM intelligence officers during the conflicts. 
Article 3 of the MoU on Amnesty and Integration into Society stated that:
The Indonesian government will, in accordance with the constitutional procedures, 
grant amnesty to all persons who have participated in GAM activities... Political 
prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict will be released unconditionally as 
soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU 
(Kingsbury 2006: 203).
The release of prisoners occurred on Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August 2005. Bythe 
end of August, the prisoners released numbered 2000 people (World Bank, 2006). This was a
cause for celebration for the Acehnese, in particular GAM families, who enjoyed family 
gatherings after so many difficulties during the conflicts. Many of their family members had 
beenkilled by Indonesian military forces. They demanded truth and reconciliation as part of 
the peace process, similar to what took place in Timor-Leste. The families also felt they 
received enough financial compensation from the Indonesian Government after losing 
relatives. Prabowo, the former commander of the Indonesian special forces (Kopassus), asked 
forgiveness for the Indonesian army, which killed Acehnese fighters during the presidential 
election campaign in July 2014. It is important for the Indonesian Government to proceed
with an attitude of forgiveness and reconciliation in order to continue the democratisation and 
peacebuilding of the Aceh region in the future. 
International organisations have attempted to accommodate the reconciliation process. The 
World Bank has studied the expectations of former combatants who have integrated and the 
way in whichthey have adapted in the early stages of reintegration. These former 
combatantswould never forget the conflict and how the Indonesian military forces fought
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against them. However, they now wanted to begin a smooth transition. Many of them had 
been unable to study at formal schools or dropped out of elementary schools or high schools
because of pressures from the local military. It was hard for them to compete with other 
Acehnese citizens who had hada chance to study at schools and universities. International 
organisations encouraged and supported them to continue their studies or join training
programs to achieve their career goals.
For former combatants who did not have any political experience when they became
parliamentary members inkabupaten (districts), cities or provinces, they were invited to join 
political training programs organised by the School of Democracy. Nur Djuly, one of the 
negotiators representing GAM, arguedthat it was a hard and long process to teach former 
combatants due to an absence of experience and intellectual capacity. One major obstacle to 
proper training was that many former combatants did not have the reading skills necessary for 
any real form of academic progress.
Syadiah Marhaban,another member of the GAM delegationin Helsinki, also said that among 
the former combatants involved in politics, inong bale(or women) combatants did not receive
proportional support to join parties or as parliamentary members. Marhaban stated that 
women were heads of families during the conflicts andthey also faciliated logistics for 
fighters. However, now they were forgotten. International organisations attempted to 
strengthen the role of women in politics and development. However, Acehnese culture does 
not allow women to take strong roles in politics. A woman bupaticandidate complained that 
she was tortured by Muslim priests who stated that “women are not allowed to be 
leaders”.But the idea that leadership roles are not allowed to be taken by women is a 
misunderstanding of the religious interpretation of Prophet Muhammad. This was related to 
the context of female leadership during the time of the Prophet and does not relate to all 
women. Aceh itself has historical experienceof women who took commandingroles during 
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the war against the Dutch colonial armies. Cut Nya Din is a good example of a popular 
commander during the war against the Dutch. 
Marhaban (2012) argued that:
There is no lack of potential woman leaders in Aceh, but themale elite,
especially those who consider themselves ‘religious’, set the ‘social 
ceiling’very low. There are two basic interrelated dimensions of democracy: 
the opencompetitive space for citizens to gain any political position and power, 
and adequatespace for activities that guarantee political participation for all 
citizens. The basicmechanism to allow participation is to organize open, free, 
and equal elections. Theformal procedures of elections are noted as one of the 
challenges for increasing women’srepresentation in politics, because both 
legislative and executive positions are the corepolicy makers; thus it is 
important for women to also participate in this process. However,an election is 
a competition in which most men candidates have the advantage due totheir 
social connections, economic resources and social status (p. 10). 
Marhaban, a former female combatant returned to civilian life, was a 2011–2012 Fellow at 
Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, researching post-conflict 
management, gender and political transformation. She represents former combatant members 
promoting peace, development and security in conflict and post-conflict regions. She also 
represents UN women’s projects. 
Democracy, Reconciliation and Development
The high participation rate of the Acehnese in the 2006 elections and the rise of local politics 
in the 2009 elections show the strength of the initiatives of the Acehnese in reconciliation 
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under constitutional democracy. LawNo. 11/2006 on the governance of Aceh is a significant 
law to guide peace and democracy.
Martti Ahtisaari, also the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, stated in his Nobel speech:
The peace process in Aceh showed how important it is that a country’s
political leadership is committed to finding a solution to an internal conflict. 
Joint efforts by the political leadership in Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement resulted in a peace agreement. However, it was only a start. 
Social and economic reforms can only progress if both negotiating parties 
and the population at large are committed to them in the long term. Work 
remains to be done in developing a national system that protects, sustains 
and improves the quality of life in Aceh (Ahtisaari 2008). 
This argument emphasisesthe importance of commitment among conflicting parties and that 
the growth of the economy, stability and security will strengthen the future of peace in Aceh. 
The international community is expected to continue its interest in and support forthe process 
of democracy and economic development in Aceh. The active participation of the Acehnese 
people in politics and overall development has created a positive foundation for peace in the 
longterm. 
As in other post-conflict regions, Aceh is not free from individuals and groups that feel they 
have not received what they expected after the signing of the peace accord. Some former 
GAM combatants continue to receive funding because of the difficulties of the economy and 
the lack of jobs soon after returning. 
The first task for the EU after signing the agreement was the foundation of the AMM,
initiated by EU members and then supported by ASEAN members in its implementation. 
AMM’s first mission was initially the disarmament of GAM members and the deployment of 
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the Indonesian Army. The most important element was the gubernatorial elections in 
December 2006. The combatants were welcomed back to Aceh and returned to their normal 
lives. The period of rehabilitation was very significant in terms of the future of peace in 
Aceh. It took a significant period of time to recover from the psychological trauma suffered 
by the combatants and to rebuild their efforts to return to their lives as farmers, sailors or 
traders. Many of them had nothing after losing their familiesin the tsunami. The EU, through 
the World Bank and EU offices in Jakarta, provided valuable funds to aid in the recovery of 
Aceh after the conflict. ASEAN countries also worked with the EU on the difficult road to 
rehabilitation. 
In the 2009 elections, the EU and ASEAN also continued their role in supporting the 
implementation of peace. They supported the construction of buildings prior to the elections 
for candidates and they also monitored the elections. Braniff said:
In Aceh, the EU’s collaborative mission, the AMM (Aceh Monitoring 
Mission), with Norway, Switzerland and seven of the ASEAN (Association 
of South East Asian Nations) to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki 
Memorandum of Understanding represented a key departure in the EU’s
external relations activities. Firstly, the EU found itself operating in 
cooperation with another regional organization (ASEAN) in an area far from 
its neighbourhood. Secondly, the EU’s intervention in Aceh represented an 
opportunity for the EU to redress criticisms of selectivity and widen its 
contribution to international peacebuilding. The mission commenced on 15 
August 2005 and lasted until 15 December 2006 (Braniff 2013: 3). 
In the early years of the reintegration of GAM, the EU supported the reintegration process of 
combatants by providing funding of EUR 2,450,000as part of the EU’s wider Aceh Peace 
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Process Support Package (APPS). The funds helped to support justice and police reform in 
Aceh, the organisation of local elections and the strengtheningof local governance reform and 
implementation of the Law on the Governing of Aceh. According to the reports‘Support to 
Aceh Reintegration and Peace Agency’ (BRA) and ‘Peace Building in Aceh’, the objective of 
the EU project was “to support the reintegration process of former combatants and reduce the 
vulnerability of victims of conflict, with a special focus on women and marginalized groups, 
by improving access to sustainable livelihoods and income opportunities” (Annex I 2007: 4). 
The deployment of a peace monitoring mission and the funding support to Aceh were part of 
the EU’s ‘human security’ approach, a new way of promoting peace. The human security 
approach stresses “the possibilities of international non-military intervention, including 
peacekeeping forces, monitoring missions, and other mechanisms such as election 
observation and a range of aid programs to assist vulnerable groups or build civil society 
institutions” (Barron & Burke 2008: 21–22). 
Like the EU, ASEAN is attempting to establish a strong institution of security and peace to 
create a stable and prosperous Southeast Asian region. ASEAN established the Institute for 
Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) inMay 2011and it conducts research on peacebuilding 
activities and broadens networks with other institutes and entities in the region, as well as 
other regions and at the international level, in promoting a culture of peace (Wandi, 
Nicolescou & Cristescu 2012: 9). The establishment of the AIPR strengthened ASEAN as a 
mediation institution after its success story in cooperation with the EU on political transition 
in Aceh after the Helsinki peace agreement. The Aceh peace process has enriched ASEAN in 
regional peacekeeping and peace operations.
ASEAN had a bitter experience during the Timor-Leste political transition. ASEAN was 
criticised “for failing to initiate any preventive diplomatic efforts in the case of Timor-Leste 
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in 1999, and for rejecting a collective intervention following the violence that erupted after 
the referendum for independence” (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood 2010: 4). Former foreign 
minister of Thailand Surin Pitsuwan, now the Secretary-General of ASEAN, said that it was 
hard for him to deploy ASEAN inthe transition of East Timoras ASEAN did not have 
experience in peacekeeping forces (Jakarta Post, 14 September 1999). The Indonesian 
Government and prominent academics encouraged ASEAN to take a stronger role in 
mediating political transition in Timor-Leste. Lambang Trijono, head of the Center for Peace 
and Security Studies of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, said that Indonesia had to 
ensure that the peacekeeping force was comprised of members from Asian countries, 
including China. This was a sentiment against the Australian and US peacekeeping forces 
because of their tendency to favour the pro-independence groups (Jakarta Post, 15 
September 1999). 
Now ASEAN is more confident in supporting peace and mediation in Asian regions. After its 
involvement in the Aceh peacebuilding process, Malaysia headed a team for peace in the 
southern Philippines between the MILF and the PhilippinesGovernment. They had learned 
from the development of peace in Aceh. Some former GAM peace negotiators assisted both 
the PhilippinesGovernment and the MILF in successful peace negotiations and, most 
importantly, the implementation of a peace agreement. On 7 October 2012, the Government 
of the Philippines and the MILF signed a peace agreement. 
The Future of Democracy and Peace
The EU is expected to continue its role in supporting peace in Aceh. The visit of the former 
Finnish president and UN peace mediator, Martti Ahtisaari, to Indonesia in February 2009 to 
attend an international conference on civil conflict resolution in Banda Aceh was a very 
important moment for the Indonesian Government and especially the Acehnese people 
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(Maulia 2009). Ahtisaari’s visit strengthened the process of peaceful democracy in Aceh. It 
attracted the international community’s interest inlooking closely at the 2009 elections after a
rise in violence had occurred. Scts of violence, among them murders, intimidation, shootings 
and terrorist acts towards local politicians, threatened democracy and peace in Aceh.
Then Indonesian President Yudhoyono, at the inauguration of an infrastructure project in 
Banda Aceh on 23 February 2009, stated that: “I hope no one will infuriate the Acehnese
people for opting for peace over conflict– the same thing we have chosen and wanted. So 
let’s secure and maintain peace in Aceh” (Maulia 2009).For the sustainability of economic 
development and the prosperity of Aceh, which are pivotal to supporting peace, the new 
budget officially supported reconstruction projects organised by the Aceh-Nias 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR), with a total budget of Rp 715.3 billion 
(US$59.6 million). The project covered the reconstruction of Keuliling Dam in Aceh Besar 
(valued at Rp 270.43 billion), Aceh Polytechnic in Banda Aceh (Rp 160 billion), Ulee Lheue 
Crossing Port (Rp 74.2 billion), Aceh Tsunami Museum in Banda Aceh (Rp 67.9 billion) and 
the ‘Aceh Thanks the World’ Park (Rp 2.4 billion). The president also handed over the 
mandiri National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM Mandiri) funding, worth Rp 
222.9 billion in total for 30 regencies and municipalities in Aceh, as well as 3000 basic 
commodities packages for underprivileged local residents (Maulia 2009). 
Peaceful democracy was challenged by a rise in violence and intimidation in Aceh 
approaching the April 2009 legislative elections. From January to February of 2009, there 
were more than 15 violent incidents in Aceh related to the elections. In October 2008, a 
grenade exploded at the house of Muzakkir Manaf, the Party Aceh chairman and former 
commander of the GAM combatants. On 16 January 2009, a bomb exploded in front of the 
UKM Hotel in Banda Aceh, destroying three cars,one belonging to the Party Aceh, popularly 
known as the party of the GAM combatants. At the end of January 2009, two armed men 
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raided the KPA’s Aceh Besar branch in Kajhu village, killing one former GAM member and 
wounding another. On 4 February 2009, the secretary of the Aceh Transition Commission 
(KPA) branch in Bireuen, Dedi Noviandi, was killed while driving his car in Gampong 
Baruand a day after, on 5 February 2009, a gunman killed two former combatants and 
wounded others. They were also members of the Party Aceh. 
The Indonesian Military (TNI) Chief Djoko Santoso stated that, approaching the 2009 polls,
vandalism, intimidation, threats, attacks and murders might occur at the hands of warring 
parties and interparty factions (Jakarta Post, 24 February 2009). This was closely related to 
the April 2009 elections which would be an important test of the peace accord. Ben (2012: 
157) argued: “tensions between Party Aceh supporters and elements of the security forces 
also continued to simmer. Whithin the military, many remained suspicious that GAM still 
harboured secessionist ambitions”.
A criticism of the Jakarta elites was that the foundation of the Party Aceh and the orientation 
of former GAM leaders in reconstructing Aceh through international cooperation was in 
contrast to the cosmopolitan character and culture of the Acehnese, as also argued by 
Avonius (2007):
What kinds of cosmopolitan voices or other signs of cosmopolitanization 
could one detect in post-conflict and post-tsunami Aceh? 
Cosmopolitanization can be seen in ways by individuals as well as 
institutions who perceive the current openness in Acehnese society and 
the blurring of national boundaries. It is the transforming of the 
foundations of everyday consciousness and identities, and through this 
influence, the way individuals perceive their own lives, environment and 
future opportunities. The ultimate aim of a cosmopolitan individual is not 
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seen as becoming a good citizen of a nation-state, though this may still 
be highly valued (p. 166). 
Avonius’ argument opposed the belief of many Acehnese nationalists that former GAM 
leaders continued to gather resources for a new Aceh region separate from the Republic of 
Indonesia. Many Acehnese in Malaysia, Scandinavia, Germany, France, Britain and the 
United States still consider themselves part of Aceh and now support the peace and 
development of Aceh. The identity of the Acehnese in a broader sense also needs a public 
forum for expression. Local parties and other forms of participation in economics, politics 
and civil society are elements of democracy and are pivotal for the foundation of long-term 
peace. The European and international community can play a stronger role in this 
peacebuilding without disturbing the unity and integrity of Indonesia.
Conclusion
The EU and ASEAN have contributed to stability and peacebuilding in Aceh. They mediated 
peace initiatives and deployed the AMM for building security and peace for the Acehnese 
after more than thirty years of conflict. They also funded programs for the democratisation,
reconstruction and development of Aceh after the earthquake and tsunami. The transition of 
combatants was well established, with some challenges in relation to poverty and political 
intimidation during elections. The human security approach of the EU was followed by 
ASEAN, which establishedan institute of peace. The Acehnese example of peace and 
democratisation has demonstrated an approach in which intensive engagement at a regional 
level can open the door to peace and stability. 
Security problems can be resolved by ASEAN member states. This was a critical issue for 
ASEAN, which failed to employ a useful presence in the Timor-Leste political transition. A
criticism of the ASEAN non-interference principle was based on its reluctance to play a
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stronger institutional role in the post-conflict transition in Timor-Leste. After the result of the 
August 1999 ballot,Timor-Lestedecided to separate from Indonesia. 
Further partnership between ASEAN and the EU should be continued. Their peacebuilding 
cooperation could be broadened by supporting peace in the transitions taking place in Africa, 
the Middle East and other conflict regions. This would be a positive step towards an ASEAN 
security community and the unity of ASEAN countries in the future. 
There has been further discussion on the processs of democratic transition in Aceh, especially 
in relation to the gubernatorial and district elections and major elections held in April 2012. 
The elections were suspended four times due to violent attacks and killings organised by 
former combatants. However, the rise in violence did not trigger further conflict. This means 
that the establishment of democracy assisted by the international community after the 
Helsinki peace accord in 2005 effected democratic consolidation in Aceh, which this thesis 
argues continues to work towards peaceful and stable democracy. As Paris (2004) 
argued,third parties including states and civil societies from the international community 
influence and strengthen peace efforts in post-conflict democratic transition. 
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Chapter 6
Democracy and Peace in Aceh: The 2012 Election
“The best solution to the Aceh question is negotiation”
(President Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta Post, 12 July 2002).
Introduction
Democracy has been an effective means of maintaining peace in Aceh since the first 
gubernatorial elections held in 2006. The number of violent attacks decreased dramatically
and former local commanders began to make their transformation from combatants into 
politicians. This contrasts with other post-conflict democratisation such as in Rwanda, Africa,
where “political liberalization not only failed to reconcile the warring parties in Rwanda but 
also apparently served as a catalyst for the genocide by threatening Hutu elements with the 
prospect of losing power” (Paris 2007: 75). In Angola, the number of killings after the 
signing of the Bicesse accord in 1991was approximately 300,000 people, which exceeds the 
estimated number of Angolans who died in the 18 years of civil war before the peace 
agreement (Paris 2007: 67). 
The second gubernatorial elections held in 2012 confirmed the continuation of peace and 
stability in Aceh, where “political parties may help to consolidate peace by forming 
coalisions between groups formerly in conflict” (Hillman 2012: 150). Coalitions among 
political parties during the 2012 elections were observed to be part of the preparations for 
national legislative and presidential elections in 2014. For example, Prabowo Subianto, a
former Kopassus commander declared as a presidential candidate for 2014, decided to form a
coalision with Muzakkir Manaf by joining his campaign during the 2012 elections and 
donating fundstoParty Aceh. Manaf also invited Mayjen Sunarko, a former military 
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commander of Aceh who fought GAM through TNI operations during the conflict, to join a
Party Aceh campaign that claimed to unite all ethnic groups in Aceh, including the Javanese 
who live predominantly in Central Aceh.In relation to the support of former military 
commanders for Muzakkir Manaf and his party, Party Aceh leaders claimed that “they can 
appeal to all sectors of society and will have the support of key institutions” (ICG 2012: 6). 
Sunarko argued that it was the right time to support Aceh democratic and peace transition 
after the violence. He said that his role was strategic, to mediate between various ethnic 
groups in Aceh, the Acehnese and non-Acehnese speakers in society (Sunarko, interview in 
Banda Aceh, February 2012). In line with Sunarko, Manaf stated a similar reason. During the 
declaration of his Vice-Governor candidature on 13 February 2012, Manaf said that 
“Acehnese came from varieties of ethnic groups. They deserve to have equal rights for 
protection and treatment from government” (Manaf 2012).
Aceh democracy and peace has also been strengthened by more than a decade of democratic 
consolidation across Indonesia. Aceh is an exceptionin Indonesian politics which was given
wider space for the development of local parties. Hillman stated that “the Aceh case is 
especially interesting because Indonesia has elsewhere banned local political parties from 
contesting elections” (2012: 150).
This chapter examines the dynamics of electoral democracy in connection with the April 
2012 elections. During the national elections of 2009, former GAM leaders made a coalition 
with the DemocraticParty. At the national level, the 2009 elections provideda
legitimatemandate for PresidentYudhoyono’s regime to continue into a second term (Aspinall 
et al. 2010). The Democrat Party gained full support from Party Aceh and won a significant 
number of votes,while Jusuf Kalla, the head of the peace negotiation in Helsinki, received
very few votes. 
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After the end of Yudhoyono’s term, Party Aceh changed its political alliances. 
Prabowo’sParty Gerindra was the predominant choice. Deputy Governor Manaf popularly 
called Mualemto be on the advisory board of Party Gerindra in the province of Aceh. The 
connection between Prabowo and Mualem had begun during the campaign period of the 2012 
elections. Prabowo and Party Gerindra supported, both politically and financially, Zaini 
Abdullah and Manaf as candidates for governor. In the elections, GAM strengthened its
political legitimacy by attempting to maximise its authority in managing the political and 
economic arenas in Aceh,through dominating strategic positions in local parliament and 
governmentat the provincial and district levels. However, the number of violent attacks 
approaching the 2012 and 2014 elections in Aceh challenged the initiatives of 
peacebuilding.This thesis argues that the spirit of democracy is threatened by political 
violence, which endangers the future of peace.
Foundation of Democracy
After the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesians enjoyed freedom of expression
and the euphoria of democracy. Civil society and the mass media could criticise government 
policy and monitor political parties. Uhlin (1997) called this the “third wave of 
democratization” of Indonesia, which began after the Cold War and the end of the New Order 
regime. For security reasons, students, activists and society in Aceh were more unrestricted 
after the New Order. The call for a referendum was endorsed by student activists, probably 
influenced by the referendum in Timor-Leste in 1999, so the third wave of democratisation in 
Aceh was effective. President Habibie faced the challenge of a rise in demand for a
referendum during his first year in power. Students did not give support officially to an 
independent state of Aceh, but their protests around the importance of human rights violation
investigations and international supportfor the demand pushed the central government to pay
more attention to Aceh. President Habibie visited Aceh in March 1999 to stabilise the region 
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and saw “overwhelming support for an internationally supervised referendum similar to that 
held in East Timor as tens of thousands of people demonstrated in front of the Baiturrahman 
mosque in Banda Aceh” during his visit (Sulistiyanto 2001: 447).
The peak period of democratisation can be seen in the bottom-up initiatives of reconciliation 
in 2000 and 2001 between Aceh and Indonesia during the presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid. Kamaruzzaman (2012), a GAM negotiator mediated by the HDC, confirmed that 
President Wahid, as well as GAM, genuinely supported the peace initiative called CoHA, 
involving leaders of GAM in Aceh and overseas. Bulqaini, who frequently talked to President 
Wahid representing thedayah, argued that the president appreciated the role of the ulama and 
students in the peace initiatives. He believed this bottom-up reconciliation would achieve a
comprehensive result more if the security forces did not interfere (Bulqaini 2012, 2014). 
Global democracy movements and Indonesian democratisation and decentralisation from 
1999 strengthened the spirit of democracy in Aceh. The tsunami and earthquake in December 
2004 shocked the GAM leaders overseas and they finally agreed to support more serious 
peace negotiations in 2005. 
Consequently, the political parties tried to accommodate the voices of the people by 
reforming their policies to achieve broader support. Party leaders in government who do not 
devise and implement their policies based on the aspirations of the people quickly realise that 
they usually get punished by receiving lower votes during the next election. For example, 
some candidates for parliament in Aceh failed to win seats due to failure to contribute to the 
prosperity of the local community, especially their constituents, in the 2014 elections (see 
Chapter 7).
Through the regulations set down for regional autonomy byLaws No. 22/1999 and No. 
32/2004, local communities could participate in electing their local leaders. The 2004 election 
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was a starting point for direct elections where people could vote for parliament members, 
heads of districts and the governor of their own region. The spirit of national democracy 
strengthened the process of reintegration of GAM after the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement. 
Based on the mandate of the MoU from Helsinki, which was reflected in Law No. 11/2006 –
the Law of the Government of Aceh (LoGA)– former combatants participated in 
gubernatorial elections in 2006 (Kingsbury 2006). 
The 2012 elections tested democratic transition in Aceh: whether it went to a new 
authoritarian regime or successfully transformed Aceh towards democratic consolidation and 
peace. In comparison to post-conflict elections in Africa, Aceh has moved towards stable and 
peaceful democracy with the participation of most Acehnese. One of the reasons for the
current stability and peace is the existence of a precondition for democratisation: economic 
development and peacebuilding facilitated by international states and the central government 
in the early reintegration period after the Helsinki accord and almost a decade of democratic 
consolidation in Aceh. 
Mansfield and Snyder (2007: 281) quoted Linz and Stepan’s argument on the five 
preconditions of consolidation: “a useable state bureaucracy, rule of law, autonomous 
political parties, a free and lively civil society, and an institutionalized economic 
society”.Democratic consolidation in Aceh was supported by an effective bureaucracy 
managed by local governments under the coordination and monitoring of the central 
government, autonomous local and national political parties, and the rule of law. Problems in
the last decade after the peace accord include the amount of violence targeting political 
leaders and sympathisers of political parties.
CSOs have attempted to play a strategic role in monitoring democratic process. However, 
their monitoring and reporting to Panwaslu and Aceh police have not been responded to 
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effectively.Party Aceh has strong authority in securing its political operations at provincial 
and district levels. This is a threat to democratic consolidation and peace with free and fair 
political participation supported by the rule of law. A violent approach to secure political 
interestshas weakened the process of democratic consolidation.
Mansfield and Snyder identified:
A syndrome of incomplete democratization and war in transitional regimes that lack 
the institutional infrastructure needed to manage the turbulent processes of increased 
political participation, especially in settings where unresolved issues of national 
identity can be exploited for antidemocratic purposes (2007: 281). 
Aceh’s democratisation is part of the spirit of Indonesian national politics. This nationwide 
political participation and freedom of expression have turnedIndonesia into the third largest 
democratic country after the USA and India. However, it is hard to describe how political 
parties access the funding machine to strengthen their power. Palmer argued:
If Aceh’s democracy proves to conform to the Indonesian standard, with the same 
reliance on elite-level patronage networks fuelled by massive corruption, then it 
seems likely that local governance will not improve. In this case, corruption, poverty 
and a sense of grievance will remain and could threaten the peace, at least in the long 
term (2010: 290).
Palmer’s concerns were realised when a deadlock between the Aceh executive and the 
legislative branches occurred, which negatively affected the development of democracy in the 
province. About a year before the 2012 elections, political rivalries influenced government 
policy. The DPRA managed to pass a by-law (qanun) to support the budget, but Governor 
Yusuf did not sign it until the central government threatened to cut the general allocation.
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PA commanders and the combatants in Aceh initially agreed to support Yusuf as a 
gubernatorial candidate from the ranks of GAM. However, the older elites of PA disagreed. 
The reformist GAM representatives and people with a civil society background were ousted 
from PA.The rivalries continued during the gubernatorial elections in 2012, when the 
pairYusuf–Muhnan were supported by reformist former combatants. The competitionbecame
stronger after Yusuf launched the PNA, which ran in legislative elections in 2014 and gained 
two seats in the DPRA. 
During the 2012 elections, PA dominated the vote in most districts of Aceh. PA won 11 of 17 
candidate pairs of head and deputy heads of districts and majors, and a pair of governor and 
vice-governor (KIP Aceh 2012). Its election strategy worked well, including attacks and 
intimidation. The elections were preceded by some violencewhere about 15 people were 
killed and some others injured.Some were local leaders who had opposed the leadership of 
the central board of PA, especially the role of Malik Mahmud in the centralisation of the 
gubernatorial candidate’s appointment from GAM’s senior leadership circle. Younger leaders 
hoped to conduct a democratic procedure for the governor’s appointment and gave some 
names as alternatives; among them was Yusuf, the incumbent governor of Aceh and former 
GAM chief of information.
Before Mahmud appointed Abdullah as the candidate for governor and Manaf as the 
candidate for vice-governor, leaders of the KPA organised a gathering to choose a former 
GAM representative as a gubernatorial candidate. Most of them chose Yusufto be the
candidate representing former GAM members. The process of appointment seemed to be 
democratic, supported by most KPA representatives from all districts of Aceh; however, the 
decision was opposed by the central board of PA.As this friction deepened, violence began to 
occur. Democracy, it is contended here, is always challenged by violence and intimidation, 
especially approaching elections;likewise, after elections, agovernment cannot reach its 
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planning targets. Thus, in Aceh, investments and development became one of the significant 
problems of the current government.
The current politics of Aceh are also affected by culture and the economy. After thirty years 
of conflict which not only destroyed the foundation of the Acehnese economy but also the 
culture, people are slowly returning to work and to living normal and peaceful lives. From 
urban cities to villages, people are enjoying gathering at their local kedai (coffee shop), where 
they discuss local politics. They feel that they have given ample opportunity to former GAM 
leaders to represent them in government, at the provincial and district levels as well as 
parliaments (DPRK). They wanted to make sure that security and dignity were preserved. 
This is an important characteristic of Acehnese agricultural society. They rarely join
campaigns, but vote for any candidate from Aceh. 
As a result of being first intimidated and then promised protection and welfare by the former 
GAM apparatus, they voted for PA candidates. During one of the campaigns, Manaf said that 
“every relative will get a million Rupiah per month if his team wins the election. The fund 
comes from the rich natural resources of Aceh”.5The people in rural communities believed 
that Manaf’s promise was possible because it was time for former GAM leaders to lead Aceh. 
They considered Yusuf to be too close to Jakarta and he did not properly support former 
GAM people. A group of former combatants in Bireueun who took over migrant farm areas 
to grow agricultural commodities said that “Mualem6and Dato Zaini Abdullah are the best 
leaders for Aceh. They will help Acehnese during this difficult period of transition”
(interviews in Bireueun, February 2012). 
                                                          
5fieldworks note by author, Banda Aceh, March 2012.  
6Mualem means teacher. It was a popular nickname for Muzakir Manaf during the conflict period. Manaf was a 
veteran of the first batch of soldiers from a Libyan training camp who then taught further generations of 
Acehnese in Libya. These men later filled strategic posts in the districts of Aceh. Libyan veterans became 
district and sub-district commanders and now have become heads of districts or MPs from PA.
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In general, the Acehnese economy depends largely on the agricultural sector. Based on the 
research of Unsyiah (2009), around 38% of Acehnese work in the agricultural sector. They 
moved from wet fields during the conflict period to dry fields during the post-conflict period. 
According to Indonesian statistics, the greatest percentage of Acehnese live in rural villages. 
They are the strongest support base of PA. 
International Support
The 2012 elections highlight the significant contribution democracy has made to the 
maintenance of peace since Aceh’s 2006 elections, held a year after the peace agreement 
between GAM and the GoI. Many Acehnese have welcomed this new democratisation, with 
approximately 78 per cent of voters participating in the 2009 presidential elections, the 
largest turnout for direct elections in any Indonesian region. But as the elections approached,
flaring tensions among Acehnese leaders – especially between former GAM elites – had
observers concerned over potential threats to the continuation of peaceful democracy in 
Aceh. A number of former GAM combatants were killed recently and local Acehnese see this 
as closely related to the tensions and rivalries evident among political groups in the province.
But the international community has invested billions of dollars in supporting Aceh’s
transition to peaceful democracy. At the ASEAN Leaders’ Special Summit held in Jakarta on 
6 January 2005, two weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami, the leaders of 26 nations and 
international organisations agreed to donate US$4 billion in aid to further the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of Aceh. Australia also contributed AUD$1billion over five years through 
the Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development;of this aid, millions 
of dollars were targeted at the support and reintegration of former GAM members. The 
programs associated with this funding will help to ensure the continuation of rehabilitation 
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and integration efforts by overcoming any inequitable distribution of resources, thereby 
supporting stability and peace and rebuilding communities.
The Multi-Stakeholder Review, a partnership between the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry 
for Legal, Political and Security Affairs, the National Development Planning Agency and the 
Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency, reports that the total amount of funds committed to the 
process of reintegration and peace building is Rp9 trillion (US$895 million) – one-seventh of 
the tsunami reconstruction funds. The Acehnese government will also receive close to 
US$7.9 billion in special autonomy funds between 2008 and 2027 as a result of the LoGA.
Adequate funding is of crucial significance in maintaining the peacebuilding process and the 
progress of reconciliation; decentralisation and democratisation have positively affected the 
transition to peace. However, for the positive momentum to continue, area-specific 
institutions need to be strengthened and, where necessary, created. The importance of 
institutions for supporting peace in post-conflict regions cannot be overstated. In Aceh, strong 
institutions in local government, parliament and civil society are still needed.
But the ongoing dispute over regulations pertaining to the 2012 elections between the 
winning Party Aceh and the incumbent governor’s camp threatens to destabilise Acehnese 
efforts to implement further reforms. The Party Aceh’s threat to boycott elections is 
counterproductive to the party and to the democratisation process. If this dispute is not 
resolved, it will overshadow more pressing issues in the development and peacebuilding 
program. These include capacity building for rural Acehnese so they can revitalise important 
agricultural initiatives, such as the region’s high-quality coffee plantations. Another issue is 
the high unemployment rate. Law enforcement training for MPs is also important if they are 
to create effective regulations for Aceh’s development and reconciliation. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission regulation, which has been keenly anticipated by human rights 
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organisations and victims of conflict, is still pending due to the ‘political negotiation process’
and is another issue which needs prioritising.
The World Bank reports that investors still perceive Aceh as a risky place to conduct 
business, meaning that growth will be limited and efforts to reduce poverty will likely lose 
their effectiveness. This must be remedied. The Acehnese government must change the 
perception of the region so it is seen as a secure and safe business environment. Providing 
high-quality infrastructure is a large part of this. These challenges will not be overcome 
unless Aceh’s political parties and leaders give priority to the broad interests of local 
inhabitants, rather than their own narrow interests.
The current precariousness of Acehnese politics has not had a positive effect on the media, 
CSOs or the Acehnese people in general. Fear of political violence is rising after the killings
of local leaders and other violence suspected of being closely related to rivalries among local 
political groups. If these political elites and civil society groups cannot manage their political 
conflicts, it will destroy a great deal of important investment in the region.
Dynamics of Politics
Aceh is currently the only province in Indonesia in which local political parties have 
developed to the point where they hold more interest and power than national parties. 
National parties, which were popular before 2005, lost significant support from the 
grassroots. The Acehnese prefer local parties which they assume better understand local 
issues than do national parties. At least, they are closer to their constituents than are national 
parties. Thus, parties at the national level are challenged by local parties, who pay more 
attention to problems at the local level. The former minister forhuman rights, Hasballah M 
Sa’ad, stated:“it would be difficult to secure long-term peace if former combatants were 
forced to join national parties. GAM had no linkages with national political parties … 
133 
 
[which] facilitated the former rebels’ stable entry into mainstream politics” (Hillman 2010: 
3). The issue of local parties has been one of the most difficult areas of negotiation. Kalla 
said:
We knew the issue of local political parties would be a difficult one for 
parliament in Jakarta. And we understood that we had to make the MoU in 
such a way that parliament would adopt it into law. We were finally 
convinced to agree to allow local parties in Aceh on the last day of the talks. I 
made two points in response to political opposition on this matter: we had 
local parties in Indonesia in the first elections in 1955; and Papua’s special 
autonomy has a provision for local parties – even though it is not 
implemented. It means parliament has agreed to allow local parties.
Hamid Awaludin, the head of the Indonesian negotiating team, said it was one of the most 
difficult steps of the negotiations when GAM proposed local political parties. This issue was 
very sensitive and raised opposition from political elites in Jakarta,would have preferred to 
give leadership positions to GAM elites at the provincial and district levels. Awaludin stated 
that “there were some 10 political parties which had signed up to support GAM activists who 
wished to run for leadership positions in Aceh in the future” (Awaludin 2009: 276). This
proposal was opposed by the GAM negotiators, who were determined to run their own 
parties. The democratic process preferred by GAM was regarded as positive for the 
democratisation of Aceh after decades of war. 
The purpose of the Helsinki peace agreement was the creation of a permanent peace in Aceh
and for former GAM combatants and leaders to integrate with the other Acehnese and 
become like other Indonesian citizens. These aims seem to have been achieved quite easily,
as these individuals are very much part of Acehnese society. During the conflict, they 
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struggled along with their fellow Acehnese against the repressive Indonesian regime, 
especially the armed forces. However, there is a serious question regarding the rise of 
violence and threats during the 2012 elections and afterwards. A group of former explosive 
squad members of GAM from North Aceh, headed by Vikram (aka Ayah Banta), was behind 
a series of killings and attacks approaching the elections.Yusuf stated that these shootings 
were purely due to economic reasons. It could be argued that his statement at this critical time 
was only for the sake of stability and apositive image of Aceh democratisation, which he had 
tried to establish in his leadership in local government. He argued:“They did so because of 
jealousy toward Javanese workers”. However, M. Nasir Djamil, one of the members of the 
third commission of the DPRA who visited Aceh in January 2012, argued that the killings 
were related to politics. He said that if the Acehnese were jealous of the Javanese workers 
holding the lowest jobs, who were digging trenches for Telkom optic cable for less than 1 
million rupiah (US$110) per month, then they, the Acehnese themselves,should accept such 
lowly jobs. He also said that Aceh neededa state of civil emergency (Tertib Sipil). 
Yusuf opposed the idea of a civil emergency, which he considered “conflicted” (Serambi 
Indonesia, 12 January 2012). In addition, he argued that the shooting by the group of former 
combatants headed by Ayah Banta was planned by the Party Aceh; he claimed that the real 
aim was to terrorise the region in order to receive serious attention from the central 
government in order to delay the time of the election (Irwandi Yusuf, interview by author, 
Banda Aceh, April 2013). In Yusuf’s appendices of data given to the Constitutional 
Commission in order to challenge the victory of Zaini Abdullah and Muzakir Manaf, it was 
stated that the terrorist tactics employed – that is, the ordering of the shooting of former 
commanders of KPAand the intimidation of voters in rural areas (where the Acehnese mostly 
live)– actually gave support to Yusuf’s campaign. It was also claimed that his campaign team 
received serious threats of shooting, killing and intimidation. 
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However, the Constitutional Commission decided that Yusuf’s arguments contradicted the 
statements of the police and government. The head of the police said that the 2012 election 
was proceeding very peacefully without significant threats of violence. Yusuf himself also 
said soon after the day of the election that the result was the outcome ofpeaceful elections and 
confirmed his appreciation of the final decision of the Provincial Independent Election 
Commission. Hestated that he understood that the decision of the Commission wasin the end
final and reflected the consideration of the central government aimed at making Aceh 
peaceful and creating opportunities for former GAM leaders to lead the local government;this 
was, he said, a political decision (Yusuf 2013).
In the 2006 elections, Yusuf was supported by the younger generation of GAM leadership. 
His challenger, Ahmad Humam Hamid-Hasbi Abdullah (popularly called H2O), was 
supported by senior GAM leaders. Deciding on candidates for the position of governor and 
deputy governor was done via a democratic process. GAM representatives from all over the 
world had a meeting to discuss who would best represent GAM. Despite this, the central 
GAM leadershipdisregarded the result of this meeting andeffectively appointed H2O without 
consultation. These tensions among the GAM leadership continued until the 2012 elections 
when Party Aceh, the winning party of the 2009 elections and the legitimate representative of 
GAM, appointed vice-gubernatorial candidates without consulting KPA district leaders. 
Some KPA leaders who were disappointed with what they called an “undemocratic 
appointment process” asked Yusuf, the incumbent governor, to run for a second term. KPA 
leaders tend to be former local commanders of GAM. Some MPs from Party Aceh at
provincial and district levels are also in Yusuf’s camp. These tensions escalated into violence 
leading up to the 2012 elections. 
At least twenty people have been killed in Aceh since March 2011. Their deaths are believed 
to be closely related to current politics (ICG 2012). Six of these were killed between 
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December 2011 and January 2012, before Party Aceh was allowed to join the elections in 
February. Some of those targeted were local commanders who supported Yusuf. This 
violence heightened tensions among the Acehnese people, who had enjoyed relative peace 
and stability since the 2005 peace agreement. People forced by police to secure their 
neighbourhoods by staying home at night. This practice is called Siskamling (Sistim 
Keamanan Lingkungan), a model of behaviour created by the New Order to make 
communities become aware of their neighbours. This exposed community members to violent 
experiences and subsequent trauma.TNI also asked the police to secure Aceh in order to 
resolve the violence. Acehnese human rights activists responded by saying that the existing 
security forces were sufficient to secure Aceh from any threat. Zulfikar Muhammad, 
executive director of the human rights NGO PB HAM of Aceh Utara, argued that “Both 
groups from Jakarta and Aceh took advantage of this violence. They wanted to suspend the 
elections” (Muhammad 2012).
Political Violence
The most challenging democratic transition was the 2012 election, when frictions among 
former combatants turned to violence. Thirteen people died in incidents involving former 
combatants. In the middle of a televised public debate on 5 April 2012 four days before the 
poll, Yusuf asked Abdullah and Manaf, the pair of candidatesfor governor and vice-governor 
fromParty Aceh, what they knew of the killings and attacks:“the terrors that have taken place 
in Aceh. The [national police] know the perpretators came from [Zaini’s party]”.Abdullah 
responded that the police needed to complete their investigation and that Yusuf’s question 
was “provocative” (Bachelard 2012). Yusuf was confident that the killings were attached to 
Party Aceh’s elite. He said:“The perpetrators are associated withParty Aceh and they were 
instructed by the elite of Party Aceh for their political interests, forcing the central 
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government to postpone the elections in order to reduce my power and influence in Aceh”
(Yusuf 2013). Bachelard (2012) quoted Aspinall’s views on the killing operations:
It is likely that Partai Aceh was behind some or all of the 13 killings. The organisation 
still has the feeling of an army corps, with strict codes, loyalty and hierarchical 
leadership. It is a habit of heart, a part of their ideology, that they solve problems 
through violence. According to the rebels’ code, Irwandi is seen as a traitor to the 
movement.
It is important to look at how the victims were targeted and the consequence of the 
operations. There was a change in operations. In the 2009 election, TNI personnel attacked 
Party Acehmembers, leaving many of them dead. This was an intelligenceoperation against 
the rise of former combatants who had managed to establish a new local political party. Some 
candidates fromParty Acehwere killedandtheir offices attacked. However, Party Aceh
continued to participate in politics and dominated the result. In the national legislative 
election, Party Acehformed a coalition with the Democratic Party of President Yudhoyono 
and won about ninty percent of the vote. They expected a reward from the incumbent 
Yudhoyono in supporting the political interests of Party Aceh. They supported Yudhoyono 
personally as presidential candidate and head of the Democratic Party as an expression of 
thanks for his continuing supportof peacebuilding in Aceh. 
In the 2012 elections, Party Aceh was very confident of winning, especially in its
strongholds: Aceh Besar, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Utara, Aceh 
Timur, Langsa, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat Daya and Sabang. However, attacks, killings and 
intimidation conducted by supporters of Party Aceh drew attention from local and national 
political elites. If former combatants were confident in their candidates,the political violence 
was arguably an approach to discredit the incumbent Yusuf as leader of the province of Aceh. 
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This began with internal frictions within GAM between older and younger generations. Malik 
Mahmud attempted to control GAM. Kingsbury described how these frictions arose during 
the peace talks: “internal divisions within GAM became evident during the peace talks and 
surfaced over the selection of a candidate for the position of Aceh’s governor. There was 
agreement to found a new political party based on the old GAM” (Kingsbury 2012). There 
were also divisions between older, ,ore religious GAM members and young, modern 
GAMmembers, who tended to be secular. Friction and disappointment also developed in the 
GAM grassroots after reintegration. Many of them were ignored by the GAM elite and 
became frustrated with the integration process. For example, a group of former combatants 
tried to establish a farming centre in Bireuen, an area of transmigrants who had left during the 
conflict. The former combatants used their early reintegration funds for agricultural 
investment. However, due to limited skills in farming and no assistance from local 
government, some of them left the farmand chose to return as freelancers in providing 
security for local businesspeople or assisting in tendersfor local government projects.
Jamaeka disagreed with the argument that former combatants managed local government 
projects by intimidation. He said that former combatants were only individuals who had
difficulty finding jobs and provided security for local business leaders by accompanying them 
to meet local government officers and asking to win projects (Jamaeka 2012).
Economic gaps between combatants also attracted violence. This was the reason that Ayah 
Banta and his former combatants killed and attacked in 2011 and 2012, because of 
disappointment with Governor Yusuf who, they claimed, did not pay attention to the financial 
position of former combatants. Yusuf opposed this argument and said that as Aceh governor 
he tried to be neutral in accommodating various political and social groups, and was 
committed to regularfinancial support for former combatants. Yusuf (2013) stated that “I paid 
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special attention to the former combatants in Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur, including Ayah 
Banta group by providing them millions rupiah”.
The violent attack operations began on 22 July 2011, when Saiful Husen alias Cagee, a
former head of KPA Batee Iliek and a member of Yusuf’s campaign team, was shot dead 
after leaving a coffee shop11.15 pm. Shortly before Cagee opened his car, he was shot by a 
gunman using an AK47. After the shooting, the gunman escaped by car. Cagee died on the 
spot andpolice found three bullets, two in his head and one in his foot.Cagee as the head of 
KPA Batee Iliek had had a political clash with the Bireuen head of Party Aceh,especially 
after Party Aceh decided to propose Abdullah and Manaf as candidatesfor governor and vice-
governor in February 2011. Cagee was among some heads of KPA and leading figures in 
Party Aceh who were forced to resign or personally resigned from KPA and Party Aceh
(Serambi Indonesia, 23 July 2011).
After the shooting of Cagee, the central government believed that it was only a clash between 
combatants. Further attacks targeted Javanese workers in private and state companies. This
attracted significant attention from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which later rescheduled the 
elections in order to give a chance for Party Aceh to participate. Aviolent attack targeted the 
labourersof PT Setya Agung plantation inNorth Aceh on 4 December 2011. Setya Agung, a 
company based in Medan, North Sumatra, hadrights to plantpalm oil, cacao and rubber over 
an area of some 8000 hectares in North Aceh. Like other companies operating in Aceh, it had 
an agreement with a GAM-owned company, CV Cimita Rata, which was responsible for
managing the rubber farm. Many of its labourerswere former combatants, but the
companyalso hired Javanese workers from Medan and housed them in a barracks belonging
to Setya Agung. This happened over many years and relationshipsbetween labourers from 
Aceh and from outside Aceh had worked well. It is common in rubber plantation that 
Javanese workers hired by some companies in Aceh. They are popular as hard workers and 
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experienced in maintaining the plantation. In many farmings managed by former combatants, 
Javanese workers play strategic role in growing the plants. In Bireuen, some Javanese women 
are permanent workers contracted by former combatants to look after the farms. These 
women are married to Acehnese. 
However, before the election of 2012, relations changed. These men were contracted by a CV 
Cimita Rata official rumoured to be loyal to Governor Yusuf. Further attacks targeting 
Javanese workers were political. The plantation labourers were sitting in a food stall near the 
barracks near midnight on 4 Deember 2011when four or five men approached from the 
direction of the palm oil plantation. They asked the workers where they were from and 
demanded to see their ID cards. Then they asked them to lie on the floor, shot them and 
left.Three died on the spot, several months lateranother died and five were seriously wounded
(ICG 2012).A week later, on 10 December 2011, someone shot at the car of a Setya Agung 
manager, but no one was injured. Another non-fatal attack on 23 December 2011 in North 
Aceh on a company carrying out an oil and gas survey appears to have been an extortion 
attempt and, unlike the killings of the Javanese, produced two arrests. 
A second fatal shooting happened at the base of the telecommunications company, 
Telkomsel, in Bireuen on 31 December 2011. About fifty Javanese men had been contracted 
to lay a fibre-optic cable for Telkomsel. They rented a house near the main road in Bireuen.
About 8 or 9 pm, two men rode up on a motorcycle. One got off and went into the 
house,where there were about fifteen labourers. Without speaking, he shot them.Three were 
killed at once; seven others were injured. On the same night in Banda Aceh, a Javanese trader
was killed at a toy shop.Javanese workers in Aceh Utara were also targetedon 1 January 
2012; one person was killed, another seriously injured. Again nothing was said; the killer just 
shot the workers. Finally, on 5 January 2012,three Javanese workers from Semarang died in 
Aceh Besar. 
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Initially the provincial police chief declared that all these murders were the result of business 
rivalries and economic jealousies – as if Acehnese were targeting Javanese for taking their 
jobs. This statement was an attempt to hide the weak capacity of local police in investgating 
these attacks due to local politics. The director of Setya Agung disagreed with the police 
statement about job competition. He said there was a major labour shortage, especially for 
rubber tappers, so if any Acehnese wanted a job, he or she could have it. The jealousy 
argument also did not make sense, because the people killed were at the bottom of the income 
scale, only looking for enough income to buy a kilo of rice. Djuli (2012) said that Acehnese 
people are reluctant to work at lower level, dirty jobs like what the Javanese did. Therefore, it 
was not possible that the shootings were due to jealousy about jobs as the Aceh police stated. 
On 21 February 2012, the police chief announced that three of the shootings had been 
committed by the same group and the police knew who they were, but refused to say 
anything more. A month later, police arrested the perpetrators, six former combatants and 
members of KPA and Party Aceh. The shootingshad a definite impacton the foreign 
investment community, whichfelt insecure in Aceh. 
It is arguable that the killings were related to the lobbying initiated by Party Aceh to run for 
the 2012 elections. On 12 December 2011, Director-General Djohermansyah made an 
agreement with Muzakkir Manaf, head of Party Aceh, to delay the elections until Party 
Acehcould participate in the election. This was responded to by other candidates from parties 
and independents in Aceh as unfair treatment. They had prepared for almost a year and spent 
a lot of funds. Yusuf argued that what Djohermansyah agreed with Party Aceh destroyed the 
foundation of democracy in Aceh (Yusuf 2013).
As shootings continued on 10 December 2011, 31 December 2011, 1 January 2012 and 5 
January 2012, the home affairs ministry began arguing strongly and publicly for postponing 
the elections to accommodate the demand of Party Aceh. This is a clear indication that the 
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shootings were related to the political negotiation. Party Aceh forced the central government 
to listen and to agree with its demands. President Yudhoyono responded to the rise of 
violence by instructing all stakeholders to maintain peace and security, which are prioritised 
in Aceh. The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Djoko 
Suyanto,said (Antara, 10 January 2012):
The president has expressed deep concern about the lawless actions, and hopes such 
cases will not recur. We don’t want the peace process and peaceful situation that have 
prevailed in Aceh for the last five years be disturbed by irresponsible persons. The 
national police are now trying to identify and find the perpetrators of the violence.
After some meetings between the central government and stakeholders in Aceh, a new 
political arrangement was managed. On 12 January 2012, the home affairs ministry submitted 
anappeal to the Constitutional Court for a review of the 2007 Election Law that would 
provide the ministry with the authority to delay the election. On 16 January 2012, the court 
made astatement that after pressure from the presidential palace, registration should be 
reopened for a week to allow canddidates who had not yet registered to do so and the election 
schedule should be adjusted accordingly, but with the poll no later than 9 April 2012. The 
ministry’s appeal regarding the transfer of authority was denied, but the other ruling gave 
Party Aceha chance to participate in the elections after a new delay was agreed.
Responses came from the stakeholders in Aceh. The KIP argued that there was no way it 
could manage another week of processing new candidates, doing the required background 
checks and still schedule the election on 16 February 2012. The schedule was pushed forward
the maximum delaypermitted by the court, until 9 April, and the court agreed. Party Aceh
now had what it expected: Yusuf completed his term on8 February 2012.
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Party Aceh agreed to the new date with enthusiasm and immediately registered Abdullah and 
Manaf as a candidate pair for governor and vice-governor. The Constitutional Court, whose 
ruling in November 2011 had been rejected by Party Aceh on the grounds that it had no 
authority to changethe LoGA, was now gladly accepted as a legitimate source of law as long 
as it produced decisions in line with the party’s wishes. On 24 February 2012, the provincial 
legislature finally passed the long-delayed qanun on election procedures that included a 
provision allowing independent candidates. This is evidencethat Party Aceh’s priority all 
along had been removing Yusuf from local government office and that once this was 
effected, compromise elsewhere was possible. Yusuf said that the political movement of 
Party Aceh was against the principle of democracy and the spirit of peace in Aceh after the 
Helsinki accord, which provides open opportunity for all individuals in Aceh politics (Yusuf 
2013). 
The motives behind the killings and attacks were political and directly or indirectly instructed 
by the elite of Party Aceh. No killings have taken place since 5 January 2012; people in 
Banda Aceh associate the cessation of attacks with the Constitutional Court’s ruling on 16 
January 2012. The implicationis that Jakarta understood the inherent threat of more violence 
and capitulated to the will of Party Aceh(ICG 2012).Violent approaches seemed an effective 
method forParty Aceh as political communication with the central government, especially in 
the case of the 2012 elections. 
On 12 March 2012, about a month before the election,police arrested six people who had 
been involved in the attacks and killings. Aceh police chief Insp. Gen. Iskandar Hasan 
confirmed that the suspects were all Acehnese, who had possibly planned to execute the 
attacks in the lead-up to the Aceh elections. He said that: “there is a possibility that the 
planned attack was aimed at disturbing the election. But we don’t know if the explosives 
were to be detonated on the day of the poll… Police confiscated five bombs, which were 
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made from pipes and iron bars” (Afrida & Simanjutak 2012).In addition, police said that “the 
men who were arrested in Aceh Utara were allegedly involved in the murder of Cagee”
(Afrida & Simanjuntak 2012). Party Aceh spokesperson Fachrul Razi said “it’s true that the 
suspects are former GAM combatants. We should wait for the court’s verdict. If they are 
really Party Aceh members and have committed the crimes, they will be dismissed from the 
party” (Afrida & Simanjunta 2012). In the court, Ayah Banta and his group confirmed that 
they had killed Cagee and thirteen Javanese workers as an expression of disappointment in
Governor Yusuf. They claimed that he had not paid enough attention to them or other former 
combatants in the grassroots (lawyer of Ayah Banta 2013).
The killings, attacks, intimidation and terror approaching the April 2012 election in the 
province of Aceh went against the basic principles of the peacebuilders who had committed 
to developing lasting peace in Aceh. Political parties and the dynamics of politics should 
strengthen peace efforts and participatory economic development in Aceh. The violence 
reduced the quality of democracy and disappointed the spirit of the people,who expected a
secure, peaceful and prosperous Aceh after about three decades of bloody conflict. Paris 
(2004: 188) said that “peacebuilders have sponsored elections in war-shattered states as a 
means of facilitating the peaceful management of societal conflicts through competition at the 
ballot box, rather than through combat on the battlefield”.So elections are a strategic 
instrument of competition among commanders of former combatants who transformed
themselves from the battlefield to the ballot box. They disengaged themselves to become
civilians who managed politics with a spirit of democracy, and free and fair competition
among candidates. 
However, Paris also said that:
145 
 
Elections do not always foster peaceful forms of competition, nor do they necessarily 
produce governments committed to resolving disputes through negotiation and 
compromise – or, for that matter, governments committed to preserving democracy. If 
the parties that win elections are dedicated to the violent destruction of their rivals, or 
if they seek to undermine the very democratic institutions that brought them to power, 
elections may actually work against the goal of establishing a stable liberal 
democracy. Moreover, if the parties that contest elections attempt to build popular 
support by appealing to intercommunal fears and hatreds, the election campaign can 
itself rekindle the very conflicts that peacebuilders seek to mitigate (Paris 2004: 188–
189). 
Weak institutions of democracy, as Paris (2004) argued, potentially return a regime to 
authoritarianism. This is why the Acehnese were worried about the political dominance
ofParty Aceh and former combatants. Aceh needs a counterbalance from opposition parties 
and CSOs. However, institutions like the police, courts and other core democratic institutions 
have been interfered with by Party Aceh, which has weakened their role.
The violence approaching the April 2012 election also targeted women, who were a 
vulnerable group in society during and after the conflict. The National Commission on 
Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) worked with 16 NGOs based in Aceh: PB 
HAM Pidie, PASKA, Pekka, Women Solidarity, Flower Aceh, Violet Grey, IPPI, SeIA, 
PKBI, LBH APIK Aceh, PULIH Aceh, Human Rights NGO Coalition, RPuK, KKTGA and 
BSUIA, which constitute the Monitoring Network 231 that documented and provided aid in 
561 cases of violence against women from 2011 to 2012. The name was inspired by Article 
231 Paragraph (1) LoGA to promote and protect the rights of women and children (Komnas 
Perempuan 2013). It was reported that: 
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Domestic violence was the dominant form (413 cases or 70%) with the remainder 
being violence in the community (148 cases or 26%). It was recorded there are at least 
319 women victims of sexual violence in times of armed conflict that still do not have 
the right to truth, justice and recovery. Furthermore, violence against women was also 
found in the implementation of Sharia law and the increasing intolerance against 
military religions (Komnas Perempuan 2013). 
The Acehenese women’s movement requested political parties to maintain the peace without 
intimidation and terror towards other parties and individuals in the 2012 election. Nursiti, a
representative of the women’s movement, delivered a requestfor peaceful elections to the 
acting governor of Aceh, Tarmizi A. Karim, and said: “we hope acting governor of Aceh to 
conduct a peaceful and neutral elections of 2012” (Antara, 8 March 2012). The movement 
also addressed the request to all stakeholders in the 2012 elections and asked all parties to 
respect women candidates (Antara, 8 March 2012).
Local Parties
The legal right of the Acehnese people to develop local parties alongside the existence of 
national parties was the foundation of the 2009 election (Law no. 11/2006).Acehnese leaders 
competed against each other in the election to attract the support of the local population. The 
awareness of the Acehnese leaders and people of the importance of peace and stability for 
Aceh has strengthened the process of democracy. The question now emerged as we 
approached the 2012 gubernatorial elections of whether the government and MPs could agree 
on the management of the election process. The issue of independent candidature, which was 
approved by the UUPA (LoGA) for the 2006 election and legalised by the Constitutional 
Court for the 2012 election, became the main subject of dispute, while the more substantial 
issues of candidates’ programs and the urgent needs for Aceh’s future received less attention. 
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Kamaruzzaman argues that it was the result of national party arrogance in designing the laws 
(UUPA) for their political interests. After the 2006 election, the national political parties 
wanted all candidates for provincial and district leadership positions to be run through 
national party mechanisms (Kamaruzzaman 2012).7Kamaruzzaman’s discussions with other 
Pansus (Special Committee) DPRA members were held before the foundation of local parties
which allowed Acehnese leaders to manage local politics independent of Jakarta, contrary to 
the national parties’ wishes. This is also the reason that former GAM commanders avoided
joining national parties, so as to ensure their freedom in managing political leadership based 
on their strength in Aceh. 
Kamaruzzaman argued that “Irwandi has established a good foundation for stable social and 
economic development in Aceh after a long period of conflict. The Acehnese peoplehave 
totally forgotten their severe past and are ready to work for their prosperity. People enjoy 
current peace and stability”. However, he was worried about the terror and violence 
organised by certain groups in Aceh for their own interests. He stated that “the frictions 
among former GAM leaders will ruin the future of peace building in Aceh. They were not 
well prepared to be strong and effective political leaders in a peaceful region”.8
Kamaruzzaman had represented GAM in the peace negotiations in 2000. He was imprisoned 
in West Java from 2001 to 2005 and released at the end of the peace negotiations after 
receiving amnesty as part of those negotiations. Hewas imprisoned along with Tgk Usman 
Lampoh Awe and Tgk Amni in Sukamiskin prison in Bandung, West Java (Awaludin 2009: 
232). He now manages Kamaruzzaman Law Firm and has assisted national and international 
companies in investing in Aceh. However, he was disappointed at the rise of violence 
approaching the April 2012 elections, which disrupted the plan for ongoing and future 
                                                          
7Kamaruzzaman, interview in Banda Aceh, 18 January 2012.  
8 Kamaruzzaman, interview in Banda Aceh, 18 January 2012. 
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investments. He worried that Aceh’s development and growth would be set back if not all 
groups could control their own political agendas.
Peaceful Elections
International observers stated that the 2012 election in Aceh ran quite peacefully. ANFREL 
reported that although there was some violence that occurred for a few months before the 
election, overall they witnessed a peaceful voting process. The International Crisis Group 
(2012) argued that the rise of killings and violent attacks between December 2011 and March 
2012 could threaten the peace in Aceh. ICG showed evidence that the killing of fifteen or 
more people approaching the 2012 election were closely related to the election. Fear, 
intimidation and trauma became important factors in the support of Party Aceh candidates,
who “guaranteed’ stability and security”. Törnquist stated that “democracy had to be set aside 
in order to ‘save peace’…if it (Party Aceh) was not elected, peace might be at risk” (2013: 
245–246). 
Aceh held its elections for governor in 2012, an event that underscored the significant 
contribution democracy had made to peace since Aceh’s 2006 ballot. Many Acehnese 
welcomed this new sense of democracy. About 78 percent of voters participated in the 2009 
presidential elections, the largest turnout for direct elections in any region in the country. But 
as the poll approached, flaring tensions among Acehnese leaders – especially between GAM
elites – had observers concerned about potential threats to the longevity of peaceful 
democracy in Aceh. A number of former GAM combatants were killed and local Acehnese 
saw this as closely related to the tensions and rivalries among political groups in the province. 
The pending election had been cancelled five times. In the first instance, itwas scheduledfor 
October 2011. Then it was rescheduled for 16 February 2012. However, after some disputes 
between Jakarta and Aceh and the rise of violence, which many viewed as being closely 
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related to current politics, the date was changed yet again.Finally, it was agreed that the 
election would be held on 9 April 2012. These cancellations drove up the cost of holding the 
election. Local government gave the Independent Election Commission (KIP) 210 billion 
rupiah to manage the elections. The budget increased after the elections were rescheduled 
from February to April 2012, to provide the salaries of those people working on the election 
committees from provincial to village levels (Atjehpost.com, 12 January 2012).
Disputes between various candidates of the PA and other Acehnese politicians were no 
surprise to GAM’s legal team, which gathered to discuss the UUPA draft. Kamaruzzaman, 
who joined the GAM legal team, stated that “I warned Fery Mursyidan Baldan, the 
chairperson of the special committee (Pansus) of DPR discussing RUUPA, that the decision 
to approve only one of the independent candidates would create big problems in the 
future”.9He argued that the laws were designed for special autonomy, which psychologically 
and sociologically is very different from the Helsinki MoU. 
Party Aceh finally decided to run its candidates in the 9 April elections. However, itlost some 
local leaders who had joined PA, but later separated from PA to join the electionefforts of 
independent groups. The declaration was attended by more than thirty thousand participants 
from all over Aceh Province. PA officially announced its support for Abdullah (former GAM 
minister of foreign affairs) as the gubernatorial candidate and Manaf (former GAM 
commander after Abdullah Shafei and later head of PA) as the candidatefor the post of vice-
governor. In order to strengthen the political legitimacy of the PA candidates, Manaf invited 
two TNI generals –Soenarko and Djalil Yusuf–both of them former heads of Kodam Iskandar 
Muda of Aceh. Soenarko stated that he had had a good relationship with the head of GAM 
since 2000, when he worked in Kopassus and had duties in Aceh. This relationship continued 
after he was appointed as head of Kodam in 2008–2009. A member of the PA elite, Hasbi 
                                                          
9Kamaruzzaman, interview in Banda Aceh, 18 January 2012.
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Abdullah, argued that this was the result of reconciliation between two former heads of the 
military, TNI and GAM. Soenarko had personal reasons to accept the invitation to join 
Timses (the dream team) of Zaini–Muzakir (popularly called ZIKIR). He was very glad to 
join the ZIKIR camp in order to stop the progress of Yusuf, with whom he had had a bad 
relationship during his time as head of Kodam.10
Soenarko’s participation in Manaf’s camp was influential in rural Aceh. Local KPA/PA 
leaders and members were very confident that they would win the elections. They felt that the 
support of Soenarko would attract more Javanese in Aceh to vote for Abdullahand Manaf.
The head of the KPA in Takengon, where Soenarko’s Javanese mother originated, argued 
that more PETA members, the Javanese militia in Central Aceh who had fought against 
GAM during the conflict, now supported ZIKIR.11
On the other hand, Yusuf’s camp responded that Soenarko’s role in supporting ZIKIR would 
be positive for Yusuf. They said that the Acehnese, especially GAM members, were still 
traumatised by the role of Kopassusand the militaryin fighting against GAM during the 
conflict, whenthey killed thousands of GAM fighters. The Acehnese would not easily forget 
the violent experiences inflicted by military forces. Soenarko was stated to be responsible for 
the killing of GAM members in 2000 when he headed the Kopassus forces in Aceh.12
However, Soenarko argued that it was urgent for the Acehnese to forgive all violence 
conducted by parties involved in the conflict and to focus on the future by accommodating 
broader political groups to develop Aceh.13 Soenarko was one of three retired TNI members 
who joined PA’s winning team of candidates for governor and heads of districts. In two 
interviews by this author with Soenarko, firstly during the declaration of PA candidates in 
                                                          
10Soenarko,retired general, interview in Banda Aceh, February 2012.  
11 Interview in Takengon, February 2012.  
12 Informal talks with Yusuf’s team in Banda Aceh, February 2012.  
13 Soenarko, interviews in Blang Pidie, 3 April 2012.
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Banda Aceh in early February, and while he was campaigning along with Manaf on 3 April 
2012, Soenarko stated during the public campaign that “my involvement in PA is to prove 
that PA is an open party for all Acehnese, regardless of ethnic and religious affiliation. I also 
invited Javanese in Aceh to choose the candidates from PA”.14
On the other hand, Soenarko’s recruits were anxious for PA consolidation. In some regions of 
Aceh Timur and Aceh Tengah, soon after PA announced its recruitment of Soenarko, the 
KPA commander of Pidie District, TgkSarjani Abdullah, who was now a bupaticandidate for 
Pidie, confirmed that Soenarko was a strong symbol of reconciliation between TNI and TNA. 
Sarjani stated that local TNI members had never disturbed the activism of PA since Soenarko 
had joined Muzakir’s team. He said that, in the past, TNI personnel used to remove PA
flags.15PA was possibly the only party that put up their flags in main streets all over Aceh 
from province to villages; these flags flew in the streets since the PA declaration of running 
in the 2012 election. PA also allowed their members in cities and districts to label their 
private cars in support of local PA candidates for positions of governor, mayors and bupati.
Cars that had pictures of candidates and the text, ‘vote for the candidates’, were free to drive 
all over Aceh. Some parties warned the Panwaslu (elections monitoring committee) to ask PA 
to clear its“early campaigns”.
The role of former GAM leaders in PA is crucial for the continuation of peace, stability and 
development. PA was optimistic about winning the elections in 2012. Manaf stated his 
party’s plan for the prosperity of Aceh:
We will work with all parties to exchange knowledge and fulfil all aspects 
that are urgently needed in Aceh development. We will recruit experts (from 
Aceh and outside Aceh) on education, health and agriculture. Our 
                                                          
14 Soenarko, campaign speech in Blang Pidie, 3 April 2012.  
15Sarjani Abdullah, head of KPA Kabupaten Pidie, interview in Pidie, 14 February 2012.
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commitment is that the priority of the programs should be addressed for 
poorer communities (Nurlis and Yuswardi 2012).16
The Prospect for Democracy 
The number of violent incidents in Aceh after the reintegration of GAM has been much lower 
than during the conflict period. In general, Aceh communities have enjoyed stability and 
peacebuilding since 2006. People are free and safe to travel all around Aceh. However, the 
fear of possible attacks rose as the April 2012 election approached. Such a spike in violence 
had occurred before the election in 2006 (provincial and district elections) and 2009 (regional 
and national legislative elections and presidential elections). The quality of democracy is 
threatened by violence and terror, which was orchestrated by certain groups in Aceh and 
Jakarta for their own political interests. Soenarko, a retired major-general and former 
commander of Kopassus, stated that some Acehnese political groups created terror and 
violence to get Jakarta’s support for their political proposals (Soenarko 2012).
Most analysts agreed that the rise of violence was closely related to the 2012 election.
However, it is difficult to prove whether PA members or leaders were involved in the killings 
and attacks as a means of postponing the date of the election until after 16 February, when 
Yusufcompleted his term as governor of Aceh. Other groups within Aceh may have created
instability for their own business gains. Thousands of guns used during the years of conflict
are still available in Aceh, hidden by local people. A former weapons trader, who supported 
GAM during the ceasefire in 2000, stated that the Helsinki accord failed to negotiate the 
destruction of existing weapons owned by Acehnese communities, whether they were linked 
to TNA/GAM forces or members of other militias (Ahmad 2012). GAM reported less than 
                                                          
16 Interviews by Nurlis and Yuswardi, ‘Wawancara Khusus Muzakir Manaf: Kami Sudi Bergandeng Tangan, 
Berukar Pendapat’, Atjehpost.com, 19 January 2012. 
http://www.atjehpost.com/read/2012/01/19/936/10/10/Wawancara-Khusus-Muzakir-Manaf-Kami-Sudi-
Bergandeng-Tangan-Bertukar-Pendapat, retrieved 7 March 2012.  
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thirty percent of its weapons were destroyed, as monitored by AMM.A former GAM 
negotiator confirmed that it was difficult to declare an accurate number of weapons owned by 
GAM. Members were still traumatised by the Indonesian Government’s failure to fulfil its
promise in previous peace negotiations (Djuli 2010).
The Aceh police had frequently announced that hiding weapons was illegal under Indonesian 
law. They welcomedthe Acehnese community to hand over any weapons they had or to show 
existing weapons to the police (Mardira2012). However, the number of weapons handed over 
was lower than expected. A former GAM commander in Pidie argued that many Acehnese 
bought weapons out of their own pockets during the conflict:“The price of the weapons was 
quite expensive, around 10 million rupiah for an AK 47.If the Indonesian government is 
serious about ridding Aceh of weapons, they have to provide sufficient reimbursement to the 
weapons’ owners” (Intan 2012). 
An effective campaign strategy is one of the most significant instruments of any election. 
During the campaign, candidates for governor or head of district provide their leadership 
platforms and their agendas in order to gain support from constituents. To manage good and 
ethical campaigns, an independent election committee regulates how each candidate and their 
teamcan attract voters. In post-conflict regions, campaigns can exploit the memory of a 
traumatic past with stories of violence, threats and other activities which go against human 
rights. This strategy has been used by most candidates in Aceh. However, Abdullah and 
Manaf successfully raised more sensitive and emotive issues. They said that the victory of 
their team would allow Aceh to become a strong, stable and prosperous region. They 
appealed to the Acehnese identity. 
The Acehnese identity is strongly established from the golden period of Aceh’s history, when 
the sultans of Aceh managed their kingdoms well and established international diplomacy 
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which aided prosperity and stability. This history is reflected by current government and the 
people of Aceh, who are moved to achieve a success story like the sultans did in the past. The 
current spirit of Acehnese politics and development comes from their hope of becoming an 
independent and prosperous region, able to take a stronger role in maintaining regional and 
international stability. They have begun to take these steps by sharing and supporting peace 
initiatives in conflict regions in Southeast Asia, as well as other regions in Asia and Africa. 
Abdullah and Manaf, in their campaign for the 2012 election, said that GAM’s struggle was 
motivated by defending the dignity of the Acehnese. They claimed that their participation in 
local politics was to apply the mandate of the Helsinki peace agreement and to implement the 
ideals of the Acehnese as prosperous and respected citizens. 
The campaign strategies of Abdullah–Manaf and Yusuf–Muhyanwill be compared and it will 
be argued that the messages they delivered influenced voters to support them. Abdullah and 
Manaf, known as Zikir (means ‘reciting’), conducted 55 campaigns from 22 March to 5 April
2012. They visited many cities and districts in Aceh province. Zikir’s team was the most 
effective team compared with other candidates. They were supported by a strong network in 
the grassroots, especially in rural Aceh, which was controlled by the KPA, a civil society 
group comprising former combatants and affiliated to Party Aceh.PA arranged their schedule 
to support the victory of their candidates for heads of cities and districts. The slogan they 
used was “Struggle and peace” (perjuangan andperdamaian),which is simple and clear. In 
their campaign, they stated 21 promises (janji-janji)divided into three blocks. Firstly, they 
had promises forgrassroots voters, that is, they wereeasily understood by rural communities. 
However, many of these were irrational. For example, some campaign items made promises 
such as: a“pilgrimage to Mecca by cruise (number 7); free pilgrimage for adult Acehnese 
(number 8); a monthly fund support of 1 million rupiahs for each family from oil and gas 
revenue (number 15)”. Thus, they played with the emotional dreams of rural communities. A
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member of the campaign team of Zikir argued that their promises were possible via a re-
evaluation of resource revenue sharing between the central and local governments (interview 
with a member of Zikir campaign team, interview by author, April 2012). 
The Results of the 2012 Elections
KIP Aceh officially announced the results of the Aceh gubernatorial election on 17 April 
2012 and confirmed the results for the 17 mayoral and district elections. The 9 April second 
gubernatorial election in Aceh had a slightly lower participation rate of 75.73%. The
Abdullah–Manaf (PA) team, former foreign minister and former commander of the military 
wing of GAM, won the election, gaining 1,327,695 votes (55.78%). Former governorYusuf 
received 694,515 votes (29.18%). Yusuf’s partner was Muhyan Yunan, the former head of 
the Provincial Public Works. These were followed by Muhammad Nazar-Nova Iriansyah 
(Demokrat, SIRA), former head of SIRA, incumbent vice-governor and head of Demokrat 
Party in Aceh, with 7.65%. The other two independents, Darni M. Daud, former rector of 
Unsyiah, and Teungku Ahmad Tajuddin, received 96,767 votes (4.07%) and 79,330 votes 
(3.33%), respectively (KIP Aceh 2012). 
Since PA’s candidate pair managed to secure more than 55 percent of the vote, well above 
the 30 percent minimum requirement, a second round was not needed. In the elections for
heads of districts and mayors, PA won in six districts and cities: Aceh Besar, Pidie, Pidie 
Jaya, Aceh Jaya, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur. Thesewere
strongholds of the former combatant party. However, it appeared that second-round elections
would take place in 5 of the 17 districts that had held local elections:Aceh Barat Daya, Nagan 
Raya, Aceh Barat, Sabang and Langsa. No candidate pair in any of those locations appeared
to have won more than 30 percent of the vote. According to electoral regulations, these 
second-round elections should take place no later than 60 days after the first round.PA lost in 
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Aceh Barat and won in Aceh Barat Daya, Nagan Raya, Sabang and Langsa. So the PA
candidates won in 11 of 17 districts and cities, and as governor and vice-governor. This result 
proves thepolitical dominanceof the former combatants, PA, which is also traditionally 
supported by Islamic schools (Dayah) and the former military structure of GAM, KPA,
which has influence in almost all villages in Aceh.
Conclusion
PA won the 2012 election as it did in 2006 and 2009. But that year was different:it was a 
reminder for PA to change its strategy by not using violence and intimidation as an 
instrument for getting support from the grassroots. It must become an effective modern party 
which attracts participation from the grassroots based on its programs. A challenge came 
from peer combatants who ran an independent candidate, incumbent Yusuf. Furthermore, 
Yusuf established a new local party only a few months after the elections – the Aceh National 
Party (PNA) – which is discussed in the next chapter. 
The platform of PNA is different from that of PA. PNA has attempted to unite the leadership 
of the Acehnese people comprising a variety of stakeholders, such as local and national 
parties, CSOs, NGOs, businesspeople, ulama and academics. Even though former combatants 
– that is, Yusuf’s faction – are dominant in the party,it provides an open opportunity for non-
combatants to actively participate in the structure of PNA or as candidates for parliament. 
Hasan Tiro is still the symbolic head of PNA;the partyclaims that itcontinues to uphold Tiro’s
ideals in order to develop Acehnese politics for the dignity and prosperity of the Acehnese
people.
The existence of former combatants, who are easily exploited by the elite for political 
purposes, is important to evaluate, as these groups are fragile in relation to the interests of 
individuals or groups with higher authority. Even though Ayah Banta argued that his team’s
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violent attacks were motivated by disappointment inYusuf, Nevada (2014) stated that the
high rate of poverty among former combatants is a crucial factor.They are dependent on fresh 
funds and are only gradually learning to empower themselves. Some of them have begun to 
work as farmers, fishermen, local traders, teachers and labourers. They consider working 
their best way to keep the peace and are reluctant to return to conflict. 
Frictionalso occurred between combatants from PA andnon-combatantindividuals and 
parties. Interviews conducted with candidates for heads of districts in Pidie and Bener Meriah 
during the 2012 elections revealed that they had been intimidated by PA with threats towards
their families and attacks on members of their support teams. A woman candidate for head of 
the Bener Meriah district complained that she had even received a threat from the local ulama
that woman are not allowed to be political leaders, because they claimed it was against 
Islamic Shariah law. This problem of religious interpretation also affected Megawati 
Sukarnoputri when she was the presidential candidate in the 1999 national elections.
The next chapter examines the 2014 legislative and presidential elections in Aceh. Candidates 
from local and national parties competed. In this election, relations between local and 
national politics were contested:PA and the Gerindra Party formed a political coalition. In 
return, PA supported presidentialcandidate Prabowo Subianto, who won by a small margin
against Joko Widodo. A new local party associated with former combatantsfromYusuf’s
camp, PNA,formed a coalition with the NasDem Party. In the presidential election, there was 
rivalry between Governor Abdullah and Vice-Governor Manaf due to their support for
different candidates:Abdullah supported Widodo and Manaf voted for Subianto. Their 
different political choices affected the dynamics of local government policyin Aceh.
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Chapter 7
Democracy and Peace in Aceh: The 2014 Election
Introduction
Indonesia, a pluralistic country both religiously and ethnically, is also diverse in its local 
politics. A rising sense of local ethnicity and religiosity has strategically changed the 
perspective on democracy; in addition, local politics has affected the structure of national 
politics. Decentralisation also influencesthe political sector, with differences at the local 
andnational levels. The contention underlying the present study is that Indonesian politics, in 
general, is secular,but politics in Aceh, with its strong sense of ethnicity and religious 
values,present a new challenge in terms of the practice of democracy. The question is usually 
raised as to whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Aceh province has implemented
Islamic law to serve as a constitutional basis for the structure of a secular democracy. In a
political context, it is instructive to understand how political parties in Aceh have to
accommodate the views of Islamists in reconciling this seeming contradiction between the 
religious and the secular. 
Mietzner andAspinall (2010:1) stated that scholars, in explaining Indonesia as a democracy, 
commonly “qualify the noun with a variety of adjectives, such as ‘collusive’ or ‘delegative’,
‘consolidated’ but ‘patrimonial’, ‘low quality’ or ‘secular’”. These qualifications of 
democracy as practised in Aceh do not, however, stop the Acehnese peoplefrom actively
participating in the liberal democracy of post-Suharto Indonesia. Not only is there freedom of
political participation, but other instruments of democracy, such as the media, also enjoy 
freedom of expression.
Changesin the political structure at the national level naturally influence the dynamics of 
local politics. National political parties extend their power to the provincial and district
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political arenas. In Aceh, the national parties have attempted to gain votes from local support 
bases. This model has createddeep political divisions in Aceh, in particular among GAM 
elites and combatants. In the 2009 elections, the Democrat Party gained total support from 
PA by more than ninety percent of votes. PA elites hoped to get benefits from the ruling 
Democrat regime (Hillman 2012). However, they were disappointed with weak support from 
Yudhoyono’s government, where proposals from Aceh that were endorsed by PA did not 
receive enough support from the President. 
Thus, PA has changed its strategy since the 2012 gubernatorial elections, when the Democrat 
Party proposed its own candidate. Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra Party helped PA by 
providing a significant budget for the 2012 campaigns of Abdullah and Manaf. Sofyan 
Dawod, aYusuf strongman, stated that Subianto donated 50 billion rupiah to PA to run its
campaign, a claim that was denied by PA (Anfrel 2012: 17).Azmi, head of the BPPA 
(Barisan Pendukung Partai Aceh, Party Aceh Supporter Front) claimed to have witnesses 
from inside PA that Manaf received funding for his campaign. It was widely believed these
fundswereallocated by Subianto to PA as an investment in the 2014 presidential election and 
for furthering mutual political and business relations. Soenarko, Subianto’s trusted man for 
maintaining relations with Manaf, said that it is “a mutual relation between former 
specialforces and former combatants who experienced violent battle during the conflict and 
now genuinely agree to make a permanent peace for the future of Acehnese and Indonesia”
(Soenarko 2012). 
The 2014 elections were crucial for local and national parties, not only because of the 
legislative elections, but also because the new president would play a pivotal role for the 
Acehnese. Yudhoyono had completed his second and final term as president. In 2014 
Indonesians would vote for a new president. For the Acehnese, the new president is hoped 
and expected to support the process of development, democratisation and peacebuilding. 
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This chapter examines the dynamics of the 2014 legislative and presidential elections in Aceh 
in four parts, which aim to define:firstly, the way in which the violence and friction following 
the 2012 gubernatorial elections influencedthe political environment before the 2014 election 
campaign began;secondly, how the legislative elections in 2014 were managed and how the 
resultssurprisedthe competing parties;thirdly, the way in which the presidential elections and 
the candidates – Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto – influencedthe political dynamics in 
Aceh; and finally, how the prospect of democracy in Aceh after the 2014 electionsmight 
influencedevelopment and permanent peace. It is argued here that the Acehnese adopted a 
particularly critical attitude towards the candidates and parties they voted for through a desire 
to ensure that the winning candidates and parties are able to develop a political environment 
that will maintainpeace and security. Economic prosperity and security are among the
factorsthat Acehnese voters consider urgent for the future of Aceh.
This post-conflict election in Aceh about a decade after the peace accord worked quite 
peacefully. The small amount of violence did not provoke further conflicts. This goes against 
the argument of liberalists who have said that democracy should be facilitated.Greener 
argued: 
Advocates of contemporary post-conflict state-building efforts often operate under the 
assumption that outsiders can, and indeed should, help with or even drive this process 
– a notion that parallels the theme of the democratisation literature of the 1990s, 
which argued in essence that democracy can and should be ‘manufactured’ (Greener 
2012: 419). 
In post-conflict regions, the management of democracy takes great effort to ensure all parties 
respect others and participate in elections freely and fairly. Therefore, third parties are crucial 
for monitoring elections. Third parties in this context are security forces, police, international 
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monitoring agencies and CSOs. Greener (2012: 419) added that: “in practice, the term ‘post-
conflict state-building’ therefore tends to refer to the role of external actors – predominantly 
members of the international community (including regional bodies, the UN, or various 
coalitions of states) – who have the resources and motivations to shape other 
states”.Greener’s argument is relevant to understanding how democratic institutions are 
crucial in holding peaceful and productive elections. Elections are part of state-building,
which Fukuyama defined as “creating political and economic institutions that will be capable 
of democratic governance and economic development – in other words, modelled on 
neoliberal forms of politics and economics” (Greener 2012: 420). In the early period of the 
reintegration process of GAM after the 2005 Helsinki peace accord, international 
organisations played a crucial role in maintaining peaceful and democratic elections in 2006, 
when Yusuf, former spokesperson of GAM, won the gubernatorial election. The culture of 
democracy within GAM and Aceh contributed to a level of democracy which gave 
opportunity to all Acehnese to participate in local and national politics. 
Furthermore, democracy has been consolidated in Aceh to ensure the transition of politics 
and peacebuilding. Hague and Harrop (2013: 55) said that:“consolidation of democracy has 
only occurred when the new institutions provide an accepted framework for political 
competition”. In this democracy, people have the chance to participate in the elections by
running political parties or voting for certain candidates,even though, in some districts, voter 
behaviouris influenced by local politics and security issues. The consolidation of democracy 
is greater after an elections in which the losing candidates respected the resultsand the winner 
accommodated the voices of the Acehnese in local government programs. However, the 
consolidation of democracy was challenged by the rise of violence approaching election day 
targeting MP candidates and supporters of the parties. 
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Violence and Friction
The human rights NGO coalition of Aceh (2012) reported that itdocumentedapproximately
20 cases of physical violence and intimidation from 1 to 11 April 2012, the dates of the 
gubernatorial, head of district and mayoral elections in Aceh. As stated in the previous 
chapter with regard to the 2012 election, the gubernatorial electionwas held on 9 April 2012
with a voter turnout of 75.73%. The valid votes for the gubernatorial election numbered
2,380,386 of 3,244,729 registered votes (Anfrel 2012). Most of the violence and intimidation 
targeted Yusuf camp members and sympathisers, and other members of the winning teams of 
candidates for head of district and mayor competing against PA candidates. Unfortunately, 
this friction continued in the 2014 elections. 
Not only are the former commanders, leaders and Helsinki negotiating team of GAM 
choosing different candidates for the presidential elections, but also the establishment of a
new local party – the Aceh National Party – is challenging the domination of PAover former 
combatants. Muksalmina (2013) argued that the purpose of foundingthe PNA was to integrate 
former combatants and non-combatants and that this is the true duty of GAM – to protect and 
embrace all Acehnese without exception (Muksalmina 2013). 
The International Crisis Group released a report in 2012 stating that, in order to understand 
the violence that occurred approaching the 2012 gubernatorial election, it is necessaryto 
understand the war within GAM.Chris Subiantoro, deputy head of Kontras of Aceh,revealed 
that friction has been occurring since the 2006 gubernatorial electionuntil the present day, 
when from January to March 2014 about 48 incidents of related violence occurred and two 
people were killed (Taufuqurroham 2014). Members of local parties, especially 
PA,frequently intimidated and attacked sympathisers of other parties. In this election, PNA 
supporters were the main target of these violent attacks. On March 2014, a group of women 
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from a village in Lhokseumawe had to lie to PA officials in their village that they were going
to a nearby market for a celebration andnot showing any signs of support for PNA. This was
a safe way to join the PNA campaign in Lhokseumawe. Democratic freedom is limited in 
rural villages where PA dominates.
The establishment of PNA is an alternative choice for some combatants who are tiredof the 
violent behaviour of PA and the weak leadership of the PA elite; their failure to guide their 
members to protect the community has also attracted criticism. Djuli criticised the behaviour 
of party supporters, whohe saidwere easily provoked by candidates. Money politics and 
intimidation are counterproductive to democratisation and peacebuilding in Aceh (Djuli 
2014). For the Acehnese people, peace and security are their first priorities, direct elections
are probably second and thirdly, the gaining of a better future for Aceh is widely supported.
The seeking of victory through intimidation, terror and killings has destroyed, it is contended 
here, the foundation of peace and democracy in Aceh,with devastating results for the 
economic development of the province. During the periodsof conflict, in particular from 2000 
to 2005 when GAM gained strength against the TNI, the Acehnese suffered economically;
the percentage of poor people in that period was about 30 percent (Statistics Aceh 2014).
The frictionplayed out more stronglyon the ground. During the 2014 election campaign, 
attacks against and killings of supporters of opposing candidateswere common. Intimidation, 
anger and opportunistic attackson opponents became a nightmare for the Acehnese people.
To respondto this, associations of Acehnese women conducted long marches demanding 
thatthe parties and the government stop the intimidation, in particular against women 
(Kompas, 12 March 2014). The Aceh ElectionNetwork (JPA – Jaringan Pemilu Aceh)
consists of five CSOs: ACSTF; Aceh Institute; Forum LSM Aceh; LBH Banda Ace; Mata;
and Solidaritas Perempuan Aceh. This network reported serious intimidation in the legislative 
elections and found that a PA local member entered three voting areasand shouted to all 
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voters to vote for PA. The head of the PPS (election committee) tried to stop the provocateur,
who later threatened the committee (Jaringan Pemilu Aceh 2014). Among the election fraud 
that the ACSTF found was: (1) coercion from Gampong Pulo Mangat, North Aceh, at the 
TPS 27 polling station, conducted by a PA campaign member who entered polling booths and 
forced people to vote for PA candidates; (2) money politics by MP candidates, such as when 
a candidate from a national political party was caught red-handed distributing cash 
doortodoor to residents between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. one night prior to the voting; and (3) use
of government facilities to campaign and to influence voters. This was especially true of the 
incumbent heads of districts (Simanjuntak 2014). 
Hafidh, a representative of the Elections Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu), was concerned 
about the difficulty for Panwaslu in following up the report of fraud. He said:“the problem is 
that community members are unwilling to become witnesses, as well as lack of evidence, 
which is hindering Panwaslu in conducting further investigations” (Simanjuntak 2014). 
Violent attacks that left some people dead occurred in Aceh. The Aceh Democratic Forum 
recorded 36 local cases of political violence since the beginning of the campaign period. The 
Forum’s spokesman, Agusta Mukhtar, said that the violence had doubled between 1 and 24 
March 2014 withshootings, assaults, vandalism and damage of property, and grenade attacks 
(Yates 2014). 
The violence began on 6 February 2014, when the head of PNAof Kuta Makmur was beaten 
to death by members of PA. On 2 March 2014, a PNAlegislative candidate was shot dead. A
month later on 1 April 2014, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a car decked out with 
political banners. Three people were killed, including a child of 18 months (Yates 2014). This
attack targeted a PA legislative candidate as the car had a PA banner, and this was revenge
for the 1 April shooting of a PNA legislative candidate. PA and PNA, both founded by 
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former combatants, competed violently in the 2014 legislative election. They could not 
abandon the method of combatants for managing relations with rival groups. 
Violent attacks are common for combatants. In a democratic culture, former combatants need
to transform themselves and abandon their old habits. There are many former combatant 
leaders who are committed to developing inclusive and democratic politics in Aceh. Inclusive 
politics accommodate various individuals from different backgrounds who have the same 
commitment to developing the economy and preserving peace in Aceh post-conflict. Former 
combatants need to learn, formally or informally, how to serve the community through 
political parties. Most people of Aceh have entrusted their leadership at provincial and district 
levels to former combatants, since they won in 11 of 17 districts and cities in the 2012 
elections. 
A further challenge is that weak institutions such as the police contributed to the rise of 
violence.Zulfikar Muhammad, executive director of the Human Rights NGO Coalition of 
Aceh, confirmed the weak position of police:
We feel our local police performance has been weak, especially in reducing gun 
violence. Our people continue to face acts of brutality ahead of the elections, despite 
additional troops deployed in Aceh. We challenge the National Police to solve the 
[April 1] shooting before the April 9 legislative elections. If they fail to do so, then 
they have failed to provide the citizens of Aceh with a sense of security during a 
crucial time(Yates 2014). 
The police and TNI were deployed in the province of Aceh prior to the election. To secure 
the election, Aceh police chief Insp. Gen. Hamidi claimed that Aceh police had deployed 
9133 personnel, or two-thirds of their total personnel, to safeguard polling stations across 
Aceh. Police also deployed 1400 officers of the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) and 341 personnel 
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from the National Police headquarters in Jakarta.In addition, Major General Pandu Wibowo, 
Iskandar Muda Military Command chief, said that TNI sent 2100 soldiers to the polling 
stations. This was a joint security operation to respond to the rise of violent attacks, 
especially between supporters of PA and PNA, two local parties that represent former GAM 
combatants (Perdani 2014).
However, the security forces did not properly protect democracyor free and fair elections. 
They only managed to secure the province in general. Even the Aceh police could not find
the criminals involved in some attacks prior to the election. The head of Panwaslu, Asqalani, 
said he would investigate every report provided there was sufficient evidence to substantiate 
it. He said Panwaslu had received 34 reports of alleged violations from 13 districts in the 
province of Aceh,including the killing of three people, one of them an 18-month-old infant, a
few days before the election. However, theseviolent attacks could not be solved by police and 
did not provide clear evidence of the breaking of election regulations. Bireun police chief 
Adj. Sr CmrKhadafi said the victims had been riding in a car covered in pictures associated 
with PA when attackers suddenly fired shots at the car at an intersection in Geulanggang 
Tenguh village in Biruen subdistrict. It was assumed the attackers were from another local 
party which was taking revenge after some attacks targeting its leaders and members (Hasan 
2014).
Women in Aceh Politics
Women candidates from various local and national political parties contesting the 2014 
legislative election conducted a long march for a peaceful election in Banda Aceh. The 
women candidates urged all parties in the province of Aceh to provide freedom to women to 
choose any legislative candidate without intimidation. The long march started in Blang 
Padang Field of Banda Aceh and received attention from the people along the road. The 
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chairperson of the Political House of Aceh Women (RPPA), Idaryani, said that the long 
march aimed to support peaceful elections, as well as introducingthe women candidates to the 
voters: “here we do not carry the party colour, but the female candidates who will enliven the 
political exchanges for the five years to come. Here are the candidates that will strengthen 
and support for the quality of democracy in Aceh” (Kompas, 12 March 2014). 
During the long march, the Aceh women participating in the 2014 elections signed a petition 
for a political agenda: rights for reproductive health and sexuality; rights for education,
especially for women; and political rights which were not discriminatory against women and 
minority groups (Kompas, 12 March 2014). In Aceh politics, women are discriminated 
against not only within the parties but also within the society, which still considers that 
women’s participation in political activism and leadership goes against Islamic law. This is 
the experience of Wahyuni, a woman activist who ran as a candidate for vice bupati in Bener 
Meriah,who was told by local ulama that women should not be leaders in politics. According 
to Siti Zuhro from the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI):“women still face the social 
stigma prevalent in patriarchal society that perceives men as more dominant and capable than 
women. It is not true that Islam restricts women. But in Indonesia, not all Muslim give equal 
opportunities to women” (Jong 2014). Based on a study of women in Aceh conducted by 
LIPI, it was concluded that:
Women were found to be discouraged from entering politics and becoming 
community leaders because of local conservative Islamic values. Aceh is one of the 
provinces with the lowest number of women at the local council level. In Aceh, only 
four out of the 69 council members are women. Besides social stigma, female 
politicians face constraints from the government and political parties’ lack of 
commitment to the improvement of the quality of female political candidates (Jong 
2014).
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Women are protected by law underscoring affirmative action: women must account for a 
minimum of 30 percent of a political party’s list of candidates for the House of 
Representatives and local legislature (DPRD) and the Regional Representatives Council 
(DPD).Currently, 108 of 506 lawmakers in the House are women – only 18.06 percent. This 
number is much lower than in neighbouring Timor-Leste, which has 38.5 percent female 
representation in its parliament (Jong 2014). However, Sigit Pamungkas, commissioner of the 
General Election Commission (KPU),argued that the minimum requirement of 30 percent is
not necessarily a pro-women policy: “individuals who are competent and are concerned about 
gender issues. So, just because the legislative candidates list has met the minimum 
requirement of 30 percent, it doesn’t necessarily mean they are individuals with pro-gender 
ambitions” (Jong 2014). 
Training and workshops are needed especially for women in order to be able to choose
candidates who respect women and prioritise the rights of women. A women’s NGO, Women 
Solidarity Bungoeng Jeumpa of Aceh (SP Aceh), comfirmed that political education is 
important for women. In the 2014 election, SP Aceh conducted political training in ten 
villages which was intended to empower women to exercise their political rights and vote for 
candidates who supported the interests of women. In the training, women voters learned how 
to trace the track records of candidates and monitor the 2014 elections (Solidaritas 
Perempuan 2014).Illiza Sa’aduddin Djamal, now Mayor of Banda Aceh, said: 
Women’s activities were never attended by the leaders in Banda Aceh. Every time 
that leaders or prominent figures were invited, only a representative would come. But 
I won people’s trust at the election by spending most of my time with my people, 
especially women. I always make them my priority (Brown 2014). 
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PNA candidate Cut Nurlina agreed with Djamal that women should be prioritised in politics. 
She stated that: “I really hope that by being elected I can do something for people in my area. 
When I heard that there is intimidation, murder threats,it doesn’t make me afraid or want to 
back down” (Brown 2014). 
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Surprising Results
The 9 April 2014 legislative election in Aceh resulted in some surpises. Firstly, Acehnese 
voters delivered a clear message of disapproval to the ruling PA, which had been dominant in 
Aceh government and politics, winning the 2009 legislative election. PA still won the 2014 
election but with considerably decreased percentages in its east coast strongholds. Secondly, 
its serious challenger came not from a GAM-led local party but from national parties, 
especially the Nasdem Party. Finally, its political partnership with Gerindra affected the 
decrease in the numbers of voters. This means the alliance weakened the politics of PA
(IPAC 2014).
In the early phase of the 2014 legislative election, former combatants supporting the PA–
Gerindra coalition were confident that this move would strengthen its political power. They 
claimed that PA had a guaranteed base of strong ground support, while Gerindra stated that it 
would provide sufficient budget for the 2014 elections.The head of Gerindra Aceh, T.A. 
Khalid, stated at the launch of the Gerindra campaign in Lhokseumawe city and North Aceh 
on 24 February 2012 that “we expect to gain a victory for PA in the Aceh parliament and a
Gerindra win for the national parliament” (Agus 2014). Khalid was confident that Gerindra,
supported by PA, would dominate the vote and be able to facilitate Acehnese aspirations for 
their place in the central government (Khalid 2014). 
Gerindra and PA shared their campaign and verbally supported each other. Acehnese scholars
argued that there would be “a rebellion” of combatants against Manaf (Hamid, interviews in 
Jakarta, March 2014). Combatants opposed the political coalition silently by not voting for 
the candidates from Gerindra, as it had been founded by Subianto, former commander of 
Kopassus, the group responsible for killings and violence against GAM during the conflict
before the Helsinki peace accord.
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It is surprising that the legislative election of 2014 brought a bitter result for Gerindra. In the 
provincial legislature, Gerindra only gained 2 seats or 2.5% of a total of 81seats. In the 
national legislature, Gerindra, which predicted it would get 80% of the total seats, only 
gained 2 seats or about 15.4% of 13 seats. A surprising result also eventuated for the 
DemocraticParty, which had dominated the 2009 national legislature when it won 7 of 13 
seats or about 53%; in 2014, it dropped by 2 seats to winjust 14.5%of seats (see Table 7.1). 
This result was contrary to the expectation that Gerindra Aceh would finance PA’s campaign
and be rewarded by winning in the national parliament in a similar fashion to 
theDemokratParty gains in the 2009 elections. 
Furthermore, KPA was not solid in supporting Gerindra. Even though PA officially declared 
its support for Gerindra’s candidates for the national parliament, former local commanders 
affiliated with KPA flirted with other parties. For example, KPA Pasee declared its support 
for Firnandez, aGolkar candidate, who won the seat inthe national parliament (Fahmi 2014). 
Table 7.1. Seats in the Provincial Legislature (DPRA) after the 2009 and 2014 Elections
Parties 2009 Percentage 2014 Percentage
PA 33 47.8% 29 35.8%
PD 10 14.5% 7 8.6%
Golkar 8 11.6% 9 11.1%
PAN 5 7.2% 8 9.9%
PPP 4 5.8% 6 7.4%
PKS 4 5.8% 4 4.9%
Partai Patriot 1 1.4% – –
PKB 1 1.4% 1 1.2%
PKPI 1 1.4% 1 1.2%
Partai Daulat Aceh 1 1.4% 1 1.2%
PBB 1 1.4% 1 1.2%
Nasdem – – 9 11.1%
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(Aceh Election Commission 2014)
The decrease of about 10 percent of PA seats in the 2014 election (see Table 7.2) requires 
further analysis: firstly, some combatants close to Yusuf established a new party – the PNA –
which created friction among former combatants; secondly, PA performed poorly at the local 
level. To gain more votes from a majority of Acehnese, PA needed to open up itsprogram and 
embrace more political and civil society leaders.Thirdly, there rose a new national party 
headed by an Acehnese– the Nasdem Party –which gained 9 seats in the Aceh legislature and 
2 seats in the national legislature (see Table 7.2). Yusuf (2014) argued that victory should not 
be sought through intimidation andthis political approach was punished,as the political 
domination of PA decreased.
Table 7.2. Seats in the National Parliamentafter the 2009 and 2014 Elections
2009 Elected MPs 2014 Elected MPs
1 PKS (15.4%) Nasir Jamil 1 PKS (7.7%) Nasir Jamil
2 H. Raihan Iskandar
3 Demokrat(53.
%)
T. Riefky Harsya 2 Demokrat 
(15.4%)
T. Riefky Harsya
4 Muslim 3 Muslim
5 Ali Yacob
6 Mirwan Amir
7 Ir Nova Iriansyah
8 Ir Muh Azhari
9 Teuku Irwan
10 Golkar 
(15.4%)
Marzuki Daud 4 Golkar 
(15.4%)
Firmandez
11 Sayed Fuad Zakaria 5 M Salim Fachry
PNA – – 3 3.7%
Gerindra – – 2 2.5%
TOTAL 69 – 81
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12 PAN (7.7%) Sayed Mustafa Usab 6 PAN (7.7%) Muslim Aiyub
13 PPP (7.7%) Tgk. Mohd. Faisal 
Amin
7 PPP (7.7%) Anwar Idris
8 Gerindra 
(15.4%)
Khaidir
9 Fadhullah
10 Nasdem 
(15.4%)
Zulvan Lindan
11 Bachtiar Aly
12 PKB (7.7%) Irmawan
13 PDIP (7.7%) Tagore Abu Bakar
(Aceh Election Commission 2014)
Presidential Elections
It was predicted by some analysts that Subianto’s financial support for the campaign of 
Abdullah and Manaf in the 2012 gubernatorial election was a part of his plan to run as a 
candidate for the Indonesian presidency two years later. Sunarko claimed that the 2012 
election was “a place for reconciliation between former special forces and combatants”
(Sunarko 2012). He realised his military men had killed combatants during the conflict when 
he was the head of Kodam Iskandar Muda of Aceh. As stated in the previous chapter, 
Sunarko actively joined campaigns in some cities and districts. His main duty was persuading 
former militias who were pro-government during the conflict to support Abdullah and Manaf 
as governor and vice- governor of Aceh. In the 2014 election, Sunarko became a major
member of Subianto’s winning campaign in Aceh. 
Manaf, vice-governor candidate and former GAM commander, declared afterthe legislative 
election campaign in February 2014 that PA totally supportedSubiantoas the presidential 
candidate in the July 2014 election. At the official launch of Subiantoas presidential
candidate in Jakarta on 16June 2014, Manaf, head of the advisory board of Gerindra Aceh,
174 
 
claimed that “if SBY got 93 percent in the 2009 elections, Prabowo will get more than 90 
percent” (Republika, 16 June 2014). 
The frictionamong the PA ranks with regards to support for the presidential candidate was
clear after Governor Abdullah officially declaredon 26 June2014 his support for Kalla and 
Widodo (known as Jokowi-JK)in the presidential election. On the first day of his visit during 
the campaign in Aceh, Kalla prayed in the Baiturrahman mosque and visited Hasan Tiro’s
tomb, accompanied by Governor Abdullah (Taufiqqurahman 2014). Abdullah said that his 
support ofKalla was due to his central role in the Helsinki peace agreement:“this support will 
strengthen the effort to implement the Helsinki peace accord and UUPA” (Djalil 2014). Kalla 
was a key figure in Acehnese support for Jokowi-JK in the 2014 presidential election. It was 
only Kalla who attended the campaign in Aceh. 
During the campaign period, Nairn’s articles on the role of Subianto’s team in the 
assassinations of PA activists were popularly discussed among human rights activists, 
journalists and the members of Acehnese parties. Nairn claimed that Maj. Gen. Sunarko, a
campaign team member forAbdullah–Manaf and now supporting the campaign of Subianto–
Rajasa, was involved in assassinating some eight PA activists during the 2009 elections. 
Nairn claimed that “at least eight PA activists were assassinated in the run-up to the April 
elections. The killings were, according to the officials with knowledge of the program, an 
attempt to disorient PA supporters and pressure the party to not discuss independence” (Nairn 
2010). Nairn stated that Sunarko, who was head of Kodam Iskandar Muda of Aceh, 
confirmed the killings by TNI personnel. Among the victims wasTumijan (35), a PA activist
and palm oil worker from Nagan Raya, who was abducted and his body found two days later 
in a sewage ditchnear an army outpost. In the campaign period forthe gubernatorial election,
Sunarko actively persuaded the Acehnese, and especially the minority Javanese in Central 
Aceh, to support Abdullah and Manaf, arguing that “it is the best time for Acehnese for local 
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and national reconciliation, including making a friend with former military generals for 
national interests” (Sunarko 2012). In addition, in the presidential election, he continued to 
play a support role in the Subianto–Rajasa campaign, asking Acehnese militia members to 
support Subianto.
Most former elites of the combatants were opposed to voting for Subiantodue to his track 
record as former commander of the Special Forces, which were responsible for military 
operations against GAM during the conflict. Djuli, a member of the GAM negotiating team in
Helsinki and one of the founders of PNA, argued that:
There is no way I could stay at home on Election Day, given the 
possibility that a military strongman such as Prabowo could take control of 
this republic and halt our hard-won democratization. Indonesia is on the 
right path to attaining the ideals set and laid out by its 1945 revolutionary 
founders for becoming a great and prosperous nation based on democracy 
and the philosophy of bhinneka tunggal ika (unity in diversity) (Djuli 
2014). 
Figure7.1 shows a comparison of the 2014 presidential election result in four post-conflict 
regions in Indonesia, Aceh, Maluku, Papua and West Kalimantan. Aceh and Papua have 
separatist movements, and ethnic and religious conflicts occurred in Maluku and West 
Kalimantan from 1998 to 2002. The figures show that Subianto–Rajasa only won in Aceh 
with 1,089,290 votes against 913,309 votes forWidodo–Kalla. Jokowi-JK won significantly 
in Papua and West Kalimantan, and won narrowly in Maluku. The split among the 
combatants and elites of PA affected the vote results for Subianto;as a concession, 
Subiantogot a lot of access to business in Aceh. 
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Figure7.1. The Result of the 2014 Presidential Election in Post-Conflict Regions in Indonesia
(Indonesian Election Commission 2014)
Future of Democracy 
Democracy in post-conflict regions faces challenges from the historical burden of violence 
and in relation to the participation of all conflicting parties to continue the process of 
democratisation and peace. Democracy constitutes a critical foundation for the maintenance 
of peace and the support of economic development in Aceh after more than a decade of the 
reintegration process. However, the rise of violence in the elections of 2012 and 2014 raises 
questions about the prospects for democracy. People tend to be apathetic to the current 
regime, which they consider is becoming more authoritarian. To some extent, non-
combatants are still discriminated against in the areas of government policy and economic 
projects. Djuli, former head of the Aceh ReintegrationPeace Board (BRA), argued that the 
reintegration of combatants has failed. Those in the grassroots have protested about how the 
abundance of special autonomy funds is only a “drop” inside the regime circle. Several 
1.089.290
433.981
769.132
1.032.354
913.309
443.040
2.026.735
1.573.046
0 500.000 1.000.000 1.500.000 2.000.000 2.500.000
Aceh
Maluku
Papua
West Kalimantan
The 2014 Presidential Elections in 
Post-Conflict Regions in Indonesia 
Jokowi/Kalla Prabowo/Hatta
177 
 
former combatants have threatened to fight violently against the current local government 
regime to achieve what they claim to be the right of the people of Aceh to force a just and 
equal development policy for all (Djuli 2014). 
In addition, in a tone of optimism regarding the current democracy and peace accord in Aceh, 
Yusuf, founder of PNA, argued that:
The post-conflict democratization process in Aceh also suffered from the 
legacy of a long and protracted conflict where victories were sought 
through violence, intimidation and terror. This mentality carried over to 
the post-conflict period – which is common in all areas in the world where 
armed conflicts have taken place. It takes approximately two decades to 
completely heal the psychological wounds and scars of conflict – and 
overcome conflict-era behaviours. Indeed, in terms of negative events, 
what happened in Aceh could be categorized as mild to medium forms 
when compared with other post-conflict regions. Acehnese are fast 
learners – and the local parties will learn, too, as they grow and mature. 
Although there have been bumps in the road, and surely there will be 
more, in all, local parties are critical to sustaining peace in Aceh and 
continuing its development (Yusuf 2014).
Yusuf’s optimism about the politics in Aceh is likely based on his experience as the first 
governor of Aceh after the peace accord. There is always a door open to peace for the 
Acehnese. Their past is history, their future is a reality by preserving and maintaining security 
and peace for the prosperity of the people (Djuli 2014).
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Conclusion
The 2014 legislative and presidential elections have marked a crucial step towards 
democracy, peace and prosperity in Aceh. However, violent attacks, intimidation, terrorism 
and the targeting of opposing parties and individuals threatened the initiative for peace. This 
also threatens the prospect of economic development in Aceh. Governor Abdullah assured 
investors in seminars and business clubs in Jakarta and Banda Aceh that Aceh is safe for 
foreign and national investors. However, they are still reluctant to investseriously. The 
Singaporean ambassador confirmed that security and stability are priority considerations for 
Singaporean investors. They are willing to invest in Aceh, but are closely monitoring the 
current political situation, which is still unstable. 
The next chapter examines democratic transition and post-conflict peacebuilding in the 
southern Philippines and in particular how the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
managed the peace accord and transformed themselves into civilians. The chapter compares 
GAM and MILF in post-conflict transition. It argues that the transformation of former GAM 
combatants provides an important lesson for MILF in how to integrate with the Republic of 
the Philippines. 
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Chapter 8
Democracy and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia:
How MILF Learned from Aceh
Introduction
People in the Southeast Asian region have shared and learned from each other in developing 
regionalism, democratisation, development and security; such collaborative endeavours
include initiatives for peace and reconciliation that need a process of legislation and 
democratic participations from all parties. They have learned from each other how 
neighbouring countries can successfully overcome conflicts and maintain stability and peace. 
In spite of their diversity, they have displayed cultural commonalities, strengths and 
weaknesses in developing post-conflict democracy. ASEAN was established in 1967 from the 
perspective of common interests among its founding members. Acharya (2001) argued that 
countries in the Southeast Asian region have experienced critical historical moments and are 
confident to unite within a boundary of security and community. State and civil societies
among ASEAN members have been actively involved in conflict resolution, as well as 
helping community members in natural disasters. A decade after the end of the colonial 
period, Southeast Asian territory was portrayed as “a region of revolt, the Balkans of the East, 
or a region of dominoes. The weak socio-political cohesion of the region’s new nation-states, 
the legitimacy problems of several of the region’s postcolonial governments, interstate 
territorial disputes” (Acharya 2001: 4).
As a region with a diverse range of ethnicities, religions and cultures, Southeast Asia has had 
problems of ethnic and religious conflicts and disputes, such asin Bangsamoro insouthern 
Philipines, Aceh in Indonesia and Pattani insouthern Thailand (Tan 2007).However, these 
countries have shown that they are able to cope with such challenges. This is the reason 
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underlying the importance of the harmony and unity of states and civil societiesin Southeast 
Asian countries, which have shared common experience and learn from each other; for 
example, disaster management, reconstruction and rehabilitation after the earthquake and 
tsunami in Aceh in 2004 created important lessons for neighbouring countries to learn in 
terms of managing possible disasters. 
Bland (2013) stated that “the Philippines president, Benigno Aquino, pledged a swift 
recovery from Typhoon Haiyan during a visit to Guiuan, one of the areas hardest hit by the 
catastrophe; the Aceh experience offers some useful lessons for Manila”. Furthermore, the 
experience of Indonesia in overcoming conflict and regional disputes is also an important 
asset to share with regards to security, stability and peace in Southeast Asia and other 
regions. Ambassador Hasjim Djalal argues that “Indonesia has had some experience in the 
management of disputes and potential conflicts in Southeast Asia, either in the context of 
multicultural cooperation or from its national experience. Some of these disputes were 
between states, while in some cases they were internal disputes” (Djalal 2011: 628). 
Like Indonesia, Malaysia has also had experience of managing conflicts and mediating 
interstate disputes. Mediation between MILF and the Government of the Philippines (GPH) 
was managed by the Malaysian Government from 2001 to the final round of the peace accord 
and the signing of the Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB) on 15 October 2012. 
MILF began a rebel movement in 1997 and rejected the peace accord between MNLF and 
GPH mediated by Indonesia, Malaysia, Libya and the OIC (Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation). Salamat claimed that MNLF is secular and therefore he founded MILF, which 
is Islamist (1998). 
This chapterdiscussesthe democratic process of reconciliation and peace in Aceh, 
Indonesia,as well as the way in which the separatist movement, in particular MILF in the 
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southern Philippines, learned from Aceh. After 15 August 2005 and the Helsinki peace 
accord between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Republic of Indonesia, the 
legislation process was conducted by DPRA (the Aceh legislature) and DPR (the national 
legislature); this joint effort produced the new special autonomy law, the Law on Government 
of Aceh (UUPA) No. 11/2006. This is a remarkable result of the democratic process of 
regional autonomy.This law is more powerful in terms of the interests of the region than any 
of the previous laws granting special status to Aceh. Special autonomy Law No. 44/1999 on 
Special Status for Aceh was replaced by legislation created after the 1999 national elections. 
Two years later, the national legislature passed Law No. 18/2001 on Special Autonomy for 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which significantly increased concessions for Aceh on oil and 
gas and other natural resource revenues, a much larger share than other provinces in 
Indonesia. 
One of the most crucial points of Law No. 11/2006 is that local political partiesare allowed to 
establish themselves in Aceh. As a result, former combatants have transformed from 
paramilitary groups into political parties. They have participated in two gubernatorial and 
head of district elections in 2006 and 2012, and two national legislative and presidential 
elections in 2009 and 2014. A number of violent attacks occurred duringeach of these
election campaigns. However, the democratic process is now proceedingand all competing 
political parties have agreed to support peace. This raises the question of how the dynamics 
of democratisation in Aceh can be a good lesson to learn for permanent peace in the southern 
Philippines and how MILF members might adopt initiatives of peace and democracy in 
Mindanao.
This chapter examines three strategic issuesrelating to how MILF can learnpeacebuilding 
from Aceh. Firstly, a lot can be learnedfrom the legislation enacted and the style of 
negotiation adopted. The role of a third party as a mediator and the support of international 
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states and organisations are both crucial, not only in the process of mediation, but also in the 
implementation stage. In this process, both Aceh and the southern Philippines have become 
priority concerns of states and international agencies. 
Secondly, political legitimacy is critical, in particular from the national government and 
legislature, as well as from the negotiating parties. The Aceh peace initiative of 2002 failed
due to military disruption of the peace accord and disagreement among GAM members 
regarding the proposal of regional autonomy from a negotiating party’s government 
representative. 
Thirdly, the most crucial aspect of the peacebuilding process is the implementation of a peace 
accord, especially in relation to the issues of democratisation, economic development and 
reintegration. In post-war and post-conflict regions, the participation of former combatants in 
local politics augurs well for future prospects of peace. A democratisation process 
participated in by all parties and protected by the national constitution strengthens the efforts 
for permanent peace. Both GAM and MILF agreed on the establishment of local parties, 
which was decided clearly in the respective peace accords.
However, it is important to see the political dynamics that are operating. Violent disruption
conducted personally by individuals of former militias and combatants – a group which 
probably lacks access to the economic advantages of the democratic process – will be 
challenging. Given the difficulty for security forces of ensuring all weapons used by 
insurgents have been handed over, law enforcement – or in Galtung’s argument, the 
importance of law and order to post-conflict transition – becomes a matter for urgent 
enforcement. In this context, political leaders in post-conflict regions have to prioritise 
security, stability and peace. In the Aceh experience, peace is regarded as more important 
than democracy. This is why the central government postponed gubernatorial elections in 
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2012 some five times due to security threats, attacks and killings.In addition, as part of the 
accord implementation, economic development needs to be prioritised, as high poverty rates 
in Aceh and the southern Philippines negatively affect the crime rate.
However, it is important to understand that every conflict requires a different approach and 
each needs creativity. What GAM initiated in order to resolve the Aceh conflict is not similar 
to the way in which MILF managed to end their insurgency. Lingga argued that “to adopt one 
peace process as a model for resolving another conflict, though there might be some 
similarities, may not work well, for every conflict has its own distinctive characteristics, and 
the process of resolving every conflict has its own dynamics” (Lingga 2007: 13). 
The periods of the peace efforts for GAM and MILF were also very different. The Helsinki 
peace accord had been initiated before the Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami on 26 
December 2004. Awaludin (2008) states that on 7 January 2005, GAM met Martti Ahtisaari 
in Finland. On 9 January 2005, Vice-President Kalla delivered a memo toPresident 
Yudhoyono about the current state of GAM and reported that he had just talked to the 
commander, Muzakir Manaf, two days before. The President considered that the negotiations 
should be conducted as soon as possible. Then the Indonesian delegates went to Helsinki at 
the end of January 2005. The negotiations were mediated by former Finnish president
Ahtisaari. The negotiation between GoI and GAM was intensive and the accord was finally 
declared on 15 August 2005. So the negotiations took about six months.
Compare thisto the fact that MILF was involved in a long mediation with GPH for about 16 
years. Iqbal reported that “it encompassed four Filipino presidents and eleven government 
chief peace negotiations. (The MILF has four chief peace negotiators). Three major wars –
2000, 2003, and 2008 – were fought during this period. Until today, the parties still struggle 
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to finish the peace process” (Iqbal 2013). MILF fighters celebrated the FAB peace accord 
signed by MILF and the GPH on 15 October 2012, about 16 years later.
Islam is the religion of a minority group in the Philippines – approximately 4 or 5 percent of 
the total population of about 87 million. Most live in the southern Philippines and are the 
majority in only 5 of the 26 provinces: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-tawi and 
Basilan. There are also significant minority populations of Muslims (between 15 and 30 
percent) in the provinces of Kotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del Norte (Collier 2006).
International and Regional Support
The first lesson is the necessity for the support of international and regional states, 
organisations and civil societies for mediation, negotiation, peace accords and their
implementation. Effective efforts towards conflict resolution involve “different kind of 
agency (international organizations, states, non-governmental organizations, individuals), 
address different groups (party leaders, elites, grassroots), and vary in form, duration and 
purpose” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2009: 168). In Aceh’s case, international 
support came from the process of mediation and the implementation. It was also due to the 
earthquake and tsunami, and international states and organisations concerned about 
permanent peace in Aceh. Hamid Awaludin, head peace negotiator from the GoI, said that:
This was international support for the Aceh peace talks… the new 
Indonesian Government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla
peace initiative being strongly supported by the international 
community.How did international support speed up the peace process? This 
cannot be separated from the tsunami disaster where the international 
community was shocked contributing massive humanitarian aid to Aceh and 
helping with reconstruction post-tsunami. It is reasonable and rational to 
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assume that none of this would have occurred without a peace process 
underway between the Indonesian Government and GAM (Awaludin 2009: 
251–252). 
Given the pressure from international states and organisations on both Indonesia and GAM, 
the process of mediation was faster and more comprehensive than the peace negotiation 
mediated by HDC from 2000 to 2003. GAM negotiators confirmed the international pressure 
after the disastrous destruction in Aceh. Djuli and Rahman stated that: “the tsunami of 
December 2004 gave the international community strong reasons to convince Jakarta to come 
to the table. GAM also perceived that there was no alternative to taking whatever road was 
available to end the war, and declared a unilateral ceasefire three days after the tsunami in 
order to allow in emergency assistance” (Djuli & Rahman Accord 20). 
The concept of dialogue as the method of conflict resolution, initiated in 2000 by President 
Wahid, strongly influenced GAM that the post–New Order government was serious about 
accepting them as part of the Indonesian citizenry. In his first visit to Aceh since 1958, after 
about fifty years in exile, Hasan Tiro gave a speech in front of the Baiturrahman Mosque in 
Banda Aceh on 11 October 2008, when he stated: “Aceh has been forgotten by the world for 
quite a long time; however, after the earthquake and tsunami, and the Helsinki peace accord, 
Aceh became an international concern to support directly to the people of Aceh who were 
devastated and lagged behind in all aspects”(Tiro 2010: 303–304). Tiro’s visit was welcomed 
by the people of Aceh. Thousands of people gathered to welcome the former head of GAM. 
International states and organisations are strategic in mediating conflicts, as they have 
legitimacy and power in managing dialogue and creating trust among the conflicting parties.
Ahtisaari considered Aceh peacebuilding, development and democratisation one of the 
greatest success efforts of peace initiatives in three decades. This was the resultof hardwork 
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by the Acehnese, the Indonesians and the international community. The success story of 
Aceh peacebuilding and democratisation has influenced other conflict and post-conflict 
regions. Former peace negotiators, from both GAM and RI, have been invited by the 
Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka and other states and conflicting groups to share their good 
experiences in peace negotiations and the establishing of agreements. Djuli, GAM negotiator 
in Helsinki, stated that he had visited the Philippines and shared his experience in negotiation 
and peacebuilding for the success of peace negotiations and peace establishment between 
MILF and the GPH.On 27 March 2014, MILF and the GPH signed a Comprehensive 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The peace process, mediated by the Malaysian government,is 
supported by the international community. Among them is Muhammadiyah, an organisation 
which is actively involved in monitoring peace negotiations and implementation in the 
southern Philippines. 
Political Leadership
In relation to the peace initiatives in Aceh and the southern Philippines, with particular regard 
to political legitimacy, Lingga stated that “a new political thinking or new initiative can only 
move forward if it has the support of those who wield power and influence in decision-
making” (Lingga 2007: 14). This is what the Philippines learned from the success of the Aceh 
peace process and how political leaders managed to overcome the conflict and provide 
genuine peace to the Aceh region. Political legitimacy, not only during the negotiation 
process but, most importantly, after the accord was implemented. President Yudhyono and 
Vice-President Kalla were able to communicate with national leaders, including military 
generals who were critical of the negotiation initiated by President Wahid and President 
Megawati, and mediated by HDC between 2000 and 2003. Yudhyono and Kalla not only 
achieved strong political legitimacy, but were also able to reassure national parties, 
parliament members and the military.They“showed willingness to reform and modernize the 
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Indonesian military and allow devolution of some powers to the regions” and Yudhoyono had 
resolved that “the military option alone would not work. In his own words, he had come to 
appreciate that for a peace process to be successful it would require focused, sustained, 
creative efforts and determination at the highest level of leadership” (Feith 2007: 2).
The leadership factorhas been crucial in Aceh democracy and peace transition, andwill work
in the mediation and peacebuilding process between MILF and GPH. In the southern 
Philippines, the layers of political leadership are more complicated. The governments of 
presidents Aquino, Estrada and Arroyo were constrained by threats of a military coup 
(Lingga 2007).The peace accord between MILF and GPH is now in the hands of congress 
and the senate, for the approval, in particular, of the establishment of local parties. If the 
agreement does not go against the constitution and if the president is willing tonegotiate with 
congress and the senate, the peace accord is constitutionally able to be implemented in the 
Bangsamoro region.
MILF has transformed itself into a social organisation that controls local political parties. A 
MILF member of the peace panel said that there is a consensus that MILF will organise a 
local political party and MILF will become a social organisation similar to Nahdlatul Ulama
and Muhammadiyah di Indonesia.He said that: “Party support and party-building should go 
on concurrently, as it is now clear the struggle is moving away from the military and towards 
democracy. We are transitioning from the bullet to the ballot” (Meisburger21). 
Political legitimacy includes the participation of the previous rebel movement, the MNLF, 
which signed a peace agreement with GPH in 1996 with the initial support of a Quadripartite 
Committeecomprising Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia, and the OIC. This process 
was continued by the Tripoli Peace Agreement in 1976. In 1991, Indonesia was invited for 
the transition of the Quadripartite Committee into the Ministerial Committee of the 
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Six,adding Indonesia and also Bangladesh. In 1993, Indonesia was elected as chair of the 
committee. Finally, in 1996 the peace agreement was signed. The GPH and MNLF peace 
initiatives took not less than 70 meetings involving more than eight countries. Ali Alatas, 
former foreign minister of the RI who chaired the negotiation, said that: “It is an Agreement 
that represents a just, comprehensive and durable political settlement to the conflict situation 
in the Southern Philippines … It is also expected to have a profound and positive impact on 
the stability and economic progress of Southeast Asia (Alatas 2001: 309). 
Alatas (2001) was confident that peace would strengthen the harmony and unity of the 
diverse peoples of the southern Philippines. The peace agreement in the southern Philippines 
has certainly had an impact on stability and security in Southeast Asia. However, the peace 
agreement was reported to be a failed experiment. In January 1997, GPH began another peace 
initiative with MILF, which had not joined the MNLF negotiation process (Iqbal 2013). In 
return, MNLF criticised the peace agreement between GPH and MILFmade in October 2012. 
Iqbal, one of the negotiators representing MILF,was concerned that the FABcontainedsome
obstacles. Among them was the refusal of MNLF to support the peace initiatives. Iqbal said
that “until now, MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari is lashing out at the GPH–MILF peace 
negotiation, especially the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro (FAB). He described the 
process as an illegal exercise and the FAB as a menu for war in Mindanao” (Iqbal 2013). 
Iqbal believed FAB was not the final decision. The process neededthesupport of all parties in 
the southern Philippines, especially in the autonomous region of Mindanao. Iqbal stated that: 
Truly, peace-making is not an easy task. It is as unnerving as it is 
exhausting. It is not the forte of the genius or the strong. They are known to 
have less patience in talking to the naïve and the weakling. Only those 
imbued with a purpose and mission – and armed with perseverance – can 
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make it through to the end. After all, itis not by force that negotiation moves 
forward; rather, it is the collaborative work of the parties that sets it in 
motion (Iqbal 2014).
Like Iqbal, Alatas believed that the involvement of a multilateral organisation such as OIC 
was an urgent part of political legitimacy and confidence for the state and the people of the 
Philippines to overcome the conflict in the south. Multilateral organisations can be pressure 
groupsfor conflicting parties to initiate peace negotiations and to implement peace 
accordsunder monitoring and support of multilateral organisations including OIC, ASEAN 
and the EU. The conflict in the southern Philippines has been taken advantage of by regional 
insurgents as a hub of Southeast Asian paramilitary training that has disrupted security in the 
Philippines and across Southeast Asia. Karnavian (2009) argued that Indonesian jihadists 
supported MILF in a secret operation targeting aGPH military base:
The Indonesians covertly took part in many attacks on the Philippines 
Armed Forces, and also helped defend certain territories with the locals. It 
was also reported, although MILF denied this claim, that JI and MILF has 
set up a SOG (Special Operation Group) … carrying out urban attacks”
(Karnavian 2009: 120). 
Political legitimacy will strengthen the initiatives for peace and prevent security threats in the 
Philippines and neighbouring countries. As a minority group, Muslims in the southern 
Philippines will face a challenge from the majority of the people of the Philippines, who are 
Christian. The inter-faith harmony reflected in the peace process will reduce the feeling of 
threat for the majority of the people of the Philippines. For example, the issue of Islamic 
Shari’ah adopted by MILF from the Law on Governing Aceh has implications for the 
opposition from non-Muslims in the south. 
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It is possibly also a conflicting interest inside MILF, in which religious scholars, ulama and 
ustaz, are influential as military commanders and religious teachers. Many of the core leaders 
graduated from Middle Eastern universities. Salamat Hashim, the founder of MILF, who 
undertook a PhD at Al Azhar University, Cairo and dropped out to found the organisation, 
said that “the MILF is the realisation of the ideas, efforts and sacrifices of Bangsamoro 
students in the Middle East who banded together and clandestinely organised themselves in 
1962” (Hashim 1998). Hashim claimed that MILF is more committed to Islamic Shari’ah
than MNLF:“The MILF adopts the Islamic ideology and way of life. Furthermore, the 
Islamic Front believes in the Islamic concept of state and government. In contrast to this, the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is more inclined to secularism” (Hashim 1998). 
Some scholars in the Philippines criticised the Islamic Shari’ah points statedin the FAB.
According to La Vina:
The Bangsamoro Basic Law shall provide for justice institutions in the 
Bangsamoro. This includes: (a). The competence over the Shari’ah justice 
system, as well as the formal institutionalization and operation of its 
functions, and the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts; (b). 
Measures to improve the workings of local civil courts, when necessary; and 
(c). Alternative dispute resolution systems (La Vina 2013: 25).
In addition, LaVina argued that the basic law should pay respect to indigenous culture and 
other Muslims who interpret the Shari’ah differently. Given the multicultural and multi-
ethnic nature of the Bangsamoro people, the basic law has to recognise “the multi-ethnic 
character of the region comprised of the Lumad communities, the Islamized Moros or 
Bangsamoro, and the settler communities and their descendants” (LaVina 2013: 27). Even 
though the FAB clearly states that indigenous people have rights not to follow the 
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constitution introduced, the implementation of the law will have implications for 
interreligious life and the harmony of the diverse community in the south. Customary law, 
called urf (custom), is also recognised in Islamic jurisprudence, which is legally accepted. In 
addition, LaVina argued that “the Shari’ah justice system and integration of customary laws 
are essential components of indigenous conflict resolution mechanism. The adoption of a 
culture-sensitive educational environment will be responsive to the unique demographics of 
the area” (LaVina 2013: 27). 
The Bangsamoro people are culturally Islamic. Their brand of Islam has developed for 
centuries since the Muslim kingdom period. It shares a common character of cultural Islam 
with other Muslims in Southeast Asia. MILF misunderstood the deep character of Muslims in 
Aceh. The GAM spokesperson for the Aceh Rayeuk (Aceh Besar) stated that “the Aceh 
conflict cannot be resolved by Islamic Shari’a offered by an outside party, because Islamic 
Shari’a is already deeply rooted in the Acehnese nation. We have a perfect [kaffah] Islamic 
Shari’a, while what the outsiders offer is only its skin” (Aspinall 2009: 216). Originally 
Islamic Shari’ah, proposed in Aceh from 1999, was intended to isolate GAM. The central 
government challenged GAM, saying that if it did not support Islamic Shari’ah, then the 
Acehnese would not support them (Aspinall 2009). 
If MILF adoptedan Aceh-style peace agreement, there would be many useful issues that 
positively supported peace efforts involving civil society and local government. Islamic 
Shari’ah in Aceh is commonly preserved by the conservative group of ulama in the Aceh 
Peace Party, which gained only one seat in the DPRA. The combatants who currently 
dominate local parties are nationalist-secular. Tiro represents this generation, who changed 
the strategy of Beureu’eh from the struggle for IslamicShari’ah to the ethno-nationalism of 
Aceh; this became a powerful movement for more than three decades. As suggested by 
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Kingsbury (2005), “despite its clear Islamic influence, GAM is a nationalist organization, the 
political goals of which are explicitly based on territory rather than religion. Further, explicit 
on the political agenda of GAM is the ending of the imposition of Islamic Law in Aceh”.
In addition, based on his conversation with Malik Mahmud, Prime Minister of the State of 
Aceh, Kingsbury (2005) argued that “GAM opposed the imposition of Syari’ah laws in Aceh 
by Jakarta because GAM’s struggle is motivated by and based on independence and not on 
religious issues. Jakarta is merely using syari’ah laws as a propaganda ploy to deviate public 
opinion from the real issue of conflict”. Furthermore, the rise of IslamicShari’ah law 
implemented in Aceh and endorsed by the conservative lobby impacts on the interests of 
foreign investment, which is urgently needed by Aceh to increase economic growth and 
overcome the high rate of employment.
Islamic Shari’ah is becoming part of the Acehnese identity, making them different from most 
parts of Indonesia where Shari’ah is not regulated officially, but incorporated into daily 
culture. In the 1990s, Aceh also implemented Shari’ah culturally. This was welcomed by the 
international community, which had supported Aceh’s struggle against the military pressures 
of the central government of Indonesia. 
After the Peace Accord
The final challenge is the peace implementation process, in particular, the dynamics of 
democratisation, economic development and reintegration. This is the most crucial period, 
when it will be seen whether MILF can transform itself into more of a CSO with a connection 
to the local political party. MILF claims that it ismuch better prepared than MNLF. In the 
democratisation process, MILF has to recruit new cadres and work professionally. Some 
people from the south have visited Aceh to learn how to conduct their political transition.
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Furthermore, for a long time there has been a pressing need to focus on developing the 
regional economy. There is a high rate of poverty and a low level of economic growth. It is 
argued here that decades of war and conflicthave destroyed the foundations of the economies
of the people of both Aceh and Bangsamoro. This should be a priority program initiated and 
continuously managed by MILFsimilarly to the way in which the current local government in 
Aceh under the special autonomy law attempts to invite foreign investors to Aceh. The 
Singaporean ambassador said that Singaporean investors are eager to invest in Indonesia,but 
are closely monitoring the security situation and political dynamics that might affect their 
investments. For the business community, security and stability are the first requirements
before they decide to come to invest. 
The author has had personal experience of contacting business leaders in Jakarta after being 
approached by former combatants. They agree that Aceh’s natural resources are rich and 
attractive for business. However, they have decided not to invest after monitoring the number 
of killings and attacks during the 2012 and the 2014 elections, which among others killed 
some labourers working for PT Telkom. Some foreign businesspeople have also been 
kidnapped recently. This is counterproductive behaviour for a local government that is 
attempting to increase economic development.
As in Aceh, economic development has become a critical issue in this post-conflict period in 
the southern Philippines. The poverty rate in the autonomous region of Mindanao in 2012 
was 56 percent, the highest rate in the Philippines (Yap 2014), even higher than the poverty 
rate in Aceh during the conflicts between 2001 and 2004 of around 30 percent, the second 
highest rate in Indonesia after Papua (Statistics Indonesia 2014). In addition, the Bangsamoro 
people have the highest unemployment rate, which endangers the processes of peacebuilding 
and development. High unemployment potentially encourages crime. Meisburger stated that 
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“the existing economy is primarily agricultural. Constraints to the economic development in 
the Bangsamoro region are significant and include widespread corruption, poor governance, 
and insecurity caused by clan violence and the ongoing separatist conflict” (Meisburger 2012: 
9). 
A further challenge is the poor quality of infrastructure, especially the roads which are a 
gateway for imports and exports from the Bangsamoro region to Sabah and Indonesia. Trade 
between Tawi-Tawi and Sabah, for example, is strategic to improving the local economy in 
the region (Meisburger 2012). The gap in the economic development of post-conflict regions
has become a problem. During the conflicts, economic development collapsed. People chose 
to remain secure by staying at home or migrating away from their villages. They lost the 
opportunity to work in their agricultural and other fields. 
The bombings and attacks by insurgents in 2013 in Cagayan de Oro city and Kotabato in the 
southern Philippines were an important test for the peace accord signed by MILF and GPH a 
year before. People began to question whether the accord was a comprehensive solution for 
creating peace and stability in the region. They argued that some insurgents and militia
groups should be involved in the peace process in order to gain a comprehensive package for 
a permanent peace. President Aquino III has established a stage for MILF’s transformation of 
combatants from antagonists of the GPH into mainstream political players (Lau 2014; Yap 
2014). 
MILF declared that it would transform into a social organisation similar to the two largest 
Muslim organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which manage 
schools, dakwah (religious preaching), and build hospitals, private universities and 
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cooperation – community centres for business development17– as well as influencing political 
parties. The National Mandate Party (PAN) was founded by the former head of 
Muhammadiyah and later head of the People’s Consultative Assembly, Amin Rais. The 
Nation Awakening Party (PKB) was founded by the former head of Nahdlatul Ulama and 
later President of the RI, Abdurrahman Wahid. Rais and Wahid played a significant role in 
the political transition after the fall of the New Order. 
MILF’s plan to set up the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) is a remarkable stepping-
stone of insurgent transformation into a mainstream political actor in the Bangsamoro region 
(Meisburger 2012; Sholeh 2014). However, UBJP will compete with other local parties 
which have been established to run for local and national elections in the south.The political 
context in Bangsamoro is influenced by certain factors: “(a) the existence of deep social 
cleavages, tensions and mistrust, (b) insecure and vulnerable populations that can be easily 
influenced or intimidated; (c) a residual proclivity to use violence to influence politics”
(Meisburger 2012: 11). 
The important lesson from Aceh is the way in which the combatants from Party Aceh
intimidated the people to gain political support in the 2012 election. For the Acehnese, 
security and safety are major priorities in their lives. They will support whoever and whatever 
party will protect them from threats. This is counterproductive to the establishment of 
permanent peace. However, people are becoming aware that they should support candidates 
or parties which have been working for peacebuilding and developing the economy.
                                                          
17The Ministry of Religious Affairs claimed that there are at least 17,000 pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) 
established in Indonesia affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama and some with Muhammadiyah. They teach moderate 
Sunni Islamic studies. Ulama graduated from these schools have played a crucial role in the Indonesian 
revolutionary, modernisation and political-economic development. They are the backbone of diverse 
Indonesian unity and have also developed thousands of cooperatives and Islamic microfinance programs 
(Sholeh 2007). In addition, Antonio claimed that “by the beginning of 1999, more than 1,500 USPs (unit simpan 
pinjam, Islamic saving and loan unit) had been established in Pesantren in 15 provinces. As well as providing 
training for over 3,000 managerial and 160 other USP staff, P2KER (People’s Economic Empowerment Project) 
has channelled working capital of Rp 16.68 billion (USD 1,339,400) to the USPs since 1997 (Antonio 2008: 260).
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In the 2014 elections, the Acehnese were reluctant to vote for Subianto, former Special 
Forces commander fromParty Gerindra. Manaf, head of PA, and his followers attempted to 
influence people, especially in the rural regions. Gerindra Aceh targeted 80 percent of seats,
similar to what the Demokrat Party gained in the 2009 elections, supported by PA. The head 
of the Demokrat Party, President Yudhoyono, had played an important role in the Helsinki 
peace accord. The Acehnese clearly understood this and rewarded his party with almost 90 
percent of the votes for the national and provincial legislatures. On the other hand, Subianto,
who verbally apologised for the role of members of the Special Forces in killing Acehnese in 
the past during his presidential campaign, was sidelined by voters and punished by the 
Acehnese. Gerindra only gained 2 seats (2.5%) in the Aceh legislature and 2 seats (25%) in 
the national legislature, which was far from their targets. 
The people and state of the Philippines must realise the ongoing conflict in the south has 
threatened security across the region. ASEAN has discussed the issue of the insurgents in the 
southern Philippines and is now more actively engaged in preventing conflict in the Southeast 
Asian region, a crucial step from its initial establishment in 1967 in order to avoid wars 
among states in the region. 
ASEAN members are committed to helpingeach other. The transition of Timor-Leste in 1999 
was the first test which challenged ASEAN members in supporting peaceful transitions.
However, ASEAN as an organisation was not ready to deliver peacekeeping forces. It was 
fortunate that some ASEAN members: Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines,
delivered their representatives to Timor-Leste. The dominance of Australia in the transition 
process raised high expectations from the Indonesian Government in relation to support of 
ASEAN members. A further test was the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh after the 
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Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami on 26 December 2004. ASEAN members along with the 
EU and other international agencies came to help the Acehnese. 
The EU and ASEAN also established the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to strengthen the 
transition of GAM combatants after the Helsinki peace agreement on 15 August 2005. The 
MoU transformed the Law on the Government of Aceh (UUPA), which regulates local 
parties and other special autonomous regions, in the MoU called “self-governance”. On 9
April 2014 three local parties contested the elections: PA, PNA and PDA. PA gained 29 seats 
in the DPRA, PNA 3 and PDA 1 of 81 seats. The establishment of local partieswas specific to
Aceh. 
Lessons from Aceh 
The people of the Bangsamoro region learned, from Aceh and Indonesia, how to implement 
their peace accord. This occurred in several different ways. Firstly, the visits of leaders from 
Aceh and other parts of Indonesia allowed the sharing of democratisation and peace 
initiatives. They came to the southern Philippines to share their experiences and also learn 
from the dynamics of peacebuilding in the south. Conferences and seminars on peacebuilding 
in Southeast Asia are often held in the south. Secondly, representatives from Bangsamoro 
visited Aceh and other parts of Indonesia to learn about the processes of democratisation and 
peacebuilding which worked very well after the collapse of the New Order. This included 
learning how the combatants of Aceh transformed into effective political players. 
In this process, capacitybuilding for former combatants is crucial. Their inclusion and the 
intention for them to learn how to apply political and economic development theory taught at 
universities and in short courses for their practical learning will help to transform them into 
strong and accountable political leaders who are respected by non-combatant leaders, 
intellectuals and other minority groups. Their willingness to protect the diverse society of the 
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Bangsamoro – as the former combatants of Aceh should do – is strategic to their political 
legitimacy in order to develop the economy of the Bangsamoro people and maintain peace. 
Djuli said that he frequently went to Manila and the southern Philippines on the invitation of 
the GPH to share his experience and knowledge about how GAM negotiated in Helsinki and 
their transformation into effective modern political and social leaders. Djuli said that to help 
the combatants’ transformation, he managed the School of Peace and Democracy (Sekolah 
Perdamaian dan Demokrasi, SPD), in which hundreds of combatants were prepared to be 
candidates of the Aceh legislature who could work effectively to balance power and to serve 
and protect the diversity of the Acehnese people. As new players in local politics, combatants 
have to open their minds and set the stage at thesame or a higher level than the other local 
and national political leaders (Djuli 2013).
Muksalmina, a former GAM commander at Aceh Besar, confirmed that the SPD training had 
changed his mind. In 2000, Muksalmina took made it a high priorityto develop the economic 
knowledge of the central commandof GAM. He realised that “the legislature candidates from 
GAM were under-capacity. Furthermore, the thoughts and attitudes of combatants who used 
to fight during the conflict have to be transformed into those of modern political players who 
have the capacity to understand and protect the diverse Acehnese community” (Hadiwinata 
etal.2010:26). So in 2012 Muksalmina and other combatants founded PNA, which gained 3 
seats in the DPRA (provincial legislature) and some seats at the district and city levels. 
Muksalmina is the executive head of PNA and the head of the board is Yusuf, former 
spokesperson of GAM who served as the first governor of Aceh after the Helsinki peace 
accord. He was imprisoned in Aceh prison and only able to leave the prison when the tsunami 
almost killed him. 
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Djuli (2013) shared his experience in developing combatant capacity not only for practical 
preparation as candidates for legislatures and executive heads of districts and mayors, but 
also in order to be transformed into protectors of Aceh society. This is how MILF 
commanders have to learn and prepare to transform into a modern civilian working mode to 
protect the community without arms and to set a high level of performance in the local 
legislature. At the first Aceh election in 2006, a year after the Helsinki peace accord, 
combatants won the gubernatorial election. Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, an independent 
candidate supported by combatants, gained 38.20%or 786,745 votes. At the district level, 
combatant-supported candidates also won in the districts of Pidie, Aceh Jaya, East Aceh, 
North Aceh and West Aceh, the city of Lhokseumawe and the city of Sabang (ICG 2007;
Ichwanuddin 2008: 134–135). 
Like Djuli, local NGOs based in Aceh were also invited to the southern Philippines. 
Wiratmadinata, secretary-general of Forum LSE Aceh, a network of 60 local Acehnese 
NGOs, discussed the decades-long conflict in Aceh and the historic Helsinki accord at a 
forum organised by an NGO based in Mindanao. The Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, the
Asia Foundation and USAID organised a forum on Aceh and the Mindanao Peace Process in 
Kotabato city in August 2008. The organiser of the forum made a press statement, as follows:
The forum aims to: identify factors that contribute to the success of the 
implementation of the 2005 Helsinki Agreement for Aceh; describe the 
role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in the initial implementation 
of the agreement; suggest recommendations that the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) can consider in the ongoing peace talks from the Aceh Peace 
Agreement, and locally, from the experience of the Moro National 
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Liberation Front (MNLF) when it forged the Final Peace Agreement 
(FPA) with the GRP in 1996 (MindaNews 2008). 
CSOs such as the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies are a crucial factor in peace and mediation 
efforts involving civil society in peacebuilding during and after conflict. CSOs can play an 
important role in social movement, as they are powerful groupsfor ending conflict and 
initiating community awareness of violence prevention and democratisation. CSOs can
manage advocacy programs for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Paffenholz (2010: 387) argued that “civil society organizations were in many cases also 
effective in bringing issues to negotiation or a post-agreement agenda”. This is strategic in a
post-conflict environment where former combatants transform into civilians, give up their 
arms and participate in development and political activism. 
Sofyan A. Djalil, an Indonesian negotiator at Helsinki, said that it was agreed to allocate 
funds for the reintegration of combatants: the “reintegration fund is allocated to GAM for 
reintegration into civil society” (Djalil 2012). However, reintegration presents a great 
challenge for many combatants who depend on arms for their security and confidence. 
Moreover, they continue using arms to uphold their demands for justice and feel alienated 
from the process of peacebuilding and economic development. The reintegration process can 
take years and decades, involving the government and community. 
Djuli had a different argument from Djalil on how the funds allocated for the reintegration 
process help to transform combatants:
It would be too naïve to even think that giving Rp 10 million (USD 800) to 
a former combatant who had spent practically all his adult life in the jungle 
would automatically change him from a killing machine into a law-abiding 
civilian. It is to their credit that, despite the extreme hardships they have 
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been suffering these last 10 years of peace, very few former GAM soldiers 
have resorted to violence to air their grievances (Djuli 2014). 
Djuli’s argument was in response to a group of former GAM commanders, led by a young 
man named Nurdin, aka Abu Minimi, who openly challenged the current governorand former 
foreign minister of GAM, Abdullah, and vice-governor Manaf, former chief of GAM’s 
central military command, to resign or die, demanding justice in government policy, in 
particular for former combatant families. Minimi claimed: “there are so many widows and 
orphans of combatants living in abject poverty while they bask in luxury” (Djuli 2014). 
The southern Philippines peace initiatives are more difficult than those carried out in Aceh in 
terms of the rise of armed militia groups which were established based on religion, ethnicity 
or ideology. The Bangsamoros’ peace efforts have also been challenged by a number of 
violent attacks and threats from existing armed groups. A further challenge in the southern 
Philippines is disarmament, the hardest process for combatants. Currently, some militant 
groups inside MILF have separated from the agreement and continue to fight the GPH. The 
Abu Sayaf group also opposes the peace agreement. They even support the jihad in Syria and 
Iraq;some Philippines fighters have joined other jihadists from Southeast Asia in Syria and 
Iraq, establishing the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah, Malay Archipelago unit, for 
Islamic State. Coalitions for peace and security are not only the duty of the Acehnese and 
Bangsamoro people;they should be a systematic movement of states and civil societies in 
Southeast Asia. 
Local Politics
A further lesson from Aceh relates to the transformation of combatants into political actors 
who leave behind their military skills and attitudes, and begin to work as civilians, advocating 
government policy, public service, development budgets and services for all ethnic and 
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religious groups of Aceh. The transformation of MILF combatants into a CSO and political 
party activists will be tested after the congress passes the basic law in 2015 and the 
involvement of a MILF-affiliated party in the national elections in 2016. 
The Aceh peace accord and its implementation have had positive influences on the process of 
peace in the southern Philippines. Among the terms of the agreement is the establishment of a
local party in the Mindanao region. MILF agreed to set up a local political party called the 
United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP). In April 2014, MILF vice-chair for political affairs
Ghadzali Jaafar said that they had finalised plans to establish a political party. The plans had 
begun a year before, following various consultations and discussion with local leaders and the 
MILF’s central committee, the policy-making body of the organisation. He said that “the 
party is based on justice and is not exclusive. This is open to anybody who wants to join the 
party” (Manpulig 2014). 
Before joining the 2016 elections in the Philippines, MILF leaders learned from local parties 
in Aceh. They visited PA, the Aceh Peace Party and some stakeholders in Banda Aceh in 
December 2014. A delegate from MILF visited the PA office in December 2014 to learn 
about itspolitical policy and political platform. Bato Mohammad Zainoddin, head of the 
delegates, said that “our visit is to adopt the political system and tricks conducted by the 
Party Aceh as a local party which (is similar to UBJP) to have special autonomous (self-
governance) region status from the central government…Principally we have to learn politics 
and regulations managed by the Party Aceh and adopt it to our new party, UBJP” (Ar-Rifai 
2014). 
Currently the tabled laws regulating the establishment of a local party in Mindanao are 
currently being discussed in congress. Some congress members oppose the idea of a local 
party, which they argue as being against the constitution. This reminds us of the opposition 
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by Jakarta elites to the idea of local parties in Aceh, which was the most difficult item
negotiated in Helsinki. Awaludin, head of the GoI negotiating team, described how the 
negotiation lasted until almost midnight before both parties agreed. 
Women in Peace Efforts
Women are very pivotal in peace efforts, reconciliation and post-conflict development in 
Southeast Asia. In Aceh and the southern Philippines, women have been actively involved in 
negotiation panels, maintaining justice in peace implementation and strengthening civil 
society and political capacity of combatants. Their role is strategic in mediating between 
combatants and non-combatants, including active efforts to communicate with state and non-
state actors in ensuring permanent peace and justice. On the other hand, it is clear that women 
and children are the most vulnerable victims of conflict and war. They have to play a triple 
role as a mother of children, as head of the family and as negotiator between the military and 
paramilitary to protect their family from the threat of conflict and war. Women have taken 
risks for their families. At the end of 1999, military operatives searching for GAM in villages 
implicated in the rise of IDPs. The military even checked IDP camps looking for combatants 
possibly hiding in the camps. Kamaruzzaman stated that:
The military attacked the refugee camp in the Abu Beureueh Mosque in Pidie 
on 13 October 1999. The attack was aimed at finding a number of suspected 
members of GAM who, it was thought, were hiding in the refugee camp. The 
volley of bullets, which were fired in a number of different directions, caused 
chaos, with 10,000 IDPs running for cover and many women who were 
victims of sexual violence suffering from shock (Kamaruzzaman 2006: 262). 
To prevent further violation, women in Aceh initiated an advocacy lobby group to protect the 
rights of women and children. On 2 June 1999, Flower Aceh mediated a dialogue between 
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women, comprising of NGOs and student activists, and housewives, to discuss the conditions 
in Aceh.As a follow-up, they set up a network of individuals called Women Volunteers for 
Humanity (RPuK), which had a special duty to help women and children in the camps 
(Kamaruzzaman 2006). 
Acehnese women also played a crucial part in two peace efforts in the period of President 
Wahid from 2000 to 2003, in particular in the Helsinki peace negotiation and the 
reintegration of combatants. Shadia Marhaban, the only woman in the Helsinki peace 
negotiation representing GAM, has been actively involved in the reintegration process of 
combatants in Aceh. She founded the School of Peace and Democracy of Aceh (SPDA) to 
build the capacity of combatants in the legislature, political parties and civil society. 
Marhaban has also actively supported the mediation process between the GPH and MILF 
(Djuli 2015). 
Conclusion
The peace accord between MILF and the GPH in October 2012 marked a crucial result after 
almost 16 years of peace initiatives. Mediated by the Malaysian government and with the 
support of the OIC, Japan and Indonesia, and civil society, the peace agreement will 
strengthen security and stability in Southeast Asia. Serious efforts on MILF’s part in 
establishing peace have forced Indonesian and Southeast Asian jihadists to leave their 
training camps in the south. The accord will also be positive for the people in the 
Bangsamoro and southern Philippines region in relation to economic development, education 
and improving the quality of life of the people, the poorest in the Philippines. 
Learning from Aceh’s democratisation and peacebuilding is crucial for MILF, especially in 
how to transform from combatants into political actors. MILF has adopted some points from 
the Helsinki peace accord and LoGA, which are reflected in the FAB,for example, the 
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sharing of natural resource revenues, the transformation of combatants into a political party 
and the role of Islamic Shari’ah as part of the identity of the Bangsamoro people. Adopting 
Shari’ah in Bangsamoro will have more difficult implications than what the people of Aceh 
currently struggle with; in the implementation of qanun, IslamicShari’ah, especially in 
criminal law (hudud),took the longest process of consultation. In 2008, MILF’s proposal, 
supported by President Arroyo, was amended by Christian politicians in the south, which 
caused further conflict. In addition, some insurgents operating in the south are not included in 
the negotiation. They are potential spoilers of the peace efforts. 
Further discussions involved how former combatants from Aceh and Timor-Leste have 
transform from paramilitariesinto political parties and civilian organisations. This chapter has
also examined the relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, an engagement to develop 
regional politics and security in Southeast Asia. The challenges for former combatants are the 
integration and transformation processes, which are crucial factors in democratic 
consolidation and peace transition. 
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Chapter 9
Democratic Transition and the Transformation of Combatants in 
Southeast Asia: Lessons from Aceh and Timor-Leste
Introduction
The democratic transition of Aceh reflected in the 2012 and 2014 elections is a good 
foundation for preserving peace initiated by local government and CSOs in Aceh, as 
discussed in previous chapters of this thesis. The consolidation of democracy by the 
participation of former combatants and other factions in the elections strengthens 
development and peace efforts. It is interesting to compare Aceh post-conflict to democratic 
transitions in post-war Timor-Leste. To begin the chapter, it is important to understand 
comparative studies of conflict and post-conflict regions in Southeast Asia. 
Tan (2007) and Christie (1996) examined comparative studies of conflict, war, peacebuilding 
and democracy in Southeast Asia from different points of view. Tan (2007) compared a 
broader analysis of insurgencies (including terrorism) than Christie (1996), who focused 
solely on historical perspectives of nationalism and separatism in Southeast Asia. 
The present study contributes further comparative analysis to this area of investigation in 
comparing post-conflict Aceh, Timor-Leste and Mindanao, all of which are strategic to 
democratic consolidation in Southeast Asia. They share a common experience of separatist 
movements and insurgents which later became leading groups in national and local politics. 
The combatants, guerrillas and veterans of conflict transformed into political leaders, 
businesspeople and human rights activists, leaving their conflict and war experiences in the 
past to adopt better post-conflict lives.
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The major challenge for these post-conflict regions has been how to overcome the existing 
violence and security threats from former combatants who are disappointed and alienated 
from the current economic development (Kingsbury 2012; Miller 2012). The former argues 
that “in circumstances in which independence from colonialism has often been couched in 
terms of the material benefits of liberation, the reduction in material welfare of newly-
liberated peoples often created new sets of challenges for less experienced post-colonial 
governments” (Kingsbury 2011: 767). In a comparative analysis of Indonesia’s Aceh, Sri 
Lanka’s Eelam, the Philippines’ Bangsamoro and Timor-Leste, Kingsbury (2012) stated that 
those post-conflict and conflict regions are a legacy of colonialism which challenges 
separatist minority groups to integrate or finally become independent from the colonial states. 
There is an interesting contrast between Aceh’s and Timor-Leste’sexperienceswith Indonesia 
in their conflict periods.
On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste became the youngest sovereign state in the world, after about 
24 years of violent war against the Indonesian state. Tan (2007) categorised the waras a war 
against the state terrorism of Indonesia. The war ended after a referendum of the people of 
East Timor on 30 August 1999 in which 78.5 per cent voted for independence (Carey 2007: 
374). This referendum inspired the Acehnese, who demanded a referendum for Aceh 
organised by student movements in that same year. The central government of Indonesia 
responded by providing regional autonomy laws in 1999 and 2001 which granted wider 
opportunities for Aceh to develop Islamic Shari’ah, which is unusual in a secular national 
constitution. The greatest transformation came after the Helsinki peace accord in August 
2005, when former members of the GAM separatist movement agreed to integrate into
Indonesia.
The former combatants and guerrillas discussed in this chapter were members of paramilitary 
groups that had been involved in conflicts and wars for almost 30 years in Aceh and about 24 
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years in Timor-Leste (East Timor). The Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) 
was established in October 1976 under the leadership of Hasan Tiro as a continuation of the 
Daud Bereueh Darul Islamrebel movement (Schulze 2003: 242); this movement later 
changed its name to Gerakan Aceh Merdeka(GAM) with a military wing, Angkatan 
GAM(AGAM). Tiro claimed that about 5000 combatants were trained in Libya between 
1986 and 1989. However, Indonesian intelligence believed this number to be only 583 
(Schulze 2003: 244). A few years after the training, in 2002, Malik Mahmud, GAM Minister 
of State, claimed an active GAM guerrilla army of of 30,000 (Schulze 2006: 226). Based on 
Indonesian military documentary sources, Sulaiman (2006: 139) stated that in 2003, GAM 
already had around 5326 armed personnel. Thousands of new sympathisers came from NGO 
activists and university students who set up a movement of political change supporting GAM 
in Aceh (Sulaiman 2006). 
As a security strategy, a GAM peace negotiator reported in Helsinki that the combatants 
numbered only 3000 with about 800 weapons. In fact, there were more than thirty thousand 
combatants in Aceh in 2005 (Yusuf 2013). They also kept hundreds of other weapons and 
explosives for possible use in case the peace negotiations failed, as happened in 2001 when a 
Swiss-based NGO – the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC)– failed to mediate between GAM and 
the RI. However, GAM received the advantages of the dialogues and cease-fire periods 
between 2000 and 2003. Schulze stated:
It became the cornerstone of GAM’s political strategy of 
internationalisation. It was used to gain international legitimacy and to 
obtain outside support for GAM’s struggle. From the beginning, GAM’s
participation in the dialogue was motivated less by what GAM could 
receive from Indonesia than by what it could receive from the international 
community (Schulze 2006: 239). 
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Former combatants in Timor-Leste are referred to as ‘veterans’ and include members of the 
Clandestine Front who, in the towns, carried out support work for the paramilitary group 
FALINTIL– Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the 
National Liberation of East Timor). Some Clandestine Front leaders were FALINTIL 
members, living covertly, and the Front reported directly to FALINTIL commanders. The 
student movement, RENETIL, is an example of the Clandestine Front in action. Some 
veterans are now working as non-military political activists in government and political 
parties, andFALINTIL has been integrated into the military and police services of Timor-
Leste. The current President of Timor-Leste, General Taur Matan Ruak, is a former 
commander of FALINTIL who became chief of staff of the F-FDTL (Falintil-Defence Forces 
of Timor-Leste). After some protests due to feelings of discrimination between Western 
Timorese and Easterners, about 600 military personnel deserted in 2006. This created a 
national security crisis until 2008, when Major Alfredo Reinado, former commander of the 
naval unit of Timor-Leste and former leader of the rebels,was killed during an attack against 
President José Ramos Horta (Sahin 2010). 
This chapter presents a comparative discussion of the transformation of combatants and 
guerrillas in Aceh and Timor-Leste. It analyses the process of post-conflict democratic 
transition; in particular, it investigates how former combatants are transformed from 
operating as a paramilitary force into that of a political movement. In this context, the 
dynamics of democracy are seen as a process of transition towards permanent peace. It begins
by outlining some experiences of democratic transition in other post-conflict and post-war 
regions in Asia and Africa. In the second part of the chapter, a comparison is made between 
democracy in Aceh and Timor-Leste that examines how former combatants participated in 
democratisation and peacebuilding in each of these regions during their respective 2012 
elections. 
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The discussion advances two arguments – firstly, that democratic transition has been 
regarded, in general, by many election observers as a relatively peaceful process. Although a 
number of attacks and killings occurred before the April 2012 elections in Aceh, it became 
peaceful during the voting and after the results of the election were announced. The elections 
of 2012 in Timor-Leste were also peaceful. Secondly, democratic processes are unlikely to be 
effective in supporting peacebuilding without prioritising the overcoming of fundamental 
economic challenges;barriers to the full implementation of the peace process lie in poverty, 
the slow progress of development and the lack of success of the transformation of those 
former combatants whose orientation was towards criminal activities. In conclusion, the 
chapter argues that the peaceful democratic transitions achieved in Aceh and Timor-Leste 
provide important lessons for peacebuilding in Asia, Africa and other conflict and post-
conflict countries. 
Peace and Democracy
Immanuel Kant’s theory of “perpetual peace” argues that the ideals of peace are nothing 
without realisation. It has been stated that “the irony of peace is the relative ease by which 
one can define it a priori at the same time as it is so difficult to realise” (Rasmussen 2010:
177). Nevertheless, Rasmussen argued that peace agreements can be a starting point towards 
lasting peace. Peace, he believed, should be the ultimate goal of every movement, including 
the aim of war and military intervention (Rasmussen 2010:179). The UN Security Council, 
for instance, could authorise “war in the name of international peace and security”
(Rasmussen 2010: 179). 
Rasmussen’s support of the ideology of peace, however, leaves questions about the nature of 
peace. In Iraq, for instance, despite the democratic transition, deadly attacks still occur 
against the so-called legitimate government long after the war. International intervention into
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conflict in Timor-Leste and Aceh is important to examine through the arguments of 
semocratic peace theory, which state that institutions of peace are required to ensure peaceful 
intervention. For example, paramilitary groups in Aceh and Timor-Leste agreed to disarm 
during the security transitions facilitated by international states and communities. The AMM
successfully mediated the transition and monitored the processes of the deployment of TNI 
and the disarmament of GAM. 
In the conflict regions that emerged in Indonesia after the fall of the New Order in 1998, 
existing fragile relations among ethnic and religious groups escalated into bitter ethno-
religious clashes after the 1999 elections; these clashes left more than 5000 Muslims and 
Christians dead in Maluku and Poso, in Central Sulawesi. Political campaigns and the 
strategies of different parties created further waves of violence in the conflict regions 
(Loveband & Yong 2006: 145; van Klinken 2006: 131). After the election results became 
known, violent attacks (which have been referred to as “phase three conflicts”) broke out in 
Maluku and attracted volunteer fighters from other islands to the region (Sholeh 2007: 146; 
van Klinken 2007: 89). Ruptures in fragile intercommunal relations in the conflict regions of 
Maluku and Poso were easily provoked by intensifying shootings which targeted different 
religious groups. People from different religious communities who had lived together 
peacefully were forced to separate into distinct Muslim and Christian regions. For many of 
them the trauma of conflict continues, as religious differences force clan members, former 
neighbours and even family members to live separately based on religious differences.
Due to the ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts that occurred after the resignation of 
President Suharto in 1998, some analysts suggested that Indonesia should move towards 
developing into a federation. The result of the referendum in Timor-Leste, held in
August1999, contributed to a rise in the demand for autonomy, accompanied by regional 
protests and violence, particularly in Aceh and West Papua. Student activists in Aceh 
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mobilised people and campaigned for a referendum on the status of Aceh. In November 1999, 
several hundred thousand people gathered in Aceh to protest in support of the implementation 
of Aceh’s special political status, which had been verbally agreed to by President Wahid but 
later revoked by the TNI (Kingsbury 2006, 10). Although President B.J. Habibie made it 
clear that a referendum like that of Timor-Leste would not be offered to Aceh (Aspinall & 
Crouch 2003: 6), Fuad Mardatillah, an Acehnese activist, said that the Timor-Leste 
referendum was an important inspiration for Acehnese students and young activists. 
The movement in support of Acehnese autonomy had, as one important outcome, the 
development of peace initiatives between GAM and the RI, mediated by the HDC
(Mardatillah 2013). The Aceh government also learned from the government of Timor-Leste 
how to develop its post-conflict economy and maximise the use of natural resources in 
support of local government, in particular the oil and gas industry. Aceh has long been 
concerned about the way in which the central government does not transparently negotiate 
with the local government on the revenues of energy resources as stated in the Helsinki MoU.
Some elites who have political interests gain support from their constituents by prolonging 
anger, hatred and negative sentiment against other groups, which is counterproductive to the 
essence of peacebuilding. Some of them have even attacked and killed leaders of other 
political groups for political purposes, for example, as happened in Aceh approaching the 
April 2012 elections. The International Crisis Group (2012) warned that Aceh’s political 
violence could affect the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding. Intellectuals and 
scholars committed to vote for a certain party in Aceh to preserve stability and peace; they 
said it was dangerous not to vote for PA, the dominant party in the province of Aceh. They 
believed that “the danger of violence would be higher if the Party Aceh lost” (ICG 2012: 6). 
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An increase in killings in late 2011 forced the central government to accommodate the 
political purposes of PA. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amiruddin Usman, the Aceh desk coordinator at 
the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs, said that Jakarta is serious 
about maintaining reconciliation and peace in Aceh (Afrida 2012). This is why the central 
government changed its policy towards the Aceh election and allowed PA to join the election 
(Usman 2013). This sense of trauma also appeared in Timor-Leste during the 2012 elections, 
when the people voted for stability and peace. 
This suggests that, like democracy, which can encourage the participation of the people if 
they are confident of finding strong representatives, violence in one region can act as a fuse 
to provoke violence in other regions. Messages of anger from political and community 
leaders can also lead to violence, especially in fragile post-conflict and post-war regions. 
Therefore, in other conflict regions like Africa, peace is also prioritised over democracy. 
After three elections between 1992 and 2007 characterised by violent bloodshed, Kenyans 
decided, in their 2013 elections, to choose peace over democracy. Long et al. (2013: 142) 
argued that in relation to the 2013 elections in Kenya, “peace is obviously preferable to 
violence, it does not necessarily indicate a fully democratic process”. Lasting peace has also 
been a challenge to realise in post-conflict regions in Southeast Asia, particularly Aceh and 
Timor-Leste. 
Democratic Transition
In some post-conflict regions, democracy leads to new types of conflicts, which may turn out 
to be worse than those that occurred before a peace accord was instituted. Some African 
regions experienced such worsened conflict situations after democratic elections were set up, 
which gave the opportunity for former leaders of combatants and armed militias to participate 
as candidates for parliament and head of districts and states. Among the many challenges to 
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peace following elections is the continuation of friction inside former insurgent movements. 
Leaders of movements who disagree with a peace accord often create new insurgents and 
more deadly groups after an election. 
MILF, for example, is a group which opposed the peace initiatives and agreements negotiated 
between MNLF and the GPH in 1996. However, they eventually made their peace initiative a
few years later and signed an agreement in 2012 that included significant steps for the 
implementation of the peace accord. This occurred after MILF learned from democratic 
peace-building in Aceh. According to Djuli (2013),GAM negotiating members shared their 
negotiation experiences in international conferences and workshops attended by MILF 
reresentatives who were interested in adopting some parts of the way GAM and GoI reached 
agreement in Helsinki, including the implementation of the peace accord. 
Furthermore,the MILF leadership sent several representatives of CSOs, local government and 
former insurgent leaders to Aceh to understand how GAM successfully transformed and how 
democracy works in Aceh. Although violence continued during elections in 2006, 2009 and 
2012 and still threatens, to some degree, the quality of democracy in Aceh, it is clear that 
stability and economic development have been achieved after the elections. Most leaders of 
political parties competed in the elections involving the DPRA or DPRK, as well as local 
governments at provincial and district levels. They have actively driven themselves in local 
democracy and development. 
The 2012 elections in Aceh and Timor-Leste are important to analyse, particularly in terms of 
how the dynamics of politics in these regions have contributed to peacebuilding and 
reconciliation. It is also interesting to see how former members of armed forces and 
combatants in both post-conflict regions participated in these elections. The results of the 
elections brought significant victories for former armed forces members and former 
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combatants. In Aceh, the former foreign minister of GAM, Abdullah, in partnership with the 
former commander of the military wing of GAM, Manaf, won the election with 55.87% of 
the votes for their PA.
However, there was a lot of pre-election intimidation by PA supporters. Between 2011 and 
2012, former members of GAM turned to fighting each other and supporting different parties. 
A series of shootings, bombings and attacks targeted political figures and their supporters 
(The Economist, 14 April 2012) and about 20 people were killed in violence related to the 
election. Former GAM combatants were involved in this violence and have been charged 
with up to 19 years in prison under counterterrorism laws. A human rights activist has argued 
that the violence had political motives and therefore should not be categorised as terrorism 
(Ghozali 2013). Yusuf, former governor of Aceh and former chief of information of GAM, 
was targeted by the group and they twice attempted to kill him. Yusuf said that “this is 
strongly coordinated by elites of Party Aceh, who are also former leaders of GAM. They are 
afraid of fair competition in the 2012 elections against me as an incumbent” (Yusuf 2013). 
However, Ayah Banta, former chief of the GAM specialist explosive group from Aceh Utara, 
argued that his group’s attacks before the 2012 election were purely the result of their 
disappointment with Yusuf’s government policy, which “does not fulfil his own promise to 
support the prosperity of former combatants” (advocate member 2013). Shortly after the 
election, some GAM members were arrested and are now imprisoned in Jakarta and Banda 
Aceh. According to Yusuf (2013), former combatants are fragile individuals, especially those 
who do not have the capacity to compete for jobs and did not have the chance to complete 
their studies;many of them did not finish school due to the conflicts and their involvement 
with GAM. 
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The dynamics of politics in Timor-Leste have been more positive in democratic consolidation 
and political reconciliation. After independence was gained in 2002, Timor-Leste struggled 
with friction among former leaders and particularly divisions among former FALINTIL 
guerrillas between Westerners (loromonu) and Easterners (lorosae). Allegations of 
government discrimination towards FALINTIL veterans created national security threats 
which led to more than 100,000 internally displaced persons. This was made worse by 
antagonism in the political leadership between Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and President 
Xanana Gusmão (ICG 2006). After the 2007 elections, which resulted in a coalition 
government between Prime Minister José Ramos Horta and President Gusmão, a more 
peaceful and stable government was created. However, a security threat from deserters 
continued in 2008. It was reported that the F-FDTL fugitive, Major Alfredo Reinado, almost 
killed Prime Minister Horta on 11 February 2008 and President Gusmão’s car was shot at by 
Reinado’s second-in-command, Lieutenant Gastão Salsinha, an hour after Reinado’s attack 
on Horta (Kingsbury 2008: 33). The friction between FALINTIL veterans is among the 
challenges that still need to be overcome. 
Democratic consolidation continued in Timor-Leste after now–Prime Minister Gusmão 
successfully achieved his second term of coalition government in the 2012 election. This 
consolidation has been further strengthened by the victory of his close aide, Taur Matar Ruak, 
as President. Stability is also continuing due to the positive political step taken by Gusmão to 
mandate former PM Alkatiri to lead the task force of a Special Zone of the Social Market 
Economy in Oecusse Ambeno; this move had the objective of giving a new perspective for 
the future, especially with regard to economic growth, employment and poverty eradication 
(Tempo Semanal 2013). As secretary-general of the FRETILIN party, Alkatiri maintains 
influential leadership at the grassroots level. People see this as the principle of national 
reconciliation in action among strategic leaders. 
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On the current challenges of Timor-Leste, Gusmão stated that “we lacked infrastructure, 
human and financial resources and political experience in democratic governance. Coupled 
with the impact of trauma, poverty and historical division, the fragile nation of Timor-Leste 
began its history with a cycle of unrest and violence” (Gusmão 2012: 208). All leaders of 
Timor-Leste are obliged to manage a stable and economically independent state, which then 
enables it to be an influential member of ASEAN. Timor-Leste also provides an important 
lesson for democratic transition in Aceh. Part of this is the foundation of the Commission of 
Truth and Friendship, which, unfortunately, does not meet the ideals of the human rights 
activists and local government of Aceh. They still propose the foundation of a strong 
commission of truth and reconciliation with the power of a local judicial process such as that 
in Aceh. 
Building Friendship between Indonesia and Timor-Leste 
A comparison between Aceh and Timor-Leste will elucidate the nature of friendship and 
reconciliation between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. This does not mean that human rights 
violations in Aceh by the Indonesian Special Forces should be forgotten, without advocacy 
for justice. But it is important to share the experience of how Aceh learned from Timor-Leste 
political transition, especially in relation to the aspects of justice and human rights. 
Prime Minister Gusmão said thatIndonesia and Timor-Leste have both shown genuine 
interest in developing new relations after the referendum. They agreed to choose friendship 
and reconciliation (Gusmão 2013: 378). Timor-Leste is now the closest neighbour of 
Indonesia. Not only does it border the province of East Nusa Tenggara, but it was also part of 
Indonesia between 1975 and 1999for approximately 24 years. Timor-Leste became a 
sovereign state after the referendum. Indonesian and Timor-Leste believe relations between 
them are an inevitable choice. 
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Indonesia and Timor-Leste have a lot of common interests and cultures, especially in West 
Timor near East Nusa Tenggara’s community borders. Many of the peoplehere are originally 
from one family or have been neighbours for generations. Some other facts also support the 
friendship between the two countries. First, Indonesian is constitutionally recognised by the 
government and the state of Timor-Leste as one of the official languages in addition to
Portuguese and Tetum. It is also supported by the people of Timor-Leste,who easily 
understand Indonesian. They learn naturally through TV stations from Indonesia. 
After more than ten years of separation from Indonesia, the Timorese now consider Indonesia 
a strategic neighbour in the context of the economy, regional security and culture. In the 
economic sector, Indonesian commodities dominate the markets of Timor-Leste. In regional 
security, Indonesian security forces are often invited by the government of Timor-Leste to 
train the police and military or they manage joint training. This is crucial to maintaining
security in the Asia-Pacific region. In the cultural context, the people of Timor-Leste enjoy 
Indonesian TV dramas, songs and dances. Many of the current political leaders of Timor-
Leste graduated from Indonesian universities.The Indonesian language is easy to learn for the 
people of Timor-Leste. A TVjournalist in Dili stated that “Portuguese is quite difficult to 
learn, while Tetum cannot provide enough vocabularies especially in sciences. Therefore, if 
you want to explain something in Tetum, and cannot find its vocabularies, we use Indonesian, 
which is easier and simpler”(Prabowo 2012). In addition to the influence of TV and other
media, students are still using Indonesian language books as a source of learning. Bookstores 
in Dilli sell books on economics, health, political and social culture in Indonesianfrom
Indonesian publishers. It is difficult to get books in Portuguese or English. 
People-to-people relationshipsforced leaders from both countries to choose friendship and 
reconciliation as the basis of mutual partnership in economic development and regional 
politics. Both countries are undergoing democratic transition. Aceh activists have visited Dili 
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to learn about social justice and democratic transition after separation from Indonesia. People 
from Timor-Leste have also visited Aceh to learn about local politics and development after 
the Helsinki peace accord. Sharing and learning between post-conflict 
communitiesstrengthens each people in democratic transition.
The relationship between Indonesia and Timor-Leste has been through a long process. After 
the result of the referendum in 1999, relations between the two sovereign states continued
with different patterns. In many post-conflict and post-war countries, a way to seek truth and 
justice is commonly established. This step is one of the main objectives of peace and 
reconciliation. In the context of Aceh, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is the 
mandate of the MoU in 2005 as stated in Article 2 of Human Rights paragraph 2: “A
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian 
Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of formulating and Determining 
reconciliation measures” (Kingsbury 2006: 203). However, the TRC process is deadlocked
due to the absence of national legislation which implements the regulations at provincial 
level. According to Yusuf,“it is hard for Aceh to continue the regulations agreed by Aceh 
legislature. This is due to political decision in national level which involve cross-sectoral 
department in central government”(Yusuf 2013). The Qanun KKR (TRC) has been finalised 
by the parliament of Aceh (the DPRA). The QanunKKR will be established as a permanent 
institution to facilitate the judicial processat the local level. The long procedure of 
establishing a truth and reconciliation commission takes from ten to twenty years (Aritonang
2013). Of course the process in Aceh must be supported by openness and positive initiatives
from Jakarta that the reconciliation process is a priority after the New Order,such that various
ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts require collective strength to overcome. The 
dynamics in Timor-Lesteare different from those in Aceh and Indonesia. Leaders from both 
countries changed the word ‘reconciliation’ to ‘friendship’. This reflects their good 
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intentions, especially from the perspective of Timor-Leste, which has to prepare to compete 
with regional countries in Southeast Asia and Pacific regions. 
The establishment of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) between Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste is a political initiative that promotes peaceful and mutually beneficial relations 
between the two countries. Kiki Syahnakri, who for more than a decade served in the military 
on the border of Indonesia and East Timor, stated:
The goal of the work of the CTF is friendship. The big target can only be achieved 
through good faith and positive efforts of all parties, especially the CTF itself through 
a relatively clean process with accurate data, valid evidence and true testimony. The 
core of friendship is mutual understanding and paying respect witha spirit of justice, 
equality and peace (Syahnakri 2009: 121).
Syahnakri is one of few Indonesian military personnel involved in East Timor operations who 
understands Tetum well. Through Syahnakri, many Timorese joined the Indonesian army. 
Syahnakri’s argument is diplomatic language to support the CTF process forgood friendship 
and relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia in the future.
Syahnakri’s argument is in line with that of Prime Minister Gusmão, who stated that:
East Timor and Indonesia have chosen the same path to looking forwards. Peace must 
be achieved by joint efforts, where there is an understanding of hardship, an 
understanding of the various issues that have an impact on both sides. A willingness 
to resolve it through the most viable and peaceful way, respect for the situation and 
the conditions experienced by each party, and continuing dialogue for strengthening 
reconciliation will be beneficial for both countries (Gusmão2013: 379).
Political transition in both countries from authoritarian regimes to peaceful democracy forced 
the leaders of both countries to promote peace and friendship. They attempted to leave behind 
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the dark history of the 24 years of Indonesian occupation of East Timor, which led to 
hundreds ofthousands of deathsinboth countries, especially Timor-Leste. Perhaps both
leaders learned from the difficultiesof post-war human rights courts and political 
transitionspost-conflict in many other countries. Cambodia is another interesting example 
where only a few people have been prosecuted by the Cambodian and international human 
rights courts. For the people of Cambodia, this judicial process has not been fair, especially 
for the victims of Pol Pot,who killed civilians for the continuity ofhis authoritarian regime
(Sok 2013). It must be learned from this kind of post-conflict and post-war justice, and 
especially for the sake of the welfare of both countries, particularly Timor-Leste,
that‘friendship’ is more meaningful than ‘justice’.
There has been a process of reconciliation within that friendship. Indonesia’s full support for 
Timor-Leste as a member of ASEAN shows Indonesian foreign policy supports the existence 
of Timor-Leste in international and regional politics. For the government of Timor-Leste, 
becoming a member of ASEAN is a top priority. Gusmãodeclared that “the membership in 
ASEAN in a priority for the Timorese State, since we consider that it is extremely important 
to belong to this family and to extract the implicit advantages that derive from here: security, 
stability, economic development and regional cooperation”(Gusmão2012: 154). 
Gusmãobelieved that Timor-Leste could provide benefits as a bridge (connector) between 
ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (the Pacific Island Forum) in a wider cooperation 
(Timur 2013).
Civil society and grassroots levels also support the idea of friendship, especially among 
students and businesspeople. Hundreds of students from Timor-Leste have studied in 
Indonesian universities. They are the best asset of the nation in building a relationship of true 
friendship. The Indonesian state and society have also responded positively to Timorese 
students in Indonesia. They have received scholarships from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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Ministry of Indonesian National Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs, as well as 
through the universities in Indonesia. 
Unfortunately, Indonesian scholars do not have a strong interest in studying the dynamics of 
politics, regional security and diplomacy in Timor-Leste, and in particular the relation with
Indonesia,perhaps because the process seems morepolitical than natural from their 
perspective. Grassroots relationships through education can be a strong foundation for
relations between the two countries. Therefore, thisrelationship should be driven not onlyG
(government) to G (government) but will be more meaningful and sustainable if P (people) to 
P (people) relations are strengthened. P to P relations will bring a more substantial 
relationship with the support of the international community. This is part of state-building,
especially for Timor-Leste and Aceh after their war and conflict. 
There has also been strengthening of this relationship through shared culture and ethnicity on
the borders of both regions. According to Naiobe,“emotional relationships built through the 
bond of marriage between the state of East Timor and Indonesia caused some residents who 
live in the border area between the two countriesto live in peace and harmony” (Naiobe
2013).
Future Challenges
Relations between the two countries will be challenging and need to be managed for the 
benefits of both states and civil society. Historical and geographical relations between the two
countries are not easy to address. Some of the challenges include: illegal trading on the 
border, human trafficking and inter-state crimes.Border security needs serious attention from 
both countries. 
The dependence of the Government and people of Timor-Leste on Indonesia, especially the 
supply of commodities from Indonesia,means their friendly relationship is unbalanced. This 
223 
 
fact means the Timorese government has not followed upinternational recommendations on 
human rights violations committed by some military elites of the RI. Furthermore, for Timor-
Leste, Indonesia’s support is also the way to become a member of ASEAN. Since the
beginning, Indonesia has been the most serious support for Timor-Leste as a part of 
ASEAN,although up to now it has not been officially accepted as a full member, because the 
majority of ASEAN membersconsiderTimor-Leste is not ready, especially in relation to the 
2015 ASEAN free trade policies.
International human rights courts in dealing with war crimes often do not produce results in 
line with expectations. Cambodia is one example, in relation to how Pol Pot and his fellows 
were convicted. The human rights court did not meet the expectations of the people of 
Cambodia. The Cambodian people are in pain due to the freedom given tothe criminals who 
killed Cambodian people, teachers, students, traders and professionals. Now they are free 
without significant charges of human rights violations (Sok 2013).
The Cambodian experience can be a lesson for other countries and post-conflict and post-war 
regions. A process of investigation is needed to investigate truth and give space for 
reconciliation of the parties to the conflict or between perpetrators and victims. Aceh and 
Timor-Leste share the same experience of how the Indonesian military committed human 
rights violations, which is now difficult to investigate properly. In a different experience in
Africa,the testimony of the victimsto the commission is crucial to declaringhuman rights 
violations against the victims during the conflict. This is a way of healing for post-conflict 
and post-war societies (Hidayat 2011: 30–31). 
But reconciliation is not necessarily always established through the judicial process. 
Compensation that meets the sense of justice ofvictims’ families is also an alternative. 
Thepeople of Timor-Leste are challenged by this model, especially for those living in refugee 
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camps in West Timor. Healing will reduce the tension between people of Timor-Leste who 
are pro-independence and those who are pro-integration. Several clashes between Timorese 
students in Yogyakarta were caused by a sense of “injustice” among the students (Mahmud 
2013). Injustice preceived by the people of Timor-Leste, both pro-independence and pro-
integration,has become one of the main issues for the two countries to resolve immediately.
At least the political elites and the governments of both countries have a common agreement 
to build positive friendships. This agreement needs to be constantly monitored and 
implemented, especially concerning grassroots community groups (including students) who 
have direct experience of disharmony, violence and conflict especially related to the issue of 
economics and justice.
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Strengthening Friendship
Efforts to strengthen the friendship between the two countries area necessity that cannot be 
avoided through the relationships between either states or civil societies. There are some key 
factors that need serious attention from the governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia. First, 
the history of ‘embarrassing’ Indonesia about East Timor should be developed into a more 
positive energy through understanding from both countries about how they used to be a 
family and have now become neighbours who maintain good relations. Secondly, Indonesia 
as the largest Muslim country in the world and one of the few countries in Asia that has 
joined theG-20 (Islam 2011: 165)is important, especially for regional diplomacy in which 
Timor-Leste should take stronger initiative. Indonesian Muslims are moderate and tolerant.
They are potentially a driving force to develop interfaith dialogue and moderate Islam in 
Timor-Leste. Acurrent challenge is the rise of radical Muslims delivering Islamic studies in 
Timor-Leste. They are connected to Muslims in Eastern Indonesia, where religious conflicts 
have become burdens for religious and ethnic harmony.The Timorese people are also being 
encouraged to study in Indonesia through either state scholarship mechanisms or approaches 
to educational institutions in Indonesia. This could be a way of reinforcing relations between 
the two countries.
Until now, the greatest trauma of modern Indonesian history is the separation of former parts 
of Indonesia. Bhineka Tunggal Eka (Unity in Diversity) has become a political slogan that 
binds diverse ethnic, religious and cultural sectors of Indonesian society. 
Conclusion
To conclude, democratic transitions in Aceh and Timor-Leste have proceeded relatively
peacefully compared to those of other post-conflict and post-war regions such as Kenya,
Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iraq. This confirms the significance of state-building to 
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strengthen peace and development policy as a requirement of democratic peace. It is inline 
with the arguments of Mansfield and Snyder (2007) and Paris (2004) that institutionalisation 
before liberalisation is a crucial step towards permanent peace. What happened in Aceh and 
Timor-Leste with their peaceful democratic transitions supports the argument in this thesis 
that building institutions such as the rule of law, local government, political parties and civil 
society participationis required in order to build a peaceful democracy. However, incomplete 
democratisation may revert to autocracy, which threatens the peace and freedom for all 
parties to participate in the democratisation process. Mansfield and Snyder suggested that 
“reversal toward autocracy might be more peaceful than democratic transition, but more war-
prone than the absence of regime change” (Mansfield & Snyder 2007: 267).
Aceh and Timor-Leste are both consolidating democracy, with challenges remaining to be 
overcome in some sectors. Trauma from war and violent conflict, poverty, unemployment 
and historical divisions, as warned by Gusmão (2012), are among crucial agenda items in the 
future for both Aceh and Timor-Leste. The ICG (2011) reported that there were violent 
conflicts in Aceh between combatants approaching the 2012 gubernatorial election, with 
more victims than the 2006 gubernatorial election.
Yusuf has founded a new party, PNA, which is the strongest competitor to the current 
government PA. The leadership of Aceh combatants is still very influential at the grassroots 
level. Fewer attacks and killings occurred in Aceh after the 2012 election; however, it was
estimated that the violence might increase around the time of the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections if not all political parties prioritised peace over politics. In the 2014 
elections in Aceh, former combatant parties participated actively. PAwas still dominant in 
provincial and district elections. 
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In the presidential election in July 2014, Subianto, who was supported by PA, won by a 
narrow margin against Widodo. The split among former combatants in supporting the former 
commander of the Special Forces (Kopassus) impacted significantly on the loss sustained by 
Subianto, who had claimed to be able to win at least 80 percent of the vote. The sentiment
against former Kopassus operatives, who wereresponsible during the conflict for thekilling of 
Acehnese combatants, contributed to this loss. Compared to Timor-Leste, politics in Aceh 
still depend on the political relationship between Aceh and Jakarta. Aceh has to play the 
game in continuing to demand the full implementation of the Helsinki MoU as a mandate of 
the peace accord. 
It is the task and obligation of the political and community leaders of both Aceh and Timor-
Leste to take their regions towards prosperous, democratic and peaceful futures. Gusmão’s
strategy of accommodating the political leadership of former PM Alkatiri is considered by 
Aniceto Guterres, MP and head of the FRETILIN Party fraction, to be a crucial symbol of 
leadership reconciliation that will greatly impact on the grassroots level (Guterres 2013). The 
unity of political leaders in Timor-Leste is an important factor in the strengthening of 
development and peacebuilding. This is in contrast to the political reality in Aceh, where 
political frictions are contributing to the slow progress of development. The Acehenese 
people are still traumatised by threats of violence from former combatants whose 
commanders and leaders are managing governments in the provinces and districts of Aceh. 
The next chapter examines Islam, democracy and international affairs, in particular how 
Acehenese democracy and peace processes have become lessons for activists in peace studies
and diplomatic actors from other states and civil societies. These actors will deliver the 
experience of Aceh democratic consolidation to the managing of conflicts in Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Civil society is represented by Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama, which have actively engaged in conflict prevention and ending 
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violence.The chapter includes recommendations on how to develop moderate Islam in Timor-
Leste and Southeast Asia from the experience of Aceh and the world.
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Chapter 10
Democracy and Regional Peace: Lessons from Aceh 
Introduction
The Acehenese democracy and peace processes are among comprehensive lessons in regional 
and international peace-making and peacebuilding. Aceh after the peace agreement in 2005 is 
a promising special case. Tornquist said of Aceh:“the combination of democratisation, local 
parties and peace was at the core” (2013: 235). In addition, Aspinall (2009: 10) stated that 
Acehnese scholars and common people identified themselves in “endlessly repeated phrases 
like ‘Aceh is identical with Islam,’‘Islam and Aceh are two sides of the same coin,’ and 
‘Islam is the blood and bones of the Acehnese’.”Kingsbury (2010), Aspinall (2009) and 
Djumala (2013) argued that discussing Aceh democracy and peacebuilding needs an 
understanding of how Islam, nationalism, democracy and peace have operated in the process. 
Kingsbury said that combatants who are committed Muslims have adopted democracy and 
inclusiveness within the combatants’ political leadership. It can be seen in the 2006 first 
gubernatorial elections in Aceh after the Helsinki peace accord. In line with Kingsbury, 
Aspinall looked at a close relationship between Islam and nationalism in Aceh context. 
Aspinall said:
Between the 1970s and early 1990s, leaders of GAM, as well as calling for Acehnese 
independence, continued to espouse formal Islamic goals suited to the Darul Islam 
tradition. The fact that the famus ulama and Darul Islam veteran Tengku Ilyas Leube 
became minister of justice in the Aceh Merdeka cabinet was itself a sign of the 
movement’s attitutes toward shari’a. Some of the organization’s documents from this 
period suggest that it aimed to establish an ‘Islamic State of Sumatra-Aceh’. Hasan di 
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Tiro himself spoke openly in such terms to the international press(Aspinall 2009: 
199).
Aspinall’s analysis confirms how Islam is a crucial factor in understanding Aceh and 
Indonesia, including in the context of the democratic process. Islam has become part of the
identity of Aceh and Indonesian politics,although Indonesia is not an Islamic state.
Foreign Minister of the RI, R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, at the Fourth Bali Democracy Forum 
entitled ‘Consolidating Democracy in Pluralistic Society’on 7–8 November 2013, said that 
Indonesia is an influential state in the Asia-Pacific in relation to the processes of 
democratisation and peacebuilding through the Bali Democracy Forum,which is“an inclusive 
platform among states to exchange experience and best practice on building democracy. This 
has been part of regional architecture of democracy” (Natalegawa 2014). In this forum, 
President Yudhoyono described how Indonesia has met the challenge of a pluralistic society:
As a plural state, Indonesia is a reflection of Asia-Pacific diversity and plurality. For 
centuries, civilisations, races, religions and cultures have established a home in these
islands [of the Indonesian state]. Today, we are a nation with a quarter billion people, 
consisting of three hundred ethnic groups, seven hundred spoken languages, religious 
plurality spread in more than seventeen thousand islands. Our generation’s motto is 
‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity)’. We have worked very hardto build an 
inclusive and democratic nation state in a diverse society (Yudhoyono 2014).
The Bali Democracy Forum is a main element of Indonesia’s strategic role in preserving 
stability, peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa and other conflict 
regions. The Indonesian role is not only through the state, but also through civil society. 
Indonesia has taken an active part in ending wars and conficts by deploying armies and 
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polices with UN peacekeeping forces. Civil societies such as Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah also play an important role in international peace missions.
Acehenese democracy and peacebuilding have been influential in global peace. The state, 
civil societies and individuals have actively promoted the experience of Aceh peace to peace
initiatives in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. This chapter focuses on 
how the Indonesian government and civil society play a part in the mediation, reconciliation, 
peacebuilding and development of post-conflict and post-war regions from the Acehenese
transition and peace efforts to regional and the global peace. Some comparisons are made to 
peace initiatives in Timor-Leste, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand as strategic 
lessons learned for further peace studies and conflict resolution. The chapter argues that the
multitrack diplomacy lessons from Aceh’s peace process are important to overcoming 
conflicts and wars, and to strengthening democratisation and peacebuilding in post-conflict 
and post-war states and regions.Multi-track diplomacy in this context is the building of peace 
by governments, CSOs, human rights activists and peacemakers through a diplomatic
approach.
This chapter examines three aspects: the concept of multi-track diplomacy and Acehenese
democracy and peace in understanding the diplomatic approach; the peace initiatives in 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East reflected from Aceh’s lessons; and lastly, the challenges 
of the Aceh transition which are crucial to learn in order to prevent further conflicts. The final
part of the Aceh lesson is similar to the problems of post-conflict regions in Africa, where 
more violent conflicts occurred after elections and political transitions. Djuli (2014) stated
that violent threats from some former combatants were due to the complexity inside the 
combatant groups. Many of them have been left behind by development which is politically 
controlled by the combatant elites, especially in PA circles. 
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On the other hand, Ambassador Supriyadi (2014) claimed that Aceh democracy and peace are
one of the greatest results of diplomacy for Indonesia, the third largest democratic country in
the world and the largest Muslim country, which is very influential in overcoming conflicts 
and wars in other regions. Furthermore, Supriyadi (2015) said that the successful experience 
of democracy and peace in the Aceh transition has been a pivotal lessonfor the peace 
initiatives between Palestine and Israel, actively encouraged by Indonesia with the support of 
states and civil societies from East Asia and Southeast Asia. This offers a criticism of liberal 
peace theory, which argues that institutionalisation before liberalisation is crucial in order to 
construct a transition of government after conflict. In addition, Aceh peace and democracy 
arethe result of commitment by local, national and international leadership to making genuine 
peace. Yudhoyono confirmed that “I am responsible and actively lead the negotiating role 
because it was a sensitive issue. Pros and cons on the peace process. I could not delegate the 
task to other people. I have to assure parliament members, TNI, police and all Indonesian 
people that peace solution is needed. The most important is that Aceh must be part of 
Indonesia” (2014: 566). 
International Coalition for Peace
Peace efforts are managed in order to achieve a standard of peace for people living in conflict 
and war regions. The UN has a standard by which to consider whether the basic social, 
political and economicrights in of the people have been fulfilled. Alger conducted extensive 
field research at UN headquarters in New York City and Geneva, Switzerland:
With respect to human rights, under UN auspices the states assembled have drafted 
standards for human life on the planet through the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and covenants on civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights, and an array of other treaties on genocide, women’s rights, elimination of 
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racial discrimination, rights of children, rights of labor, environment, hunger and 
malnutrition, and many others (Alger 2007: 303). 
Peace efforts in the international context refer to coalitions of states to overcome conflicts 
and wars by deploying peacekeeping forces to reduce the number of victims of conflict and 
aid in transitionspost-conflict and post-war. Transitions in Timor-Leste, Aceh and Mindanao
from conflicts to peace have required the significant support of international coalitions. At 
this level, state actors are the main players in building peace and preventing violence. This is 
a track one diplomatic approach. 
Peacekeeping forces coordinated by the UN have contributed greatly to peacebuilding. This 
type of operation also strengthens international cooperation to preserve peace and stop 
violence. Timor-Leste’s political transition was secured by an international coalition. Ramos-
Horta stated that: “What the experience of Timor-Leste teaches us is that there are no short-
cuts to peace; peace is a journey that must be reached step by step, a foundation that has to be 
built bloc by bloc”.Caballero-Anthony and Haywood said that ASEAN members also 
contributed to peacekeeping in Timor-Leste in 1999 and Aceh in 2005. ASEAN rejected 
collective intervention following the violence after the referendum for independence in 
Timor-Leste. This policy was criticised in that ASEAN failed to initiate preventive 
diplomatic efforts (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood 2010). However, members of ASEAN 
such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines participated in supporting the 
Australian-led coalition, which means that “ASEAN countries were not completely passive in 
the immediate aftermath of the violence” (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood 2010: 4). 
ASEAN members also contributed to peacebuilding in Aceh. Caballero-Anthony and 
Haywood stated that five members of ASEAN, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Brunei Darussalam, following the cessation of hostilities in 2005 between the 
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GoI and GAM, participated in an EU-led civilian Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to 
implement the MoU. AMM’s duties included “overseeing the demobilisation of GAM and 
the decommissioning of its armaments, as well as monitoring the human rights situation, the 
process of legislative change, and the reintegration of GAM members” (Caballero-Anthony 
& Haywood 2010: 4). Furthermore, peace efforts were also conducted by CSOs, individuals 
and other non-state actors. 
Post-Conflict Democracy
Post-conflict and post-war states and regions have experienced democratic transition 
differently. Violence before and after elections may trigger further conflicts, especially in 
states and regions where democratic institutions are not well established. Yamano, Tanaka 
and Gitau (2010) examined the violence after the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, where 
about 1000 people were killed and over 500,000 people were displaced. The presidential
candidate who lost the election executed members of ethnic groups who had voted for the 
winning candidate. In Kenya, post-conflict elections have contributed to more violent 
conflicts. Post-conflict violence like Kenya’s legitimates the view that conducting elections 
too soon after a civil war raises significantly the threat of war happening again. 
However, Brancati and Snyder (2011: 2) argued that “early elections do not necessarily 
increase the risk of war under all circumstances. Decisive victories, demobilization, and 
peacekeeping diminish the fighting capacity of former combatants who might otherwise be 
tempted to return to war when faced with unfavorable election results”.A weak democratic 
transition in Kenya triggered more violent and bloody conflicts when it attempted to hold 
early elections after the main conflict had been resolved. Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 265) 
argued that:
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Not only does an out-sequence transition run the risk of failing to culminate in 
consolidated democracy, but it also risks triggering intense nationalism and war. This
is most likely to occur when a country’s political institutions are especially weak at 
the outset of the transition from autocracy to a partially democratic regime, and when 
elites are threatened by democratization. 
Mansfield and Snyder’s (2005) arguments are relevant to understanding the behaviour of the 
political elites in Aceh, especially those in PA who were threatened by Yusuf’s proposal as 
an independent candidate for governor in the 2012 election after PA’s elite refused to endorse
him. Ayah Banta, one of the combatants in the grassroots, led a force that attacked and killed
local commanders supporting Yusuf. They also killed some labourers from Java working for 
the national telecommunication company. This rise in violent attacks pressured Jakarta to 
postpone more than three times the schedule of the election, until after Yusuf ended his term. 
This strategy aimed to reduce political influence of Yusuf in local government, especially at
district level.
Democracy, Peace and Security 
Democratic institutions established in Aceh were a very crucial factor in supporting the 
democratic process. The initiatives of the Aceh Election Commission to encourage a peaceful 
election through the media and written agreement from all candidates helped to prevent 
further conflict provoked by attacks and intimidation by certain parties to gain political 
advantage. In addition, the Acehnese are tired of conflict and the provocation of individuals 
and parties which tends to create further conflicts that go against their economic and political 
interests. Combatants still dominate local governments;however, their authority and powers 
are decreasing, being challenged by new candidates and new parties which have gained 
significant support. The Nasdem Party is among those which have won the hearts of the 
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Acehnese. Some individuals have also won against former combatant candidates who 
claimed the ability to dominate the vote by more than 80 percent. This argument is supported 
by analysis of the 2012 and 2014 elections. 
Democratic transition in Aceh has also been influenced by a stable and peaceful democratic 
process at the national level with a high percentage of participation of the people. In general, 
they are critical of policies of the regime which go against the interest of the people. For 
example, the Democratic Party lost significant votes after the arrests of their political leaders 
by the Anti-Corruption National Commission (KPK). The Democratic Party lost a significant 
number of seats in the 2014 election in Aceh. 
Last but not least, the most crucial factor in democratic transition is the role of civil society. 
Meredith Applegate, Operations Coordinator, Indonesia, of International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES), said that:
Civil society and many other electoral stakeholders have prioritized making the 
elections in Aceh peaceful; however, sporadic instances of violence and intimidation 
have been reported in several districts, particularly during the months prior to Election 
Day. Efforts to support peaceful elections in Aceh have targeted political parties, 
journalists, the public and other electoral stakeholders (Applegate 2012).
Based on fieldwork and discussions on the 2012 gubernatorial and head of district elections 
in which former combatants were involved in local parties and other Acehnese in local and 
national parties, this thesis argues that democratic transition is supporting peacebuilding and 
peacemaking (see Chapter 6). The Independent Electoral Commission in Aceh (KIP Aceh) 
officially announced on 17 April 2012 the gubernatorial election results and confirmed the 17 
other mayoral and district election results. The PA candidate pair of Abdullah and Manaf 
won the gubernatorial election with 1,327,695 votes (55.87%), while the incumbent governor 
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Yusuf gained 694,515 votes (29.18%). Since PA’s candidate pair succeeded inobtainingover 
55 percent of the vote, well above the 30 percent requirement, a second round was not 
initiated. However, second-round elections did take place in 5 of the 17 districts that held 
local elections: Aceh Barat Daya, Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat, Langsa and Sabang. No 
candidate pair in any of these districts and cities appeared to have obtained more than 30 
percent of the vote. 
More than seventy percent of the Acehnese voted for their leaders in government and their 
representatives in parliaments, although violence occurred in some parts of the province. The 
intimidation, attacks and killings in some polling stations in Aceh suburbs went against the 
principles of democracy, freedom and justice.NGOs based in Aceh closely monitored the 
elections. Furthermore, the KIP managed a peaceful election by asking a commitment of all
candidates to prioritise peace in the democratic process. 
The process was challenged by the attacks and killings by GAM special forces headed by 
Ayah Banta. They were arrested after the election. A big question is how GAM transformed 
into a terrorist group. The thesis argues that GAM is a secular movement, but Islamic 
ideology that developed within individuals transformed them into militants and radicals.The 
court sentenced Ayah Bantato life in prison and he is now in Nusakambangan prison, where 
Indonesian terrorist group leaders and leading activists spent years in order to reduce their 
influence on other detainees in common prisons. Unfortunately, the environment of Ayah 
Banta’s detention has made him even more radical. A detainee claimed that Ayah Banta has 
declared he will follow Abu Bakar Al-Baghdady of Islamic State in Iraq and the Middle East.
Small numbers of young Acehnese have joined a terrorism training camp in Janto.
As one of the democratic institutions, KIP Aceh should work to maintain peaceful elections. 
KIP commissioners are nominated by an independent selection board made up of community 
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members, women, academics and NGOs.However, PA has taken advantage by appointing 
members of KIP Aceh for its own political interests. ZyAd (2014) claimed that:
What is exceptional about elections in Aceh is that the KIP selection process provides 
for interference by parliament. In contemporary Aceh, PA dominance in the regional 
legislature allows them to elect commissioners uncontested and the process of 
selecting commissioners is subject to unusual politicking. PA has proven 
exceptionally willing to exploit democratic political process for their own gain. 
Unsurprisingly, Aceh’s PA-dominated parliament has appointed KIP members 
favourable to party interests. As a result, in the election we have witnessed 
commissioners at the provincial and district levels who are either affiliated informally 
to the party or openly active on the party board such as in Sabang. 
This political party’s influence on the election commission affects the quality of democracy. 
The commission guarantees a democratic process which protects the rights of participants in
the elections. However, PA appointed its own people in the commission to secure the result 
of the elections. PA won 11 of 17 heads of districts and one pair of governor and vice-
governor. The protests from individuals and parties, including Yusuf and the PNA,about the 
political violence approaching the 2012 and 2014 elections have beenignored.
Democracy and International Affairs
Not many countries’ global image has undergonesuch fundamental change as Indonesia’s
within such a short time. Indonesia had been extensively observed to be one of the foremost 
contributors to Southeast Asian stability by the mid-1990s (Sukma 2012). After the political 
disorder of 1998–99, however, there rapidly developed a reason for international and regional 
apprehension. Indonesia’simage was severely affected by domestic issues: economic 
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hardship, communal and political violence, the threats of separatism and the rising problem 
of religious terrorism and fundamentalism (Sukma 2012). 
Indonesian domestic politics, especially having successfully dealt with separatist movements 
in Aceh in 2005 and ethno-religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso in 2002, became a political 
foundation for the state to involve itself more broadly in international affairs. Basri (2012:
46) concluded that “it is true that Indonesia has the potential to play an important role in the 
regional and global economics, but only if it can overcome supply-side constraints”.
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Civil Society and Peacebuilding
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia,
with members claimed to number approximately forty and thirty million respectively. They 
promote peacebuilding and democratisation in Indonesia and represent Indonesian Muslim 
diplomacy in international affairs. They undertake second-track diplomacy in disseminating 
peace around the world.van Bruinessen (2012: 125) argued that: “Muhammadiyah and NU 
enjoy strong legitimacy as representatives of broad segments of the Islamic community 
(ummah), and they have remained the largest and the strongest embodiment of civil society 
thoughout the twentieth century”.
The second World Peace Forum, held jointly by Muhammadiyah and the Cheng Ho Multi 
Culture Trust and supported by the Center for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilizations 
(CDCC), took place in Jakarta from 24 to 26 June 2008. With the strategic and timely theme, 
‘Addressing Facets of Violence: What can be Done?’, this was a momentous event for 
Indonesia and especially the host Jakarta, where violence had recently occurred in June 
2008.The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) attacked peace activists under the banner of religion 
(Islam). This attack was just one of many violent acts in the first decade of post–New Order 
Indonesia. Religious radicalism and violent jihadist groups have grown significantly, 
enjoying the new freedom and democracy in the country. What should Muhammadiyah and 
the government do after international peace dialogue?
In this forum, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, Australian Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter 
Balkenende, along with President Yudhoyono, presented messages of peace. The coalition is 
an important circle of peacebuilding, which is imperative in this period of world 
transition.The peace forum helped to revive the image of Indonesia away from being a new 
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hub of radical movements and towardsbeing a tolerant and moderate country. This image 
development is very significant not only to maintainingIndonesia’s strategy for foreign policy 
but also to reconstructing the new Indonesia, where democracy is peacefully implemented 
and people preserve multiculturalism and pluralism as the Indonesian identity, as agreed by 
the nation’s founders in 1945.
Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic CSO after Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), plays 
a very significant role in supporting peace. This is strategic for Muhammadiyah, which 
initiates peace by making coalitions with the West.EachCSO represents different segments of 
Indonesian Muslims. Muhammadiyah has established thousands of schools and dozens of 
universities, hospitals and orphanages in many big cities, and even a few banks, all of them 
well managedand organised system. On the other hand, NU is less professionally organised, 
reflecting the different social backgrounds of the rural masses and small-town businesspeople 
(van Bruinessen 2012).
In 2008, NUalso managed an international forum for peace coordinated by the International 
Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) which was also attended by world leaders.
Muhammadiyah and NUare supported by the government and the international community to 
preserve peace in the region.In this sense, Muhammadiyah and NU, as the largest CSOs in 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia, play strong roles in peacebuilding.
This international cooperation is now challenged by the rise of radicalism and terrorism, 
which some people regard as not dangerous. The killings in Maluku and Poso, and bombings 
in Indonesia and the rest of the world, have been conducted by terrorist groups grown from a
spirit of radicalism and religious militance.According to the research of LP3ES (2007), the 
numbers of radical groups involved in violent jihad are very small, not more than 1 percent of 
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the Indonesian population. Of 10,000 Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, around 200 are 
introducing a radical jihadist curriculum.Hence, the number of radical groups is much smaller 
than mainstream moderate and tolerant groups. However, it will continue to grow if the 
governments and civil societies of Indonesia and the world do not take action to develop a 
peaceful form of Islam supporting interfaith and intercultural dialogues and endorsing 
education for poor people.
LSI polling in 2007 on the commitment of Muslims to Shari’ah implementationshowed it is
understood in a variety of ways by people. When they are asked about conductingShari’ahas 
part of their daily Muslim activities, the number of voters forShari’ahimplementation is very 
significant.However, when they are asked what they think of hudud (cutting off the hands of 
criminals), the number of proponents is very low. People misunderstand the meaning of 
Shari’ah, although they have implemented it in their daily lives as part of the culture. The 
peaceful Malay culture of Islam demonstrates good assimilation between Middle Eastern 
Islam and Southeast Asian culture.Mainstream Muslim CSOs have to unite and continue 
making coalitions for preserving peace and strengthening their role in teaching moderate and 
tolerant Islam. This is one of the tasks for the participants in the World Peace Forum.
In international diplomacy representing Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah have played a
strategic role. They represent moderate Muslims and genuinely promote peace and 
reconciliation. During the negotiation between MNLF and the GPH in the 1990s, 
Abdurrahman Wahid as head of the NU central board helped the GPH and Foreign Affairs of 
the GoI in facilitating communication with Nur Misuari, the MNLF leader. Wahid has 
communicated with Musuari for a long time through their global engagement. Wahid also 
helped in overcoming conflict between Palestine and Israel. And it was during his short term 
as president of the RIthatgood relations began between Indonesia and the Middle East. Ulama
of Indonesia have shared their experience in Al Azhar and other Middle Eastern universities 
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with ulama from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. This is the power of Muslim CSOs and 
the leadership of Indonesian Muslims which have been actively involved in overcoming 
international conflict.
The experience of Indonesian Muslims in overcoming conflicts in Aceh, Maluku and Poso 
has strengthened Indonesian initiatives in peace efforts in other conflict and post-conflict 
regions. In addition, Muhammadiyah is one of the CSOs officially monitoring the processes
of peacebuilding, negotiation and implementation of the peace accord between MILF and the 
GPH.
Indonesian Muslims in Global Peace
As stated in the discussion of earlier chapters of this thesis,peace studies, negotiation and 
conflict resolution arethe concern of not only international relations (IR) study but also 
sociology, psychology, political science, law and other disciplines. At postgraduate level, the 
study of peace and conflict resolution is interdisciplinaryand incorporates various social 
sciences. However, the theory of conflict and peace was originally discussed in sociology. 
Lewis Coser is among the early sociology scholars who wrote systematically on conflict 
resolution, before other sociologists developedconflict into a more complex phenomenon. 
The discussion of peace, mediation and conflict resolution has been carried out in conjunction 
with discussion of violence, conflict and war.
Martin Shaw, reader in the sociology of politics at the International University of Hull, UK, 
has interestingly discussed criticism of sociology in relation to IR. Shaw analysed the views 
of Barry Buzan, one of the most influential realist figures in the study of IR. According to 
Shaw,Buzan in his book People, States and Fear put security in material objects such as
countries or weapons. However, Shaw stated that these materialsreturn to humans. Therefore 
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people must be the centralsecurity object. Buzan’s security concept was considered by Shaw 
a static definition (Shaw 1994).
In the study of IR, conflict resolution is related to diplomacy and international security 
cooperation. There are several actors involved in negotiation and conflict resolution, which is 
relevant to understanding how Aceh democracy and peace provide lessons in regional 
diplomacy and global peace. Weatherbee (2005) looked atthree levels of international actors 
in Southeast Asia: regional state actors, extra-regional actors and non-state actors. The 
Acehnese and Indonesians have been involved at all three levels. State and non-state actors 
have actively participated in international conflict resolution. This is based on lessons they 
learned from the democratic and peaceful transition in Aceh. Non-state actors have played 
strategic roles in Aceh and other conflict regions. They are NGOs and INGOs (Goodhand 
2006). Smoker, Davis and Munske (1990) analysedthe approaches to international conflict of
several actors, namely states, multinational corporations, international government
organisations, NGOs and INGOs.
The work of Kant provides a strong foundation for individual rights and freedom and has 
been influential in shaping Western liberal democracy. Kant considered that a“zone of peace”
can only be created between liberal (democratic) countries. His ideasstimulated the French 
Revolutions of 1776 and 1789. Kant was very critical of practical politics that do not pay 
attention to the wishesof the general public, who expect a comprehensive peace. He
published an essay entitled ‘Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ in 1795, 
almost simultaneously with the Treaty of Basel between Prussia and France in March 1795. 
For Kant, a peace treaty is only a temporary pause, not peace itself. His theory has become
the classical theory of peace. In the tradition of IR, Kant is included in the classical liberal 
group. According to Kant, to create peace, the rights of citizens should take precedence. 
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There are three related aspects of Kant’s concept ofpeace:(1) the external sovereignty of 
states and the changing nature of relations among them; (2) the internal sovereignty of states 
and the normative limitations of classical power politics; and (3) the stratification of world 
society and globalisation of dangerwhich makes it necessary for us to rethink what we mean 
by ‘peace’.
To understand the role of Indonesian Muslims in negotiation and conflict resolution needs an
understanding of the basic principles of conflict resolution, which in fact have been practised 
by Muslim leaders in various social conflicts in post–New Order Indonesia. The Muslim–
Christian peace agreements in Poso in Malino I (2001) and in Maluku in Malino II (2002) 
involvedmanyMuslim leaders of Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, and 
boarding schools, and government agencies represented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Indonesian Ulama Council. They were intense negotiations 
and communications for peace efforts in Poso and Maluku with Christian leaders. Likewise, 
the unrest in Solo (1998) and Situbondo and Tasikmalaya (1996) involved negotiation and 
communication with different ethnicities and religions, namely the Chinese community and 
Christians respectively, because the targets of the riots were shops belonging to Chinese 
businesses and also churches and Christian schools.
In negotiation and conflict resolution,the principle of persuasion was an important 
methodconducted by Muslim leaders. They become mediators who wisely used the
persuasion approach, which is more concerned with the way to peace than a threat or 
demonstration method to force others to follow the aspirations of a group. According 
Ledgerwood et al. in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, persuasion 
is an approach that can change behaviour and actions on the basis of mutual trust from 
violence to peace,while negotiation is a process that is carried out by two or more entities 
together to discuss issues that have become a source of conflict, for the benefit of all parties. 
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In practice, a cross-cultural negotiation approach often involves religion, language and 
customs in reaching the best solution, in common interest towards peace.
In many peace efforts, Indonesian Muslim leaders negotiated with leaders of different 
religions and ethnicities using a cross-cultural approach to the common interest. They used
persuasion with each community both before and after the peace agreement was negotiated.
They were mediators for the communities involved in the conflict. Traditional and religious 
leaders in the Malino II peace efforts and some agreement in Maluku reportedly used both 
persuasion and negotiation. However, Muslims argue that customary law needs renewal 
without violating the religion. This is a challenge for the old tradition, which used to be a 
means of peace but now needs transformation with a modern and contextual understanding of 
conflict resolution. In Aceh, dayah and ulama have played strategic roles, especially during 
the first peace negotiation initiated under President Wahid.
As part of the middle class, Muslim leaders play a strategic role in peace efforts. According 
to Saeed,Muslim leaders as part of Indonesia’s middle class have played a role in many 
things including interfaith dialogue, conflict resolution and gender equality. They are active 
in strengthening civil society since the New Order and occupy a strategic place in the 
resolution of conflict and social unrest. However, in Islamic studies, Indonesian Muslims 
have not become an object of discussion. Besides being geographically far away from the 
birthplace of the divine religions, also Islam’s development is in a later phase in the Middle 
East and Africa. The Islamic character in Indonesiaincorporates Islam and local tradition,
which has made Indonesian Muslims more moderate and tolerant than Muslims in the Middle 
East. This includes Aceh.
This is what makes Islamic Indonesia open and accommodating of modernisation and global
change. With the strengthening of Indonesia’s economy, it is expected that Muslim leadership 
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will emerge. Sukma said that “by defining Islam as a force for peace, tolerance and harmony,
the government has sought to articulate an image of Indonesia’s brand of Islam as a 
moderating voice between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, and within the Muslim world 
itself” (Sukma 2012: 86). President Wahid tried to take a strategic role in the Islamic world to 
open up and introduce new changes from Indonesian democracy. Initial priority was given to 
countries that were sceptical or did not know about Indonesia, among others Sudan, Yemen, 
Nigeria and other countries in the Middle East and Africa. This is how Wahid mediated some 
conflict problems in Middle Eastern, African and Asian regions. Basyar stated that rebuilding
diplomatic relations with the Middle East become strategic for the Wahid government.
During the Suharto period, Indonesia considered that diplomatic relations with the Middle 
East were not a priority. Unfortunately, controversy ensued when Wahid tried to open 
diplomatic relations with Israel.
Furthermore, Wahid revitalised relations with Timor-Leste by rebuilding a relationship with 
the Portuguese. In the terms of Smith, theforeign policy direction of the Wahid government 
was more unorthodox than those of the earlier leaders of Indonesia. He combined the power 
of religious knowledge and long experience in NU and other NGOs, as well as international 
leadership.
The leadership of Indonesian Muslims and their role in global peace can be seen in the 
initiatives of CSOs in peace efforts. van Bruinessen (2012: 135) stated: 
Indonesian efforts to mediate in international conflicts (the Southern Philippines, the 
Middle East) have been relatively modest, but at least the government has been 
positioning itself for a new international role in the Muslim arena…Indonesia’s
growing confidence is also evident in the increased charitable activity directed 
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towards Palestine, in which several Indonesian Muslims charities have been 
competing for attention.
Tibi’s idea in Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change is also interesting to 
consider in understanding the dynamics of religion in the midst of conflict and political 
transition. In line with the interpretation of Tibi, Cambodian religious leaders provide another
one of many examples of how religious leaders playstrategic roles in the development of non-
violence and peace. Appleby in The Ambivalence of the Sacred Religion, Violence and 
Reconciliationwaskeen to explain the importance of religion. Appleby also remained aware 
of the radicalism and fundamentalism that appear in religious communities, but not from 
religious roots. The trigger is the economy and politics.
Samdech Preah Maha Ghosananda, aged 68 years, is a Cambodian Buddhist monk who in 
1993 led hundreds of pastors, dozens of NGO activists and tens of thousands of people to 
support the first democratic party in Cambodia after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge. A year 
later, Ghosananda also led national reconciliation followed by hundreds of other Buddhist 
clergy. Figureslike Ghosananda are in the same position as Mother Theresa (Christian), 
Mahatma Gandhi (Hindu) and Muhammad (Islam) in conducting social liberation from all 
kinds of authoritarianism.
In Indonesia, civil society movements were developed by Islamic schools and NGOs such as 
LP3ES.They developed Islamic schools and dayahthrough research methodology and 
management. This movementproduceda new generation of graduates from Islamic boarding 
schools such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, Emha Ainun Najib and Muslim 
Abdurrahman, who strengthened the position of Islamic boarding schoolsas a strong element 
of civil society against state hegemony. Other notable figures in the conflict resolution and 
peace movement are M. Din Ahmad Syamsuddin and Syafi’i Maarif (active in interfaith 
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dialogue), Husein Muhammad (gender equality), Tuan Guru Turmudzi Badruddin (conflict 
prevention in Lombok) and theUlama Boarding School in Aceh, including Tgk. H. Ibrahim 
Bardan (Chairman of Ulama Dayah Aceh), in mediating between the GoI and GAM before 
the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005, and other traditional and religious leaders in various 
conflicts and violence in Indonesia.
Indonesian leaders have been involved in mediation, peace initiative and conflict resolution 
with states and civil societies. The Acehnese involved in peace negotiation in Helsinki have 
shared their experience in peace efforts in the southern Philippines. Djuli and Marhaban are 
among the active participants in peace initiatives and conflict resolution in Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia and African countries. They have visited conflict regions and presented their 
experience in seminars, workshops and training. Marhaban is from Aceh and now working 
for peace in the UN. Indonesian leaders have mediated between the Khmer Rouge and the 
Government of Cambodia, between Bangsamoro Muslims and the GPH, between Muslims in 
southern Thailand and the Governent of Thailand, in peace efforts between Palestine and 
Israel, and others. The GoI has also deployed peacekeeping forces to Africa, Eastern Europe, 
the Middle East and other conflict and war areas to support the UN in overcoming violence 
and restoring democracy. 
Several other figures are among the important Indonesian leaders who have mediated national 
and international conflicts.Ali Alatas was Indonesia’s foreign minister for four cabinet 
periods between 1987–1999 under Presidents Soeharto and Habibie. Alatas was born in 
Jakarta in 1932 and graduated from the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, in 1956.
From his work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Southeast Asian countries, Alatas 
was nominated by a number of Asian countries in 1996 as UN Secretary-General. At least 
two peace agreements in Cambodia (between 1988 and 1991) and the Philippines (between 
1993 and 1996) were mediated by Alatas. The first initiative was attended by representatives 
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of the warring factions in Cambodia, namely King Norodom Sihanouk Hun Sen representing 
the KhmerRouge, held in Bogor inJuly 1988 with the name Jakarta Informal Meeting. In this 
meeting, Alatas stated that “any settlement, to be just and durable should be attained through 
political means and not by force of arms”. After several meetings, a peace treaty was signed 
at the Paris International Conference on Cambodia on23 October 1991. This peace effort
involved the UN and ASEAN,as well as international organisations that participated in 
facilitating the reconciliation process.
Furthermore, to bridge the conflict between MNLF and the GPH, Alatas played an important 
role in the peace agreement between the GPH and Muslim militias. Until now MNLF 
remainscompliant with this agreement. At the request of the two conflicting sides, Alatas led 
a reconciliation process which was attended by both partiesin Bogor Palace inApril 1993. 
Alatas stated that “Negotiations require a spirit of conciliation, mutual concessions and a 
desire to achieve peace and a just solution”. The peace efforts continued the spirit of the 
Tripoli Peace Agreement in 1976 by creating broad autonomy under the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of the Philippines. After more than 70 informal meetings, nine areas were 
agreed on: autonomy; national peace; regional security forces; education; economy and 
financial system;revenues from mining and minerals; system administration; representation in 
the national government, legislative bodies and the executive, and the judiciary; and the 
introduction of shari’ah ‘ah Islam.
Unfortunately, organised militia groups were not included in the peace agreement. Among 
them were MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). MILF and ASG strengthenedtheir ranks 
with large groups of militia from various organisations and regions in Southeast Asia. 
Fatchurrohman Al Ghozi, Dulmatin and Umar Patek – three of thoseinvolved in the 2002 
Bali bombings– are among the mujahideen from Indonesia who fought with MILF and ASG. 
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Al Ghozi died in the Philippines, victim of the Philippine army after escape from prison. 
Dulmatin died after being arrestedin March 2010. Patek is now in Porong prison, East Java. 
Likewise, Muhammad Yusuf Kallahas become one of the important leaders in the peace 
process, both domestic and abroad. The peace agreements between Muslims and Christians in 
Poso in Malino I (2001) and in Maluku in Malino II (2002) cannot be separated from Kalla’s
role in mediation and reconciliation in these Muslim and Christian communities. The peace 
agreementsinfluenced the decline in clashes between two different religious communities. 
Even when he was Vice-President, Kalla tried to prevent violence following a gun battle 
between Brimob and Tanah Runtuh Poso in October 2006.With his experience of mediation,
Kalla as Vice-President accompanied President Yudhoyono after the results of the 2004 
elections and attempted to approach the leaders of GAMto integrate with the RI. Finally, after
some negotiation meetings supported and facilitated by the EU, GAM and the RIreached a 
peace agreement in 2005. This provided an opportunity for GAM leaders and members to be 
active in politics and other activities for the realisation of peace and prosperity for the people 
of Aceh. In the 2006 gubernatorial election, a GAM representative, Yusuf, managed to win 
and lead an Aceh government after almost thirty years of conflict. In the 2009 elections, 
GAM established a local party different from the general parties in Indonesia based in 
Jakarta.
Alatas’s and Kalla’s approaches representthe character of Indonesian mainstream Muslims,
who are progressive and moderate. Kalla is often represented as an NU figure fromsouth 
Sulawesi. In an NU conference in Makassar in 2010, he received a tremendous response from 
the conference participants and the NU community. His charisma and persona have become 
an important part of his activities and programsin maintaining peace and mediating 
conflicting groups from various religions, ethnicitiesand politics. These leaders wereactively 
involved in national and regional peacebuilding when they took strategic positions in the 
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Indonesian Government, Alatas as foreign minister and Kalla as vice-president.Indonesia 
hassince taken a stronger role in democratisation and peace efforts in Southeast Asian region. 
With experience in Aceh and Timor-Leste, Indonesia has proposed a strategic long-term 
program of peacekeeping forces established under ASEAN.
To help mediate in the Burmese case, Indonesia approached Myanmarto demandthat the 
Myanmar Government transform towards democracy and to ensure the Myanmar 
Government paid more respect to human rights. In his capacity as the 2010 chair of ASEAN, 
Sukma (2012: 81) said that:
Indonesia offered to mediate to end the border conflict between Thailand and 
Cambodia – the first such initiative ever undertaken by an ASEAN member 
state.Although Indonesia still abides by the association’s cardinal principles of non-
interference and concensus, one cannot fail to conclude from these major initiatives 
that its policy towards ASEAN has begun to change significantly.
Indonesia has transformed into a confident state helping its neighbours in ending conflicts 
and promoting global peace. Its new economic capacity as the tenth strongest world economy
hasleft behindan old stereotype. Former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans (2012: xvi) 
stated that: “old stereo-typical habits of thinking about Indonesia still remain depressingly 
familiar: that it is military dominated, authoritarian and undemocratic, and a hotbed of 
Islamic extremism which makes it a dangerous country”.
This stereotyping is also common in Aceh, where the practice of Islamic law,some analysts 
argued, goes against the universal principle of democracy. Criminal laws (jinayat) and other 
Islamic laws are qanun (law) which are argued by women activists as discriminatory against 
women. These regulations have also reduced the interest of international investors in
investing in Aceh. This challenge also became a concern of Governor Yusuf, who was: 
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“careful not to reject sharia as such, but he vowed to stop its repressive expansion under his 
watch, because Sharia law was created not to get humans into trouble but to form an Islamic 
community” (Miller 2010: 44). Furthermore, other GAM leader maintained that: “the 
Acehnese did not want Islamic law from outside forces, because Syariat Islam is already the 
flesh and blood of the Acehnese nation” (Miller 2010: 44). 
Islamic Shari’ah, however, is part of the identity and dignity of the Acehnese who rejected 
history through the implementation of Islamic Shari’ah. In practice, the law is intended as a
foundation of a peaceful and prosperous community with ethics that protect the community. 
However, the intention to protect the Acehenese community has become discriminatory.
Islamic Shari’ahprovides legitimacy for local governments that pretend to prioritise ethics
and morality, but are incapable of good governance. Aceh is still the poorest province in 
Sumatra and some leaders in Aceh have been charged with involvement in corrupt
government projects. In February 2014, Governor Abdullah approved aQanun Jinayat
(criminal bylaw) which stated “non-Muslim or military suspects will be tried in a sharia court 
unless the violation is covered by the Criminal Code (KUHP) or by the Military Code 
respectively” (Simanjuntak 2014). This was an amendment of the provocative 2009 Qanun 
Jinayat that introduced the sentence of stoning to death.Bantasyam, a legal observer and 
peace activist based in Aceh, questioned the subtance of the law:
It would be awkward if Islamic law was applied to non-Muslims regardless of 
whether the violation was categorized as a shari’a violation. If based on the principle 
of individuality, then Islamic law applied only to Muslims. If based on the principle of 
terrotoriality, then whoever was in Aceh would have to follow Islamic law just as it is 
implemented in Arab and sharia-based Islamic countries (Simanjuntak 2014).
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However, Islamic Shari’ahdoes not have a direct correlation with politics. Indonesian voters 
have been consistent in their choices in nationalelections; since 1999, the percentage of the 
vote gained by Islamist parties has never reached even 25 percent.
As the third largest democratic country after the Unites States and Indiaand with a good 
ecnomic foundation, Indonesia has reason to be confident in regional and global engagement 
in peace and stability due to at least four factors: “the demographic bonus provided by a 
relatively young population; Indonesia’s generous endowments of energy and commodities; 
its stable macroeconomic conditions; and its political stability” (Basri 2012: 30). During a 
meeting of G20 leaders in Pittsburgh, President Yudhoyono “proudly shared Indonesia’s
experience with far-reaching policy changes in 2005 and 2008 that raised fuel prices and 
allocated the extra funding to the poor in the form of cash transfersand health and education 
programs,”comments which informed a Pittsburgh communique that suggested countries 
“phase out and rationalize …inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targetted support 
for the poorest” (Basri 2012: 28–29).Indonesian confidence in building a stable and 
democratic country has led it in regional leadership on initiatives for peace and 
development.Indonesia hasprovided a good lesson for some countries in Southeast Asia. 
Lessons learned from post-conflict transition have been managed by states and CSOs in 
Southeast Asia. They have shared their experience in conflict resolution in each ASEAN 
member. Human rights activists, journalists and academics from Southeast Asian countries 
attended a workshop in March 2007 entitled ‘Peace Journalism in Southeast Asia’. They 
invited as a speaker a Thai general who had experience in the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
(AMM). He said that Aceh’s democratic and peaceful transition would be adopted by the 
govermnent of Thailand to solve separatist conflict in southern Thailand. 
Conclusion
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Indonesian experience in Aceh with democratic consolidation and peacebuilding has 
strengthened Indonesia to share its experience in mediation and peace efforts in Southeast 
Asia and the Middle East. Some Acehnese individuals, local governments and CSOs have 
visited conflict and post-conflict regions to help overcome conflict and share Aceh’s
experience in democratic transition. Marhaban, the only female negotiatorin Helsinki in 2005, 
assisted the GPHand MILF in mediation and negotiation, including persuading both parties to 
give more spaces to women representatives. Individuals and organisations from the
Philippines also visited Aceh to learn directly from the people how to resolve conflict and 
maintain peace. 
Individuals from the Indonesian government such as Kalla and Yudhoyono have been
actively supportive of regional and international peacebuilding. Kalla and Yudhoyono played 
strategic roles in the reconciliation process and maintaining security and peace in Aceh. They
also visited conflict and post-conflict regions to share their experience in building peace. 
Individual Acehnese and Indonesians representing non-state and state actors have also been 
involved in diplomacy for peace. Kalla was invited by the authority in Palestine to help in 
mediating the conflict between Palestine and Israel. TheGoI,in particular the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, managed a program to mediate peace between Palestine and Israel by giving 
training and building the capacity for the people of Palestine. The GoI also engaged with 
Myanmar to open the state and welcome the international community for the development of 
Cambodia. 
In addition, NU and Muhammadiyah, the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia,
have played strategic roles in preserving peace in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and the Middle 
East. Some individuals in these organisations have participated in mediation between 
Muslims from the southern Philippines and the GPHs. Muhammadiyah is an official 
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organisation promoting peace in the Middle East.Similarly, NU played a strategic role in 
mediation in Palestine. 
The challenge for peace initiatives is how democratic institutions develop as a requirement 
before liberalisation. Paris (2007) said that strong institutions lead to stable peacebuilding. In
other words, weak institutions of democracy lead to the foundation of new authoritarian
regimes. Strong partnerships between states and civil society strengthen peacebuilding and 
post-conflict development towards permanent peace and prosperity, as expected by the 
Acehnese when they voted in the 2012 and 2014 elections. Aceh peacebuilding has worked
more successfully than the Mindanao peacebuilding process due to different levels of 
institutional and leadership support. In Indonesia, national leaders, the central government 
and civil society groups supportedthe Aceh peace and democratic process. Paris’s (2007: 
188) argument that “peacebuilders have sponsored elections in war-shattered states as a 
means of facilitating the peaceful management of societal conflicts through competition at the 
ballot box, rather than through combat on the battlefield” is relevant to understanding 
peaceful democratisation in Aceh from the 2006 to 2014 elections, participated in voluntarily 
by most of the Acehnese population. 
On the other hand, national leaders in the Philippines are still doubtful of permanent peace 
and democratisation in the southern Philippines. Moreover, fragmentation of religious and 
ethnic groups in Mindanao have challenged the prospectsfor peace and democracy in the 
region. Peace talks in the southern Philippines have to involve wider groups. Montiel, de 
Guzman and Macapagal highlight “the power of social representations to nuance meaning-
making within bigger social groups who are involved in peace talks. The conventional way of 
analysing conflict and peacemaking is through borader categories may add to a deeper 
understanding of a territorial peace process”(Montiel, de Guzman & Macapagal 2012: 45).In 
addition, armed competition among ethnic and religious groups for the sake of group defence 
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threaten the ongoing peace and democratic initiatives in the region. However, lessons gained 
from Aceh peace and democracy are crucial to the people of the southern Philippines 
forending their conflict and uniting for more permanent peace.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion:Lessons from Aceh Democracy and Peace
Introduction
To conclude the thesis, this chapter argues that Aceh has successfully gained a strong 
foundation for the continuance of peace; this is reflected in the dynamics of local democracy,
with a high percentage of participation of individuals and local and national parties, an
increase in economic growth and development, and the support of international states and 
CSOs. The foundation of democracy and peace in Aceh post-conflict is a strategic instrument 
for Indonesia, as a member of ASEAN, to inspire peace efforts in Southeast Asia and other 
areas of the world. In addition, this thesis has compared Aceh post-conflict to other post-
conflict regions in Southeast Asia, in particular Timor-Leste and the southern Philippines, in 
order to highlight the processes by which peace can be achieved and maintained.
Individuals and organisations from these regions have learned lessons and mutually 
supported peace implementation by visiting and meeting in their own countries;
additionally,some events have been officially managed by multilateral organisations such as 
the UN, the EU and ASEAN, as well as states, universities and centres of peace studies. This 
is how peace in one state can influence the overcoming of conflict within that state, as well as
other conflicts in other states. This chapter also concludes thatthe reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of Aceh after multiple disasters – the earthquake, tsunami and protracted 
conflict – has allowed post-conflict Aceh to lay a strategic foundation for Indonesia, as a 
member of ASEAN, to project Aceh’sexperience and achievement of peace to regional and 
international peace efforts. 
As stated by Martti Ahtisaari (2006),thepeace accord inAceh markeda great result – the 
ending of almost thirty years of separatist conflict hasprovided a lesson for peace activists 
259 
 
from all over the world. Some individuals and groups from conflicting regions in Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and other parts of the world have visited Aceh to 
gain lessons directly from local political parties, NGOs and the local government on how to 
preserve peace and development. Gusmão said: “I cannot miss this opportunity to salute the 
Indonesian government for the creative and responsible way in which it has conducted the 
Aceh stabilization process (I consider it to be a triumph of Peace), a fruit of the commitment 
by the Indonesian leaders and civil society” (Gusmão 2012: 154). 
On the other hand, Aceh government officers, human right activists, MPs and GAM and 
Indonesian negotiators have been invited to international peace conferences, workshops and
seminars, and to post-conflict states and regions, to share their peace experience and learn 
from others in order to join together to make world peace. Djuli (2013) and Yusuf (2012), 
both GAM negotiators, said that they have been invited by governments and civil society 
groups from the Philippines, Thailand and Sri Lanka to share their peace negotiation and 
implementation strategies,which are important for overcoming conflicts in these regions. 
Some Acehnese have also visited Timor-Leste to learn about democratic transition and 
themechanism of thetruth and reconciliation commission between Timor-Leste and the RI
after independence. Timor-Leste finally agreed to build the Commission ofTruth and 
Friendship (the CTF) as a result of the political negotiation between both countries.This was
a shift from an international panel to a bilateral commission, which was seen by some 
analysts as a lack of response in relation to justice for victims of human rights abuses by the 
Indonesian army before the gaining of independenceby Timor-Leste.Among the problems 
highlighted by the CTF is a perspective on truth based only on the considerations of senior 
officials and the lack of the victims’ perspectives in the testimony in the cases being 
investigated. Hirst, program associate with the International Center for Transitional Justice in 
Timor-Leste, said:“a fundamental flaw in the public hearing processes has been the identity 
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of the persons providing testimony. This problem was caused partly by the Commission’s
focus on eliciting testimony mainly fromaccused perpetrators and senior officials rather than 
victims”(Hirst 2008: 24). Hirst’s concern as to the lack of victims’ perspectivesbrings into 
question the level of justice able to be achieved. Additionally, the CTF is strongly influenced 
by the need Timor-Leste has for bilateral relations; it is a young country trying to establish 
mutual relations with Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries by proposing to become
a member of ASEAN. This proposal is supported strongly by the Indonesian government. 
Aceh after a decade of the peace accord is still leftwith some problems and challenges,
including the importance of establishing a truth and justice commission that can reduce the 
burden of its violent past in order to develop the economy and foster political stability in the 
future. Subianto, former commander of the Indonesian special forces (Kopassus), confirmed 
that Kopassus members attacked Aceh during the conflict and were responsiblefor human 
rights abuses. He hoped for forgiveness for Kopassus members and promised to support 
economic development in Aceh.
Furthermore, democratic institutions established after the Helsinki peace accord are expected 
to strengthen the peace initiative and raise morale, which will aid development in post-
tsunami and post-conflict Aceh. In addition, peace initiatives in Aceh have positively affected 
security and peace in the Southeast Asian region. The spirit of democracy and peace in Aceh 
has beenadopted by the Philippines to resolve conflicts between the GPH and MILF. In this 
process, Acehnese have been actively involved in the peace negotiations and implementation 
in Mindanao. Muslims from Mindanao have also visited Aceh to learn directly from local 
parties and CSOs. 
CSOs are pivotal groups in post-conflict regions like Aceh. They are involved in initiatives 
forpeacebuilding and coordinating with state bodies and society generally. They were 
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responsible for checking the proper practice of democracy duringthe elections conducted in 
2012 and 2014, and building awareness across society of the importance of
choosingcandidates forlocal governments and MPswho could best ensure benefits for 
Acehnese society. Today, they are also critical ofparties involvedin political violence. 
However, their balanced approach is not always followed by a commitment fromdemocratic 
institutions such aspolice and political parties to manage local politics for the building of 
peace in Aceh. 
Lessons from post-conflict Aceh have been viewed from four aspects. Democracy as a 
pivotal instrument of peace is the first lesson, based on the two elections in 2012 and 2014
with a high percentage of Acehnese participation. However, intimidation, violent attacks and 
killings during the elections threatened the process of democratisation. 
A second lesson is the regional autonomy of Aceh, in particular how it affects peace 
initiatives and relations between the local and central power structures – Aceh and Jakarta. 
The Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) number 11/2006,which interprets the Helsinki peace 
accord, is viewed by some Acehnese as reducing their rights as agreed to in the accord;
however, it is much stronger than the regional autonomy lawsenacted in Aceh in 1999 and 
2001. LoGA (2006) has empowered Aceh to manage its local resources with good financial 
support from revenues yielded by energy sharing. This model has strengthened the role of 
former combatants and other Acehnese to manage local government and development for the 
prosperity of Aceh. The number of poor Acehnese has also decreased significantly. However, 
corruption and mismanagement in local government have challenged the effectiveness of the 
regional autonomy policy for the prosperity of all Acehnese. 
In addition, the critical role of international states and CSOs in post-conflict Acehnese
democracy and development is a crucial lesson to learn. In international relations theory – in 
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both realist and liberalist philosophies – the international community is strategic in peace 
inititiatives, from the mediation process to the implementation of peace accords. The 
continued support of international states and NGOs will always be needed if the Acehnese are 
going to be able to continue their contribution to strengthening development and peace in 
Aceh and the surrounding region. Some multinational companies have attempted to invest in 
Aceh. However, the threats to security and stability have prevented them from seriously 
committingto ongoing investment, even though local government has guaranteed the security 
of the post-conflict province. Former combatants in North Aceh and East Aceh are still 
threatening local government. This is part of the challengeof post-conflict regions where 
former paramilitary groups potentially become perpetrators. Law and order from government 
is crucial to make the peace transition work well and gradually. Lastly, a further strategic 
lesson from Aceh is the effect of peace, stability and development in Aceh from regional and 
international peace efforts.
Before leaving the subject of peaceful democratic transition in Aceh, it is important to look at 
theoretical debates on Aceh post-conflict from international relations to peace studies. 
Realism and liberalism have dominated the debates of this thesis. In realism, the national 
interest of Indonesia in terms of negotiation and peace accord implementation, and the non-
interference policy of ASEAN are obvious. The criticism of realists in relation to the failed 
peacekeeping mission in post-conflict Iraq is important to understand in the context of 
theneed for an inclusive approach through the open participation of all parties; it is only 
through a truly democratic and peaceful transition to a new government by direct election,
orpower-sharing among commanders and local leaders,that a post-conflict region can move 
towards permanent peace. Therefore, a liberalist approach suits the transformation of a post-
conflict society, in particular a democratic peace or liberal peace approach.An alternative is a
peace approach operating as a new mechanism in the UN to successfully overcomeproblems 
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of post-conflict and post-war security and political transition. Finally, multilateralism is an 
effective approach in international relations to help post-conflict transition. It is discussed in 
the final section of this chapter. 
Democracy and Peacebuilding
The findings of the thesis are consistent with the arguments of liberal peacebuilding, a 
dominant approach to peacebuilding from the 1990s. Liberal peacebuilding is based on the 
idea that “democratisation and liberalisation of the economy are integral to building 
sustainable peace” and “democracy is the key to peace both within and between states”
(Dibley 2014:66). In this process, negotiation and diplomacy are more prioritised than war 
and violence, which gives a chance for conflicting parties to meet and find the best solution 
for them. 
In 2003–04, hopes for peace in Aceh were considered close to ruined due to the 
unwillingness on the part of the Indonesian government and GAM to consistently use a 
diplomatic approach instead of one based on security interests and militarism. The Indonesian 
government lost patience with the dialogue and put its trust in military solutions. Similarly, 
GAM leaders retained their struggle for an independent state. They opposed the regional 
autonomy status established by the central government in 1999 and 2001 as a strategy to 
overcome separatist violence in Aceh (Aspinall 2013). 
Fortunately, peace negotiations were recommenced in early 2005 with a keen response from 
both the government of Indonesia and GAM; they agreed to open an inclusive dialogue to 
end the conflict and to find the best peaceful resolutionthat would be beneficial to all parties 
(Kingsbury 2006; Awaludin 2009; Aspinall 2013). In this process, international supportwas a
crucial factor following the earthquake and tsunami and it was hopedthat international states 
and CSOs would be able to peacefully and comprehensively assist in the reconstruction and 
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rehabilitation of Aceh after the natural disaster. The negotiation worked very well due to the 
open-minded and inclusive approach of the negotiating members,who listened to each 
proposal and warmly agreed to the solution for ending the separatist conflct. Aspinall argues
that “most remarkably, GAM had abandoned its cherished goal of independence. The Aceh 
case shows that unpredicted events, shifts in the balance-of-power between the warring 
parties and the dynamics around the negotiating table can lead to a dramatic and lasting 
breakthrough” (Aspinall 2013: 64). 
In general, the thesis argues that democracy has worked constitutionally with a high 
percentage of participation of the Acehnese – above seventy per cent on average in both 2012 
local elections and 2014 national elections. After the elections, political consolidation worked
peacefully. Yusuf competed with Manaf in the 2012 electionsand attempted to construct a 
coalition for the future development of Aceh. They arranged various meetings coordinated by 
former GAM elites. The working ofdemocracy in Aceh is still considered a politicalritual 
regulated by the government; that is, it still operates at the level of going through the 
motions.However, the quality of democracy is expected to rise.Analystshave named this 
‘procedural democracy’ or ‘electoral democracy’, in which people participate in politics 
based on the procedure managed by an elections commission, with some weaknesses 
challengingthe quality of democracy. In ‘classic democracy’, the separation of power among 
the legislature, judiciary and executive as a trias politica is a model of governance of states
and designed to control fair and free politics. Government is checked by parliament. Law and 
order are managed by a judiciary system in which police are involved. Without such a 
democratic process, the system of checks and balances did not work properly in post-conflict 
Aceh.
Institutions that in classic democracy are expected to strengthen the foundations of 
democracy are weakened by the system presently operating in Aceh. Among the strategic 
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institutions is thepolice force, which has, as a main duty,the securing ofthe process of 
elections; additionally, theElection Commission (KIP) facilitates all the mechanisms of 
elections and the Election Monitoring Committee (Panwas) monitors the process of elections. 
The democratic process did not work properly in Aceh due to the tendency of institutions like 
the police, KIP and Panwas to support the dominant political party –Party Aceh.
A coalition of Acehnese NGOs monitored the 2012 elections and confirmed that PA had 
intimidated the voters, in particular, in PA’s strongholds in North Aceh, East Aceh, Pidie, 
Pidie Jaya, Aceh Besar and other districts. Witness reports made to Panwas regarding
intimidation were ignored. In addition, the police did not effectively respond to violent 
attacks related to the elections, including some killings. The number of violentincidents that 
occurred during the local election became a priority concern for the government and civil 
society, especially in terms ofsearching for a motive for thepolitical violence. Ayah Banta, 
who led the GAMspecial force,confessed before the criminal court in Jakarta that his group 
had killed some targets aspart of an expression of disappointment inthe leadership of 
Governor Yusuf. He claimed that Yusuf did not support former combatantsproportionally,
especially with regard to their basic needs. Their dependence onthe logistics facilitated by the 
Acehnese in rural villages during the conflict continued after the peace accord. Now they 
expected continuous financial support from the local government. Yusuf(2012) responded to 
this claim by stating that he had given special attention and provisions to combatants and 
their families, including Ayah Banta’s group. 
Ayah Banta and some combatants who were involved in political violence are part of the 
ongoing challenge facingpost-conflict Aceh, where the full reintegration of combatants has, 
according to Djuli(2014), largelyfailed.However, Djuli exaggerated his argument, not looking
at some of the underlying factors acting against successful reintegration.Limited funds have 
been provided to facilitate the reestablishment of combatants into their new lives since 
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August 2005, after the peace accord was signed in Helsinki. Djuli argued that the 
reintegration of combatants hasfailed due to the high level of violence associated with former 
combatants. However, most former combatants atthe grassroots believe they have contributed 
to the development of Aceh by serious involvement in reintegration programs, like farming 
and fishing, based on fieldwork in a farming area in Kabupaten Bireuen in January 2012. The 
funds provided by local government were allocated toformer combatants dedicated to the 
rehabilitation of empty farming landformerly managed by Javanese transmigrants who leftthe 
land after some attacks by GAM during the conflict.A local combatant commander who 
coordinated the farming complained that some of the combatants who had agreed to join the 
farming rehabilitation program from scratch finally left the area. Some of them did not have 
enough patience foragriculture and moved to work in other businesses. 
However, in general, combatants who did not graduate from elementary school feel that it is 
hard to gain a good job. They have to continue to a higher level of education,at least up to 
high school; this initiativehasbeen facilitated by local government. A combatant who, 
subsidised by local government,had just graduated from high school said that soon after 
graduation, he successfully applied fora position in the 2012 election Panwas at the sub-
district level (kecamatan). Now, he has positioned himself to monitor the elections and triesto 
be neutral towardsall parties, even though personally he voted for PA. He plansto continue 
his study towards anundergraduate degree in Bireuen tofurther his opportunity to win
available jobs. 
Djuli (2013) confirmed that capacity building for former combatants is a must in order to 
transform them from a paramilitary mentality. Muksalmina alias Irwansyah, a local 
commander of combatants in Aceh Besar and now executive chairman of PNA, has enrolled 
inan undergraduate degree at Syiah Kuala University. He said that learning never takes 
account of age. Although he is now chairman of a local party and manages a good business, 
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his commitment to study for hisundergraduate degree will not only transform himself, but 
will also positively affect other combatants in lower ranks to have highermotivation to learn,
formally or informally. 
Like Muksalmina, Teungku Jamaica has continued his undergraduate degree in English at 
Syiah Kuala University. Jamaica is a former spokesperson of GAM in Pasee and assisted 
Vice-Governor Manaf.Another local commander whocompleteda year of coursework on 
politics and peace at a human rights NGO based in Lhokseumawe said that he had learned 
how to respect other arguments. This is the way of co-existence and peacebuilding, by 
sharing ideas and thoughts coming fromdifferent perspectives. As a combatant, he had to pay 
respect to others, including former combatants. 
Capacity building and education have started to transform combatants to become more 
inclusive and welcoming towardsother Acehnese who do not have combatant experience. The 
foundation of PNA in 2012 was intended to establish an inclusive local political party which 
could accommodate academics, human rights activists and combatants. An academic 
involved in the foundation of the party said that it was a positive effort to combine 
combatants and non-combatants in building local political partieswhich will eventually result 
in greater open-mindednessamong Acehnese and allow them to work together for the future 
of peace and prosperity through a political party (Mardatillah 2012). This will reduce the 
claim that the current peace has been initiated only by combatants. In the electoral 
campaignsin 2012 and 2014, it was stated that the current peace is the result of political 
initiatives of combatants to end the conflict and their commitment to reintegrate in the RI; in
return, former combatants managing areas of local government prioritise development policy 
for combatants. 
Regional Autonomy
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The current dynamics of post-conflict politics and regional autonomy in Aceh are reflected in 
the history of Aceh, a province which has experienced political violence for almost 
threedecades. Intimidation, attacks and killings approaching the 2012 elections influenced 
itspolitical structure. After a few postponements of the elections, PA registered its candidates 
forgovernor and vice-governor – Abdullah and Manaf, respectively – to run for the election
and they were successful in winning the election. Yusuf, the incumbent, gained second place.
Political violence targeted individuals and political groups opposing PA. The violence 
threatened the democracy which hadbeen developed followingthe first election in 2006, when 
former combatants also won. Kingsbury (2006, 2010) argued that democratisationinside 
GAM contributed to the development of democracy and peace in Aceh.The democratisation 
also transformed former combatants from paramilitary to political entities. In addition, CSOs
developed by some elites of combatants facilitated parliamentarycandidates. The Aceh Peace 
and Democracy School (SPDA) headed by Nur Djuli and Shadia Marhaban, both GAM 
negotiators in Helsinki, successfully transformed former combatants to involve themselves in 
local politics and attempt to preserve peace in Aceh.
In addition, the communication between Aceh and Jakarta needs to be reconstructed for 
strengthening democracy, peace and economic development in Aceh. The revenues 
fromnatural resources have to be managed more effectively to fairly distribute them to all 
Acehnese. Currently, local government tends to manage the funds for some regions thatwere
ignored in the development program during the New Order–that is, Central Aceh, West Aceh 
and South Aceh. For Central Aceh, where local elites initiated two new provinces of ALAS 
and ABAS, special attention from local government is received in the form of more funds for 
the physical development of the region. The road construction in the region is expected to 
increaseeconomic development, especially in areas of agriculture such as coffee beans and 
crude palm oil,which are popularly exported overseas.
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Regional Peace
Multilateralism is an effective approach for overcoming conflict and supporting post-conflict 
transition. It involves coalitions among states to stop the conflict and support the economic 
and poitical transition. The recovery of Aceh post-tsunami and conflict was greatly supported 
by a multilateral coalition of international organisations and international states whichpaid 
great attention to peace and development in Aceh. The EU and ASEAN were involved in the 
monitoring of the peace implementation. Other states and organisations also supported 
capacity building for local government and parliamentary members, as well as education,in 
post-earthquake and post-tsunami Aceh. Their contribution is expected to continue to ensure 
that the process of democracy and peace works well. Deadlocksin negotiations between local 
and central governmentshavehappened from time to time and the EU continueshelpingto 
mediate through Ahtisaari’s organisation. 
Currently, the most pressing aspect is to what extent the Aceh peace process has been 
adoptedby the Philippines to overcome separatist conflicts in Mindanao. MILF adopted the 
peace negotiation strategies of GAM and GoI, and they keep learning from Aceh as tohow to 
establish local parties, DDR and the implementation of peace. The threats of violence in 
Mindanao are still acutedue to the complexity of paramilitary organisations operating in the 
south. Marhaban, an Acehnese woman and GAM negotiator, represented Aceh inthe 
UNregardingpost-conflict transition, facilitated by the negotiating members. She encouraged 
the Philippines to involve Muslim women asGPH and MILF negotiators. This is one of the 
contributions of peace in Aceh to managing successful peace initiatives in the southern 
Philippines. 
A furtherlessonfrom the achievement of peace in Aceh ishow it can build Indonesia’s image 
and capacity to take a stronger part in international affairs, especially in overcoming
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international conflicts.TheIndonesian government canpromote the success story of peace in 
Aceh for regional and international peace initiatives, including in Sri Lanka and Palestine. 
Indonesia has stepped further forwards in mediating peace and building capacity for post-
conflict states. To overcome conflicts such as that of the Palestine–Israeli deadlock, Indonesia 
has tried to mediate them. Indonesia, in its capacity as co-chair with South Africa of New 
Asian African Strategic Partnership, has coordinated programs of capacity building with 
member countries of ASEAN and Africa such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, South 
Korea, Turkey, Morocco, Nigeria and Algeria , as well as with Palestinian state officials. The 
latter was based on several MoUsbetween Indonesia and Palestine formed in October 2007 
on capacity building and training programs organised for Palestinians in Indonesia (Asia 
Pulse 2010). Indonesian leadership in peacebuilding in the Middle East peace process and the 
development of Palestine has continued throughits becoming a host for the Second 
Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestine Development 
(CEAPAD II) in Jakarta in March 2014, attended by ministers and high-ranking officials 
from countries in East Asia and Palestine. At the end of conference, the participants made a 
joint statement of ‘East Asian Countries Partnership for Palestine’, stating that:
We highlighted the statementof the President of the Republic of Indonesia to continue 
Indonesia’s support for Palestine National Development, and the struggle to be a 
sovereign country, as well as a full member of the United Nations. This conference 
aims to renew the continuous commitment to support Palestine and to ensure the 
Palestinians are capable of providing essential services to their people (CEAPAD II, 1 
March 2014).
Ambassador Supriyadi (2014) argued that Indonesian capacity in overcoming conflicts within 
the states of Aceh, Maluku, Poso and Kalimantan, and Indonesia’s active role in mediating 
between MILF and the GPH and the conflict in Cambodia has strengtheneditsimagearound 
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the world. Indonesian leadership in mediating the Palestine–Israel conflict by building the 
capacity of Palestinian officials, Supriyadi added, was strategic for peace efforts in the 
Middle East.An example of this is Kalla’s visit to Palestine in April 2010, when he shared his 
role in the peacebuilding of Aceh; it is expected that similar initiatives will be adopted in the 
future by the authorities in Palestine and Israel.The experience of GAM and Indonesian 
negotiators in Helsinki in August 2005has had the effect of thembecoming actively involved
in peace negotiation and peace efforts in other part of the world experiencing protracted 
violence and conflict. Thus, the role that Aceh and Indonesia can play on the world stage in 
terms of peace negotiation is significant and worthy of support, both internally and in the 
wider world. 
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